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i
AbstractDefault inheritance reasoning is a propositional approach to nonmonotonic rea-soning designed to model reasoning with natural language generics. Inheritancereasoners model sets of natural language generics as directed acyclic graphs, andinference corresponds to the specication of paths through those networks. Aproliferation of inheritance proof theories exist in the literature along with ex-tensive debate about the most reasonable way to construct inferences, based onintuitions about interpretations of particular inheritance networks. There has notbeen an accepted semantics for inheritance which unies the set of possible prooftheories, which would help identify truly ill-motivated proof theories. This thesisattempts to clarify the inheritance literature in the three ways indicated in thetitle: psychological plausibility, proof theory and semantics. The thesis intendsto displace debate about the best inferences to draw about a network from logi-cians' introspections to empirical investigation of how people respond to sets ofdefaults. The third chapter investigates a range of assumptions made within theliterature on default inheritance reasoning and additionally attempts to arbitrateamong conicting inheritance reasoners based on the best t with empirical data.This empirical research is among the rst studies which have attempted to informinheritance proof theory with clues about the way people reason. The secondand fourth chapters of the thesis contribute to inheritance proof theory by iden-tifying complexity results that have been misleading, and by dening some newinheritance systems based in part by the observations made in analyzing the dataaccumulated in experiments reported in Chapter Three. The main contribution ofthe proof theoretic chapters is the presentation of a set of denitions for a rangeof inheritance reasoners within a well dened family of path-based systems. Itis shown how the reasoners relate to each other in terms of both the conclusionsreached as well as in indicating the changes to the denitions required to obtainthe appropriate mutations. Implementations are supplied for a number of thesesystems. The fth chapter uses this parameterization of inheritance proof theoryin providing a unied semantics using channel theory, a new mathematical frame-work designed to model natural regularities and information ow. The essentialmodeling tool supplied by channel theory is the information channel, an object inthe universe that enables information ow and which stands for regularities. Thesemantics for inheritance uses information channels as the interpretation of inher-itance links. Inferences, corresponding to paths through the inheritance networks,are interpreted by composite channels. Thus, various reasoning strategies have anatural interpretation in corresponding restrictions on the putative serial compo-sition of channels. This is the rst unied semantics for a family of path-basedinheritance reasoners. The thesis concludes by pointing out the various ways inwhich this work can be extended.
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Chapter 1Introduction
1.1 Defeasible InferenceThis thesis is about the combination of facts that birds y, that penguins arebirds, that penguins do not y, and that people are not in the least bothered bythis state of aairs. However, since the workings of most computer systems arebased on classical two-valued logics, this presents a dilemma if they are to be usedto reason like or about people. The classical rst order representation of thesestatements is given in (1.1).8x; bird(x)  ier(x)8x; penguin(x)  bird(x)8x; penguin(x)  : ier(x)(1.1)On their own, those sentences are a bit alarming given the implied contradiction,but in a rst order system they lead only to the conclusion that penguins do notexist. However, given an additional fact as in (1.2) there is a contradiction thatcannot be explained away. In a classical system a contradiction is fatal, sincealthough the system becomes instantly decidable (and in fact, with constant timecomplexity in proving any statement true or false), the system actually becomes
1
Introduction 2useless since any sentence at all is thus trivially provable.8x; bird(x)  ier(x)8x; penguin(x)  bird(x)8x; penguin(x)  : ier(x)9Opus; penguin(Opus)) ?) 9Elvis)::̂) :::
(1.2)
It is dicult to patch rst order logic to cope with the acquisition of knowledgethat is not compatible with what is already known.8x; bird(x)  ier(x)8x; penguin(x)  bird(x)9x; penguin(x)(1.3)If (1.3) represents what is known at some particular time, and this is subsequentlyaugmented by the fact that 8x; penguin(x)  : ier(x), then at the very leastsome meta-system is required to examine each known fact and modify the setuntil a stable state is reached again as in the consistent rst order representationin (1.4). For any nontrivial domain, this will clearly be quite a complex processsince there are so many individual exceptions.8x; bird(x) ^ : penguin(x)  ier(x)8x; penguin(x)  bird(x)8x; penguin(x)  : ier(x)9x; penguin(x)(1.4)Of course, it is possible to abstract over exceptions by dening classes of predicatesfor each of them (as in \birds which are not known to not y, y"). However, thisjust yields a more aesthetic representation of each fact since antecedents do nothave to list each individual sort of exception; it remains as complex to performan update to the set of known facts (for a survey of meta-logical approaches, see
Introduction 3Genesereth & Nilsson, 1988).8x; bird(x) ^ : abnormal1(x)  ier(x)8x; penguin(x)  abnormal1(x)8x; ostrich(x)  abnormal1(x)8x; penguin(x)  bird(x)8x; penguin(x)  : ier(x)9x; penguin(x)(1.5)An alternative approach is to adopt a modal logic which adds an operator Cwhich performs a consistency check over the entire corpus of known facts. Thus,(1.6) also means, \birds which are not known to not y, y", but achieves thatin a more concise fashion than listing exceptions directly or through exceptionpredicates; however, it is at the expense of computing logical closure of the entireknowledge base.8x; bird(x) ^ C( ier(x))  ier(x)(1.6)A related approach which does not require axiomatization of C is supplied byReiter's default logic (Reiter, 1980; Reiter & Criscuolo, 1983) which relocates theconsistency check to special-purpose inference rules that supplement the usual rstorder set. The rule in (1.7) is glossed, \if it is known for some x that it is a bird,and if it is consistent to assume that ies, then it can be concluded that it ies."bird(x): ier(x)ier(x)(1.7)Default logic is a quite general framework, but is also undecidable.The approach to dealing with defeasible inference that is most compatible withthe systems that are the central focus of this thesis is conditional logic (Boutilier,1989; Delgrande, 1988, 1990; Cavedon, 1995). Conditional logics augment classi-cal systems with an additional implication relation which essentially means \typ-ically". This approach will be described in more detail in Chapter Two of thisthesis, but in quick gloss, advantage is taken of a conditional operator in additionto material implication, such that (1.8) means \birds typically y." In terms ofthe possible worlds semantics underneath, it actually means \In the most normalworlds, if x is a bird then it ies."bird(x)) ier(x)(1.8)
Introduction 4The reason for compatibility is just the fact that `typicality' is made a primitivein the representation language. This is essentially what default inheritance rea-soning provides as well, but inheritance reasoning is in a propositional setting.Another family of approaches to default reasoning are based on statistical inter-pretations of typicality (Bacchus, 1989; Pearl, 1987, 1988); however, I omit thosefrom consideration here.1.2 Inheritance ReasoningDefault path-based inheritance reasoning is basically a propositional family oflogics whose syntax is usually given in graphical form. Typicality is representedin the language with default links as in (1.9).bird  ! flier(1.9)Links connect both types and individuals (1.10). Chains of links are called paths.Individuals can occur only as the rst node of a path. Links may be positive ornegative, and a negative link can occur only as the last link in a path (a negativepath is one whose last link is negative).Jonathon  ! bird  ! flier(1.10)The essential terminology associated with inheritance reasoning will be presentedin Chapter Two and formalized in Chapter Four of this thesis. Conclusions sup-ported by an acyclic network composed of inheritance links correspond to pathspermitted within the network. An advantage of inheritance reasoning is that in-ference can be polynomial (Horty, Thomason, & Touretzky, 1990).1 The specicfamily of reasoners considered in this thesis are those dened by (Touretzky, 1986;Touretzky, Horty, & Thomason, 1987; Horty & Thomason, 1988; Horty et al.,1990).Proof theoretic issues ensue from the fact that sets of defaults encoded in anetwork can contain conicting paths, as the example used so far already suggests(see Figure 1.1 for the corresponding inheritance network). Because inheritance1Niemela and Rintanen (1994) present results demonstrating that certain restrictions on theordering of information in knowledge bases can oer tractability to systems like default logic aswell.
Introduction 5
flierbird  Opus penguinFigure 1.1: Opus Doesn't Flynetworks are directed acyclic graphs, they do naturally encode hierarchical infor-mation which can be used to arbitrate among conicting paths, the `most specic'path taking priority when such a judgement can be made. An obvious metric ofspecicity is path length, hence the denition of shortest-path reasoners. However,Touretzky (1986) noticed that shortest path reasoners are not stable in reachingthe same conclusions about some networks and the same networks with links addedcorresponding to conclusions that were available in the original.Denition 1 (stability) If   is an inheritance network and ` is the permissionrelation for some reasoner R, R is stable i when   `  and   ` 0 then   [f()g ` 0, where  is just the link corresponding to the conclusion sanctionedby .So, for example, since the network depicted in Figure 1.1 permits a path fromOpus to bird, it should be possible to add a corresponding link to the networkas in Figure 1.2. If a reasoner operating over the network is stable, then the
flierbird  Opus penguin
Figure 1.2: Opus Still Doesn't Fly, Or Maybe?same conclusions will be reached. Clearly, a shortest path reasoner is not stablebecause in the second network it can no longer reach an unambiguous conclusion.It is arguable (see Chapter Three of this thesis, for instance, for an argumentbased on the way people respond), that the `redundant' link actually should beregarded as rst-class information, however Touretzky (1986) was motivated to
Introduction 6devise an inferential distance ordering which basically ignores the contributionof the redundant link. Given conicting paths, the inferential distance orderingprefers for a node to inherit properties from the closest node, and given nodesx; y; z, x is closer to y than to z, i there is an inferential path from x through yto z. Thus, the penguin node is closer to Opus than the bird node is, and Opusshould thus unambiguously inherit the property specied through the negativelink.Subsequent work on inheritance reasoning has led to consideration of morecomplex problems and has given rise to a proliferation of reasoning strategies.Touretzky et al. (1987) outline a space of variations. This thesis attempts to ex-tend and unify this body of work by providing a set of denitions parameterizedwithin the same formal framework that make clear how the various systems relateto each other. The second chapter of this thesis outlines the variations that areof interest here in relatively informal terms, but presents enough formal materialto be able to clarify some misleading claims that have been published regardingcomplexity results. Essentially, it is about the complexity of inference based onthe direction of path construction (whether a path is dened as a path extendedby a link, two overlapping paths, or as a link extended by a path | the for-mer is known as upwards reasoning, variations of the second are known as doublechaining or downwards reasoning, and the latter has not been addressed in theliterature). Some of the NP-completeness results that have been applied to down-wards reasoning apply only to the double-chaining variety, not to the variety ofdownwards reasoning that is symmetric to upwards reasoning, introduced in thisthesis. Chapter Four of this thesis presents a uniform logical denition of variousreasoning systems by demonstrating how they are obtained from modications toa logic based re-denition of a basic system (the one originally dened by Hortyet al. (1990)). An advantage of this presentation is the relatively clear implemen-tation in a logic programming environment due to the textual correspondence inthe denitions and code; indeed Prolog implementations are supplied for a numberof the systems. Presenting a uniform framework for specifying inheritance prooftheory also has implications for the articulation of a uniform semantics param-eterized to the proof theory, analogous to the way that accessibility relations inthe possible worlds semantics are parameterized to the presence of modal axioms
Introduction 7in the corresponding logic. In fact, Chapter Five of this thesis aims to presentsuch a semantics for at least a subset of the systems considered in Chapters Twoand Four. To my knowledge, this is the rst unied semantics for a family of in-heritance reasoners. Some specic inheritance reasoners have been provided withsemantics, but not in a general enough way to make it clear how proof theoreticvariations correspond to semantic ones. While this work does not exhaustivelycharacterize reasoning in the entire space of possible inheritance systems, it doesprovide a substantial start.1.3 Information ChannelsThe model is constructed using channel-theoretic tools provided by researchersin situation theory to account for the behavior of natural constraints as well asto model dierent general frameworks for representing information ow (Barwise,1989, 1991, 1993; Barwise & Seligman, 1994). In the original formulation fromsituation theory (Barwise, 1989), constraints were used to interpret conditionalslike those in (1.11) and (1.12) which clearly are related to generics.(1.11) Snow means the sidewalks are slippery(1.12) If it is snowing, then the sidewalks are slipperyBarwise interprets (1.11) with the constraint (1.13).28l where l is a location parameter and s refers to a situation, S 0 ) S 00where S 0 = [s0 j in s0: at l: snowing; 1] andS 00 = [s00 j in s00: at l: slippery sidewalks; 1](1.13)Essentially, then, applying the constraint in (1.13) to a space-time gives the inter-pretation of (1.11). In this case, it is entailed that s0 is part of s00, but in generalterms constraints convey information about the situations which support the typesin the antecedent and consequents of the constraints.Channel theory provides more structure to the analysis. Channels are tokenswhich connect situations and through which information ows from one to the2S = [s j in s: at l: slippery sidewalks; 1] means that S is the type of a situation in whichthe sidewalks are slippery. The s is basically the variable that is lambda-abstracted.
Introduction 8other. A less realist conception of a channel is just that it is the reication of thebinary relation between situations that are related by a constraint. The essentialfeature, though, is that channel types are objects which support constraints astheir types such that all tokens of a channel type support at least all the constraintsthat the channel type does. Clearly this is not a reductionist account of naturalconstraints, but a realist one. Natural regularities are modeled by channels. Thus,if snow means that sidewalks are slippery it is because there is an informationchannel of a particular sort that connects snow situations with slippery ones.That is, if there is a constraint which can be used to indicate information aboutsituations it is because that constraint is the type of a real connection betweenthose situations. The reication of the connection is the central feature of channeltheory that is important to this thesis because it is the basis of the semanticsprovided. This feature is what enables the convenient account of defeasibility:an informational constraint like bird) flier can be the type of a channel whichconnects tokens, but it needn't require that the connected tokens are actuallyof the indicated types. Channel theory provides a way of allowing reasonablespecication of conditions under which a constraint can be said to hold withoutrequiring that it be correct on all tokens that might be classied in a particularway as a result. In this regard the framework has some similarity to the intensionalsemantics that Schubert and Pelletier (1987) oer for generics, which also makesa bit more exible what it is to be in the extension of a predicate, although theymanage without reifying connections (see also Cavedon & Glasbey, 1994).Inheritance links are modeled by constraints which are the type of informationchannels which meet particular conditions (which are spelled out in Chapter Fiveof this thesis). Inheritance networks are translated into structures comprised ofsites, types, and channels, as well as relations among these entities. In particular,sites can be understood as situations, tokens of the situation types given as thetypes. An indicating relation, like a default statement, can hold in general of itssituation types while failing to hold for specic situation tokens. Situation tokensare related to each other through channels to create signaling relations. Infor-mation ows from one situation to another through a channel of the right type.Denitions are provided which model various sorts of path conict in the inheri-tance reasoner as dierent conditions of information ow in the channel-theoretic
Introduction 9model. Paths permitted by particular theories are interpreted by appropriatelyconstructed composite channels in the corresponding channel-theoretic model. Itis shown, for instance, that a path is permitted by the reasoner of Horty et al.(1990) if and only if there is an informative channel type corresponding to thelink implicit in that path in the interpretation of the network when closed underthe corresponding composition on channels. That is, a link is interpreted by achannel, and a path is interpreted by a composite channel. Constraints on pathpermission are interpreted by constraints on channel composition. Chapter Fivedetails all this in relation to a subset of the reasoning variations considered inChapters Two and Four. The advantage of using channels is that they supplyexactly the right level of modeling to interpret a large family of reasoners withina uniform framework.1.4 MotivationsDefaults are an important representational device that allow concise representa-tions in formal logical frameworks. They are important because concision abetsrapid prototyping of systems founded upon them, because they can oer accom-panying processing gains to implemented systems and because they oer a moredirect model than classical systems of human reasoning. Default logics and defaultreasoning have been incorporated into a number of current theories and computerimplementations based on them. Paradigmatic morphology (Calder, 1989, 1990)uses defaults in lexical specication of morphology. Lascarides, Briscoe, Asher,and Copestake (1995) and Lascarides and Copestake (1995) present implementedtheories of order-independent default unication for typed feature structures whichhelps pave the way for natural language processing systems based on Head-DrivenPhrase Structure Grammar (HPSG, Pollard & Sag, 1987, 1994) to incorporatedefaults. Logics of defaults have also been applied to other problems of linguisticrepresentation such as temporal coherence in discourse (Lascarides & Oberlan-der, 1993). Defaults are only a small part of a large literature on nonmonotonicreasoning, and in fact have any number of practical and theoretical applications(for a review, see Pelletier & Elio, 1993). Inheritance in particular is also utilizedextensively. Inheritance in natural language processing has recently been the topic
Introduction 10of a special issue of Computational Linguistics, as well (for an extensive surveyof applications, see: Daelemans, Smedt, & Gazdar, 1992). It is an indispens-able tool for concise lexical specication; it is utilized in the lexical specicationlanguages provided by both Paradigmatic Morphology (Calder, 1989, 1990) andDATR (Evans & Gazdar, 1989), and in organizing the lexical hierarchies of Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) (Pollard & Sag, 1987), as well as inspecifying the feature theory which Pollard and Sag (1994) rely upon (Carpenter,1992). Both Calder's system and DATR admit default as well as monotonic inher-itance with mechanisms for sorting out the inheritance of conicting information.It is important to fully understand the mechanisms that drive inheritance in sys-tems like DATR. A lucid understanding of inheritance clearly has practical andtheoretical implications for a range of topics in computational linguistics. Defaultlogics make it possible to reach conclusions based on normative facts in the absenceof contradictory information, and although default logics nearly always sanctionconclusions which are invalid by the standards of classical two-valued logics, theseconclusions are what people consider reasonable inferences. Thus, default logicsalso supply a formal model of human reasoning that is a better approximationthan classical logics can supply. Contrary to the claim of Chater and Oaksford(1990), who take Reiter's Default Logic (see Reiter & Criscuolo, 1983) as coexten-sive with default logics, this is bolstered by sometimes ecient decision proceduresassociated with constructing inferences that can be polynomial (Horty et al., 1990)and in some cases linear (Niemela & Rintanen, 1994) (note that Lascarides andCopestake (1995) have a polynomial default unication). With ecient decisionprocedures, default systems have a strong claim as cognitive models since humanreasoning is generally rather ecient.While default logics do approximate human reasoning better than classicalsystems are able to, subsequent work in the details of the logics seems to ignorethis fact. Elio and Pelletier (1993, pg. 407) point out:Despite the acknowledgement by the articial intelligence communitythat the goal of developing non-monotonic systems owes its justica-tion to the success that ordinary people have in dealing with defaultreasoning, there has been no investigation into what sorts of defaultreasoning ordinary people in fact employ. Instead, articial intelligenceresearchers rely on their introspective abilities to determine whether
Introduction 11or not their system ought to embody such-and-so inference.Elio and Pelletier (1993) present the rst experiments into evaluating the pre-dictions of the AI literature with respect to human reasoning with default infor-mation, specically the prediction that given a default theory and an object whichis an exception to the default, the exceptional object will have no inuence on theapplicability of the default to other objects. Elio and Pelletier (1993) also presentthe rst pilot experiments testing inheritance reasoning with respect to the sameprediction. Hewson and Vogel (1994) presented the rst comprehensive evaluativestudy of default inheritance reasoning, considering its psychological plausibility asa model of human reasoning with sets of defaults. Chapter Three of this thesispresents the results of Hewson and Vogel's (1994) experiment as well as of an addi-tional experiment which used the same materials but on a wider range of subjects.These experiments report mixed results in terms of supporting particular extantinheritance proof theories, but some of its principles are supported. While theredoes exist an argument that because inheritance and other default reasoning isinvalid in classical terms, it is faulty, and that it therefore is not important toprovide logics that implement such reasoning, there is also the reply that if notvalid, such reasoning is reasonable and eective and is therefore worth the eortof studying.1.5 Outline of the ThesisWorking with the assumption that some sort of logic other than a classical twovalued system is required for a proper semantics for natural language generics, aswell as to represent human reasoning with generics, Chapter Two gives a fairlycomprehensive introduction to the class of logics of interest to the thesis: pathbased default inheritance reasoning. It outlines some of the foundational assump-tions of the approach, and carves out a space of reasoners that expands the setconsidered by Touretzky et al. (1987). The chapter is as informal as is possible(though some denitions about path construction and permission are essential)to convey the intuitions about inference on inheritance networks while still beingable to clarify some of the complexity results associated with default inheritancereasoning. While this is a contribution of the thesis, it is after all just a clari-
Introduction 12cation. However, a later chapter uses the observation that negative complexityresults associated with a class of downwards reasoners are actually tied only to asubclass of them, and introduces a new downwards reasoner that is symmetric inpath chaining strategy to the polynomial system of Horty et al. (1990). ChapterTwo also outlines the main approaches to providing a semantics to inheritancereasoning: update semantics (Veltman, 1991, 1994) (to keep the discussion in thischapter at a fairly uniform level, an appendix to the thesis gives a precis of the for-mal apparatus Veltman (1994) uses), conditional logics (Delgrande, 1988, 1990),and conditional logics with preference relations on models (Boutilier, 1989).Chapter Three addresses the issue of psychological plausibility. First a coupleof informal experiments are presented to compare the relative success of classicaland default interpretations of implication in predicting human behaviors, basedon responses to modus tollens. It seems clear that the tendency to `incorrectness'associated with misapplications of modus tollens is consistent with a defeasibleinterpretation for implication. In fact, this seems to be true as well for misappli-cations of modus ponens in which people reason from If P then Q and P is trueto the conclusion that Q is only sometimes true. The chapter presents the workof Hewson and Vogel (1994) and analyzes further proof theoretic issues that wererepresented in their materials and data but which they did not report. A secondexperiment is also presented using the same materials on a larger (and all-adult)subject pool. The chapter identies foundational assumptions of inheritance rea-soning that are supported, and others that are not. This makes it dicult toadjudicate among conicting proof theories, as was part of the original intention.Some alternative plausible proof strategies are also suggested.The fourth chapter of the thesis re-presents the proof theoretic alternativessupplied by the family of reasoners considered in Chapter Two and Chapter Threein a more formal setting by providing a parametric denition for inheritance intowhich dierent proof theoretic alternatives can be realized. The chapter showswhat modications are required in order to achieve certain reasoning strategies,and also uses the uniform framework to initiate a closer study of exactly how thereasoners relate to each other. Corresponding implementations are also providedfor some of the reasoners. While the space of potential reasoners has been discussedin the literature before (Touretzky et al., 1987) they have not, to my knowledge,
Introduction 13been interdened in a uniform framework such as they have been here. ChapterFive takes advantage of this parameterization in supplying a semantics for thefamily of inheritance reasoners. That chapter rst presents the formal modelingtools supplied by channel theory as described in x1.3 above, and provides aninitial application of the tools to feature theory. The chapter proceeds to developthe tools required specically for a model of inheritance reasoners. Essentially,inheritance graphs are interpreted by models with atomic channels correspondingto inheritance links. Various channel composition operators are introduced andin the closure of an atomic model under the appropriate composition operatorthere is a channel for each path or link permitted corresponding reasoner, whosepermission relation the composition operator interprets. The machinery is utilizedto give a semantics to the family of inheritance reasoners discussed.The sixth and nal chapter summarizes the results and discusses ways of ex-tending them. In each of the main interests of the thesis|psychological plausi-bility, proof theory, and parameterized semantics|there is room to cover moresystems than have been by applying the same techniques. It is emphasized thatmore attention should be given to conducting empirical psychological research inthe area to better inform proof theory of the requirements of a psychologicallyplausible model of human reasoning with generics.
Chapter 2Inheritance Reasoning
2.1 Introduction: A Psychologically PlausibleModel of InferenceThis chapter introduces the basic notation and proof theoretic considerations atstake for inheritance reasoning. Default inheritance has been proposed as a (some-times; see below) tractable alternative to rst order logic as a model of humanreasoning with natural language generics. Brachman's (1985) arguments about theimpossibility of representing analytic truths in a purely default framework noted,there is reason to think that nearly all knowledge is expressed in sentences with re-spect to which exceptions exist. Inheritance logics make typicality a primitive andtherefore oer structurally better approximations for the semantics of sentenceslike \Birds y," than do the qualied sentences in rst order logic. Because ofthe inherent representational complexity of recording exception lists, inheritanceis a more psychologically plausible model. Note that using a statistical model oftypicality (\Birds y" = \Most birds y"), chaining generics is invalid.1 However,people do seem to make inferences from sets of generics. Therefore, it is a task ofthe inheritance literature to identify inheritance logics that best capture the pat-terns of human reasoning with generics.2 Chapter Three explores the psychological1If most As are Bs and most Bs are Cs, it is not necessarily true that most As are Cs.2Of course, this is not the only task because if human reasoning is provably incorrect in somecases, then it would be nice to develop tools that help them to reason correctly or at least morecorrectly. 14
Inheritance Reasoning 15plausibility of the model in greater detail.Inheritance networks are often based on relationships like is-a and is-not-aamong individuals and classes and are presented quite simply as directed (usu-ally) acyclic graphs of explicit links. The denitions which specify the links thatare implicit in a network are considerably more complex because the network isnot tree-structured. A single node may have multiple superordinate and subordi-nate nodes; inheritance from each node must be accounted for, as well as for thepossibility that negative links (which represent is-not-a relations) admit conict-ing inheritance information. A plethora of systems described in the literature oera wide variety of ways to resolve conicting chains of explicit links in determin-ing inheritance properties. Nonetheless their procedural denition for resolvingconicting path information clouds the relationship between styles of conict res-olution and corresponding denitions of inheritance.Chapter Four will formalize various proof theories and relate those systemson the basis of the specications which yield the proof theoretic dierences. Ifollow the approach of Horty et al. (1990) and the family of reasoners they dis-cuss elsewhere (Touretzky et al., 1987). Chapter Five relates the same systemssemantically using channel theoretic notions.2.2 NotationPath-based inheritance reasoners provide a non-monotonic propositional systemfor default inference which is applicable for the analysis of human reasoning aboutgenerics like, \Birds y." In these systems, generics are encoded as links in directedacyclic graphs, the nodes of which represent individuals, properties, or classes, andthe links of which represent statements of positive or negative defaults. So, forexample, Figure 2.1 depicts a default inheritance network. Let the nodes of thegraph labeled A, B and C represent penguins, birds and iers, respectively. Thus,the network represents that birds y, that penguins are birds, and that penguinsdo not y.Inheritance has been invoked as a psychologically plausible logic for capturinghuman reasoning with generic information. Arguably, there are no contentful as-sertions that are strictly true under universal quantication. Instead, such truths
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A B CFigure 2.1: A Simple Inheritance Network
A BFigure 2.2: An Inconsistent Networkcan be seen as typicalities, statements that hold in spite of exceptions. One ap-proach (as in conditional logic approaches) is to analyze generics as universalimplications that hold as material implications in the correctly restricted set ofcases (thus eliminating exceptions). The approach of inheritance reasoning, incontrast, is to take typicality as a primitive, and to develop a nonclassical propo-sitional logic of reasoning with such statements. The approach is motivated by theubiquity of hierarchical arrangements of information in popular and scientic or-ganization of knowledge. However, in part because the primitive is typicality andnot strict implication, the approach leads to a nonclassical system. One feature ofinheritance, is for instance, the localization of inconsistent information. Networkslike the one in Figure 2.1 contain contradictions when classically interpreted, butusing typicality as the primitive, it is possible to reach an unproblematic conclu-sion that penguins don't y. Even if there were directly conicting information,such as in Figure 2.2, this need not propagate as in classical systems to warrantany conclusion at all.3(2.1) Linguists use handouts.(2.2) Computer scientists don't use handouts.3In fact, it seems that if there is ever going to be a general semantics for natural language,it will have to be in a framework that can represent local inconsistencies. No one would arguethat Maugham's (1919) The Moon and Sixpence is meaningless because it contains the sentence,\There is no object more deserving of pity than the married bachelor" (p. 163), quite thecontrary!






Figure 2.3: Network RepresentationFor example, consider the natural language generics in (2.1{2.5)(which, note,are mutually inconsistent in classical terms, and certainly typicalities rather thanuniversal truths), represented in an inheritance network shown in Figure 2.3. Anynumber of inheritance reasoners will reason about these to conclude about me thatit's ambiguous whether I use or don't use overheads, but that I typically use hand-outs. However, it is not possible to conclude arbitrary propositions in any suchsystem. The localization of inconsistency, a form of paraconsistency, is deemedto be a more psychological plausible notion than the classical treatment of incon-sistency. Additionally, the attractive computational properties of some of thesesystems (polynomial time decision) even with greater expressivity than classicalpropositional logics4 make inheritance reasoning a serious candidate for consider-ation as a psychological model of reasoning (note that the various nonmonotonic4This requires some qualication, as inheritance systems typically lack disjunction and generalnegation. However, since inheritance does allow typicality as a primitive and since individualscan be represented in the language, inheritance has aspects that make it more expressive thanthe propositional calculus. On the other hand, ignoring the interpretation of links as `typically',inheritance can be seen as a subset of the monadic predicate calculus. In this light, the eciencyof inheritance can be seen to follow from the prohibition on cycles, and other topological featuresof allowable argument structures (see Niemela & Rintanen, 1994).
Inheritance Reasoning 18logics (McDermott & Doyle, 1980) and default logics (Reiter & Criscuolo, 1983)are undecidable).Various arguments about the `correctness' of proof theoretic strategies aremade in the literature by appeal to introspective judgements of plausibility. Chap-ter Three of this thesis will explore some of these issues with some rigor throughexperiments involving more than logician's introspections.Inheritance reasoners dene methods for reaching conclusions implicit in graphrepresentations of sentences.5 Implicit conclusions correspond to paths throughthe graph that are distinguished as permitted. As an example, an easily statedtheory of inheritance is shortest path reasoning, in which the conclusion of a graphthat is not simply linear is taken to be the conclusion that corresponds to theshortest linear path through the entire graph. Touretzky (1986) has shown thisform of reasoning to be formally undesirable; however, most inheritance reasonersagree with shortest path reasoning in simple cases, and determine, for instance,that the potential path in Figure 2.1 from A to C through the intervening node B isnot permitted because it is preempted by the more specic information representedby the direct negative link from A to C. However, when it comes to more complexgraph topologies, dierent inheritance reasoners diverge considerably on whichpaths should be permitted from a given graph (Touretzky, 1986; Touretzky et al.,1987; Boutilier, 1989).A wide range of path based reasoners exist in the literature (Sandewall, 1986;Stein, 1989; Touretzky, 1986; Horty et al., 1990; Boutilier, 1989; Gener & Verma,1989) and axes of variation among many of the systems have been outlined (Touret-zky et al., 1987). In this thesis, the system of Horty et al. (1990) (the system theydescribe is refered to herein as H90) is taken as a basic system to work from. Theaxes of variations range from syntactic properties of reasoners (on-path or o-pathpreemption) to more complex semantically motivated dierences (restricted skepti-cism vs. full skepticism). This chapter explains these properties in informal termsthrough graph topologies, setting the stage for Chapter Four to identify exactlyhow these properties of reasoners emerge from the reasoners' formal denitions (by5In what follows, sets of default sentences are often referred to in terms of structural propertiesof those sets when represented in graphic notation; in these terms, theories are directed acyclicgraphs.
Inheritance Reasoning 19providing a parameterized denition for path-based inheritance reasoners in whichsetting dierent parameters in a basic system yields each of the possibilities).2.2.1 Some FormalitiesDefault inheritance networks are composed of nodes and default links. Nodes rep-resent individuals, concepts, and properties, and links represent the classicationof connected nodes. A link between two nodes in the form A  ! B denotes theclassication: As are typically Bs (As are Bs). A link with a slash through it,  != ,is a negative link. A network is a directed acyclic graph of positive and negativelinks, and is used to represent propositional knowledge of a \tangled" or \twisted"hierarchical nature. An inheritance reasoner is a set of denitions that determinethe conclusions justied by a given network. Conclusions correspond to the linksthemselves or to chains of links (whose endpoints form an implicit link) that arepermitted paths. Let  vary over paths; lastnode() denotes the last node in path, and firstnode() denotes the rst node in path . If  is a positive path, thena ; z denotes the implicit link between rstnode() = a and lastnode() = zthrough the possibly empty sequence of nodes . If  is a negative path, thena ;= z denotes the implicit link between rstnode() and lastnode() through thepossibly empty sequence of nodes , such that the last link in  is a negative link.An expansion of a network is the set of explicit and implicit links supported by areasoner applied to that network. An inheritance reasoner is the set of denitionsthat specify which paths in a network are permitted, and the permitted paths areexactly the contents of an expansion.Individuals (as opposed to concepts or classes) may appear only as the rstnode of a path, but they need not necessarily occur in the path at all. Any link ina network is a path; if the link is of the form, p  ! r, then it is a positive path,and if it is of the form p  != r, then it is a negative path. If a path consists of morethan one link it is a compound path. Since networks are assumed to be acyclic,every path has both a rst node and a last node. The length of a path is thenumber of links that it contains. The degree of a path is the length of the longestchain of links between its endpoints. For a given network, if  is a positive path,lastnode()  ! r is a link, and r does not occur as a node in , then   ! r isa positive path as well. Symmetrically, if lastnode()  != r is a link, and r does
Inheritance Reasoning 20 .................. --- srqpFigure 2.4: A Network with a Generalized Path of Length Three. - .................. -1PPPPPPq srqpFigure 2.5: The Link p  ! r Has a Degree of Two.not occur in , then   != r is a negative path. Since we assume  to vary overonly positive paths, this means that negative links can occur only at the end ofa path. The polarity of a path is determined by its last link: a path whose lastlink is negative is called a negative path, and all other paths are positive. It isconvenient to refer to awkwardly long paths with strings of node labels; using thisconvention, \r" and \=r" are abbreviations for the aforementioned paths. Themetanotation  ! indicates a link whose polarity does not matter and similarlyfor implicit links ; .6Proposition 1 If  is a path of the form   ! z having degree n, then  is apositive path with degree less than n.Implicit in the denition of a path's degree is the fact that there can be morethan one path between any two nodes. In such cases, paths are said either toconict or are said to be redundant to each other. If a path  is redundant withrespect to another path 0, then  is a subsequence of 0.Denition 2 (Subsequences ) If  and 0 are two paths of the same polarity,  0 i each node in  also occurs in 0 and for any two nodes x and y suchthat x ; y in , x 0; y in 0That is, the supersequence contains at least all of the nodes of the subsequence6Note that Touretzky (1986) incorporated \don't know" links directly into his language;however, these are not used in the literature in general nor does he make extensive use of themhimself. Nonetheless, it is convenient in the metatheory to have a way of talking about somethingthat is denitely a link, even when its polarity does not matter.
Inheritance Reasoning 21and the nodes occur in the same relative order (a subpath is a special kind ofsubsequence in which the nodes are in the same consecutive order).Part of the task of an inheritance system is to dene procedures for adjudicat-ing amongst these multiple conicting and redundant paths between two nodes.Reasoners vary when settling conict in terms of their degree of skepticism. Acredulous reasoner establishes multiple expansions when faced with conict, andin each expansion only one of the conicting paths is sanctioned. Skeptical rea-soners always resolve to a single expansion, though they vary in the number ofpaths that they admit to the expansion. Skeptical reasoners vary in their degreeof skepticism, the more skeptical the reasoner, the smaller the size of possibleexpansions. The preferred paths which are chosen are said to be permitted. If apath is permitted in a network, then we say that the expansion of the networkcontains the implicit link between the endpoints of the path. A reasoner is stable ifits expansions of a network are identical with the expansions of the same networkwith any number of its implicit links added.2.2.2 UniformitiesReasoners are dened to prefer (hence, permit) paths on the basis of topologicalconsiderations. An example of a topological consideration is preference for morespecic information, which in network terms means being closer than other nodesto the rst node in the set of paths relevant to the question. There are manyaxes of classication of inheritance reasoners that are interesting to focus on. Themost controversial set was identied by Touretzky et al. (1987); however there aremore foundational considerations than those which are interesting mainly becauseso few systems in the literature take exception to them. Hewson and Vogel (1994)identied a few of these in an investigation of the psychological plausibility ofinheritance reasoning as a model of cognition; the ndings of Hewson and Vogel(1994) will be reported and extended in Chapter Three of this thesis. This sectionoutlines what the basic assumptions are in inheritance reasoning.
Inheritance Reasoning 22Transitivity.This property is realized in inheritance reasoners that admit chaining of explicitlinks into paths corresponding to implicit conclusions. Chains of statements canbe either positive or negative, and can have arbitrary (but nite) length. Not allinheritance systems admit general chaining, notably the statistically based ones(Bacchus, 1989), because it is not a statistically valid inference for defaults, al-though it is a practically tenable inference. Bacchus' (1989) logic mixes strictand defeasible inheritance, and limits inference through defeasible links to includeonly one defeasible link. Other systems also include `certainty factors' that per-mit longer defeasible chains with decreasing certainty. Ballim, de Ram, and Fass(1989) present one such system which is an interesting intermediate between Bac-chus' system and reasoners like H90 which admit general chaining: the systemof Ballim et al. (1989) actually uses the certainty factors only to select amongconicting paths rather than setting a certainty threshold for accepting even un-contested defeasible arguments as Bacchus' (1989) logic equivalently does. It iseasy to imagine other systems that incorporate a certainty calculus more exiblethan Bacchus' in allowing chaining with defaults, but less exible than Ballimet al.'s (1989) in placing a minimum threshold for certainty in chaining on evenpaths that lack conicts. However, in H90 and the related family of reasonersconsidered in this thesis, general chaining of defeasible links is admitted. Resultsof Hewson and Vogel (1994) and Chapter Three conrm that people draw conclu-sions consistent with transitivity and suggest that there is an interesting limit onthe maximum length of an acceptable transitive inference.Acyclicity.One way of stating the restriction to acyclic graphs is to stipulate that a nodecan occur only once in a path (thus, it is a sort of `occurs' check). The cyclicityrestriction can be slightly relaxed, as done by Gener and Verma (1989). Theyrelease the restriction against cyclic paths and prove that in the case of negativecycles no complications are introduced which confound their denitions of pathconstruction. A negative cycle is something like p  ! q  ! r  != p, the cycleoccurs using the single negative link allowed in the path. Since a negative link canoccur only at the end of a path, a path containing a negative cycle will still have a
Inheritance Reasoning 23last node. Though we can construct an endless chain of links because of the cycle,we cannot construct a path that has a link after the negative link. Negative cyclesare less problematic than arbitrary cycles because they do not lead to paths ofinnite length: all paths in a network that admits negative cycles will still haveboth rst and last nodes. This is an interesting restriction to make on inheritancereasoning, largely because of the implications for interpretations of those systemsas models of human reasoning with generics. An argument for acyclicity is that itis extremely dicult to think up taxonomies that would be best represented withcycles. In any case, whether reasoning should be restricted by acyclicity is not aproperty that I will investigate or elaborate in this thesis.Negativity.As described in Section 2.2.1, the path-based inheritance literature denes a neg-ative path as one in which the nal link is a negative link and the preceding links(if any) are all positive. This reects the intuition that one cannot reason be-yond a negative assertion of the form As are normally not Bs:7 if As are normallynot Bs, then As stand in no transitive relation to anything else that Bs might be.Nonetheless, general sequences that include non-nal negative links can be labelednegative chains. Though it would be rather less well motivated than chaining ofdefaults, it is possible that people reason with such statements as if negativityis a feature, so that if As are normally not Bs and Bs are normally Cs, then Aswould be considered normally not Cs. Also possible in this light is that `doublenegations' can cancel or intensify each other. Both potential responses are clas-sically invalid, but negativity propagation is more pragmatically misguided thanchaining: no inheritance reasoner builds in these features. Valid reasoning withnegativity is one of the assumptions of inheritance reasoning that Hewson andVogel (1994) investigated since it is interesting to know if it is a quality of humanreasoning with generics.7It is important to remember the dierence between this and the weaker: As are not normallyBs.
Inheritance Reasoning 24Preemption.Preemptive links are treated nearly uniformly in the literature as providing spe-cic information that should override longer paths whose endpoints they connect.Specicity is interpreted topologically with the idea that inheritance networks en-code taxonomies with most general information at the righthand side of a link, andso on throughout the hierarchy. Relative specicity is used as a way to mediateconicting defaults. For example, DA B C , represents a network in which theinheritance literature nearly unanimously agrees to license the conclusion that Asare not Ds. With this intuition, shortest path reasoning suggests itself as a sim-ple way of computing specicity, and under the assumption that explicit links allhave equal status it is an ecient way to approach inheritance. Touretzky (1986)contributed the inferential distance ordering to the literature in his thesis. Infer-ential distance is more complex in its formalization than shortest path specicityin that it can be used in systems that distinguish certain links as redundant. Anexample of a system in which topologically dened preemption is not incorporatedis termed `ideally skeptical reasoning' by Stein (1989). This system asumes no no-tion of preference in the face of conicting arguments, even structurally denedspecicity considerations.Redundancy.The priority of explicit links has been identied as a controversial issue with respectto stable reasoning (Boutilier, 1989). But, since Touretzky's thesis (Touretzky,1986) it has been accepted in the literature that certain topologically identiablelinks in inheritance networks are redundant since they convey no information thatis not already present in longer paths, through transitivity. Essentially, certainexplicit links are deemed redundant with respect to implicit links, in particular,when the explicit link expresses the same conclusion that can be drawn from alonger path. In terms of graph topology, a `redundant' link is a direct link thatconnects the endpoints of another path with the same polarity. For instance, areasoner that implements transitive inference would likely conclude from this net-work, A B C , that As are normally Cs. Thus, this related network, A B C ,is deemed to contain no additional information. In a reasoner that incorporatestransitivity, the conclusions implicit in both graphs are the same regardless of the
Inheritance Reasoning 25information-supplying status of the redundant link; however, when graphs likethese are embedded in larger networks such as, DA B C , and DA B C ,a reasoner that assumes redundancy (as nearly all path-based reasoners do) willreach the same conclusions for both graphs, but reasoners that assume each directlink conveys novel information may sanction dierent conclusions for each graph.Touretzky (1986) argued that shortest path reasoning is unsound because of theinstability that results from adding an implicit link to a network and reasoningwith the result.8 The conditional logic approach to defaults of Delgrande (1988,1990) would nd the second of the above two graphs ambiguous, and thus, Del-grande's approach is unstable (noncumulative). However, this is not a haphazardinstability as in shortest path reasoning; rather, there is a strong position takenin distinguishing explicit and derived information.
DA B C EFigure 2.6: Stability/RedundancyHowever, this alternative analysis of `redundant' links is not the one thatBoutilier (1989) adopts. Rather, he points out that the literature is not uniformin its topological identication of redundancy. For example, consider the graph inFigure 2.6; it is like the network just mentioned, with the exception of extensionto the node E and another redundant link from c  ! e. Without the link c  ! e,H90 and Boutilier's (1989) system would conclude nothing about whether As areEs, since they do not admit chaining beyond a negative link, and specicity andredundancy for both mean that As are not Ds. However, Horty et al. (1990) deneH90 so that given the network in Figure 2.6, it will conclude that As are in fact Es,while Boutilier's (1989) system reaches no conclusion for the same reason that itwould without the link, under the assumption that the link c  ! e is redundant.Both assume a topological denition of redundancy, but Boutilier's is simpler: forhim a link is redundant if it spans a longer path of exactly the same polarity, but8This property has been called the cumulation property: if  is a network and l1 is an implicitlink between the endpoints of a permitted path  in  ( `  or  ` l1), then  ` l2 i [ l1 ` l2.
Inheritance Reasoning 26in H90, a link is redundant if it spans a longer path of the same polarity, and (if itis positive) no negative link contributes information about one of the nodes in thepath with respect to which the link is redundant.9 Clearly, H90 is not stable withrespect to links that Boutilier would identify as redundant. Horty et al. (1990)nd this an acceptable property since it gives their form of inheritance reasoning\a sensitivity to the structure of arguments that is dicult to achieve in deduc-tive systems," while Boutilier nds it ad hoc and unintuitive. The semantics forinheritance reasoning given in Chapter Five is parameterized for this dierence.2.2.3 VariationsTouretzky et al. (1987) identify a number of choice points in the design of a pathbased inheritance reasoning system. Dierent decisions on these points cause dif-ferent reasoners to sanction dierent conclusions about the same networks. Theaxes of variation considered herein are preemption, ambiguity, and path construc-tion.On-Path/O-Path Preemption
DA B C
Figure 2.7: As are normally not DsMost inheritance reasoners include some form of preemption|a reasoner canbe on-path or o-path preempting. In on-path preemption, the rst node of apreempting link must occur on the preempted path, as in Figure 2.7 in whichb  != d is a preempting link whose initial node occurs in the preempted path abcd.9The additional condition is not in place for the symmetric case of redundant negative links;since by the very assumption that it is a redundant negative link any positive link that wouldcontribute conicting information about one of the intervening nodes can at most be part of achain that culminates in the negative link that forms the negative path that makes the otherlink redundant.
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DA B C
EFigure 2.8: Ambiguous?Because the path acd is deemed redundant with respect to the longer preemptedpath, it too is preempted, giving the conclusion that As are typically not Ds.However, for the related graph in Figure 2.8, the path aecd is not redundant withrespect to abcd, and since b does not occur in aecd, using on-path preemption thenegative path does not override the positive nor vice versa. A skeptical reasonerusing on-path preemption will reach no conclusion about whether As are Ds ornot. In a reasoner that uses o-path preemption, preemption can occur even whenthe preempting link does not occur on the preempted path without the preemptedpath being redundant. Thus, given the network shown in Figure 2.8, a reasonerthat uses o-path preemption will conclude that As are not Ds.Touretzky's (1986) original system used on-path preemption, but of coursethere is much debate about which is most `intuitive'. Sandewall (1986) argues thataecd should be considered redundant as well, and that the link b  != d provides themost explicit information. Touretzky et al. (1987) provide an interpretation forthe graph which they claim renders the conclusions of o-path preemption ques-tionable (a = George, b = chaplain, c = man, e = marine, d = drinks beer) sinceGeorge's being a marine provides the information that he isn't a typical chaplain.Nonetheless, they adopt o-path preemption in their specication of H90 (Hortyet al., 1990). This debate is reconsidered by Al-Asady and Narayanan (1993) whoobserve that the argument against o-path preemption given by Touretzky et al.(1987) actually runs contra to the basic principle of path-based inheritance thatmore specic information should override more general information: informationknown about George by virtue of his being a man (that men typically drink beer)is more general than the information known about him by virtue of his being a













JFigure 2.10: Parity Checking and Restricted SkepticismH90 is classied as a restricted skeptical reasoner because it does not allowambiguities to be cascaded. Consider the network depicted in Figure 2.9. A re-stricted skeptical reasoner determines that the ambiguity about whether a canbe classied as c is sucient to prevent the construction of a path (abc=d) whichcan conict with the conclusion that a is d. A fully skeptical reasoner (or ideallyskeptical as dened by Stein (1989)) would conclude that the conicting pathsabc=d and abfd make a's d-ness ambiguous. Thus a fully skeptical reasoner has asmaller expansion than the restricted skeptical reasoner. Stein (1989) points outthe curious behavior of restricted skepticism when applied to larger networks likethose in Figure 2.10. As before, the restricted skeptic (H90) concludes nothingabout whether a is c, but does conclude that a is d. Similarly, because a is d,H90 can conclude nothing about whether a is h, and that leaves unblocked theconclusion that a is j. Thus, ambiguity does not cascade as in the fully skepticalreasoner, but it does propagate in an alternating fashion. That the alternationhas an analogy in parity checking does not render the behavior remarkably intu-itive. Touretzky et al. (1987) state that it is not known whether it is possible tocompute the alternative fully skeptical expansion of a network without computingthe intersection of all of the credulous expansions, since this is assumed to becomputationally complex in the general case.Kautz and Selman (1991) show that the membership of a literal in all ex-pansions can be computed in O(n2) time in the size of the network for a systemthat does not incorporate preemption, and this means that the intersection ofexpansions can be computed in O(n3) time. However, for the more interestingcase of skeptical reasoning with preemption, Kautz and Selman (1991) prove thatcomputing the membership of a literal in all expansions is co-NP-complete. Thisis an extremely interesting result given that Stein provides a system that alsocomputes the intersection of credulous expansions of networks with preemption
Inheritance Reasoning 30and does so in polynomial time, and that H90 (Horty et al., 1990) also computesskeptical inheritance with preemption in polynomial time. A cursory summary ofNP-completeness theory (Garey & Johnson, 1979) makes it easier to appreciate thesignicance of these results. A problem  is in co-NP if its complement is in NP.P is closed under complementation: if  is in P so is c. It is not known whetherP = NP, but it is generally assumed that P 6= NP. However, if NP 6= co-NP, thenP 6= NP because P is closed under complementation.10 Thus, it seems that theelements of co-NP are `harder' than the problems in P. Yet, problems that are co-NP-complete are easier to imagine being solvable by polynomial algorithms thanthose that are NP-complete since typically the co-NP-complete problems are e-ciently solvable for quite large classes of instances but grind down on worst-cases.In this case, ne-grained restrictions of the problem can yield an element of P.For these results on inheritance reasoning, this suggests a closer look at the prooftheoretic variants chosen by each system. The version with specicity for whichKautz and Selman's (1991) co-NP-completeness holds uses o-path preemption,while Stein's (1989) system utilizes on-path preemption (which is intuitively easierto compute), and the o-path preempting H90 maintains tractability through itsrestricted rather than full skepticism.Direction of ReasoningUnfortunately, the source of complexity is not so easily diagnosed as that. Selmanand Levesque (1989) argue that the decisive complexity factor in the case of H90is that it uses upwards reasoning, and H90 has this feature in common with Stein's(1989) system. However, here I will argue that their results are not decisive either.Upwards reasoning corresponds to forward chaining with the point of originbeing the queried node. Essentially, the denition given in Section 2.2.1 of thischapter relied on forward chaining: direct links are paths; if  is a positive path,and lastnode()  ! r is a link, and r does not occur as a node in , then   ! ris a path as well. Downwards reasoning as dened in the literature, however, relieson Touretzky's (1986) double chaining which can be stated as follows: direct linksare paths; if q  !  is a path and   ! r is a path then q  !   ! r is a path.10Still, if NP = co-NP that does not prove that P = NP.
Inheritance Reasoning 31The dierence between these modes of reasoning can be understood with respectto the diering conclusions reached about particular graphs.
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XXXXXXz :XXXXXXz:: ecdbaFigure 2.11: Preemption by a  != d Permits the Conclusion a  ! e.Figure 2.11 (Touretzky et al., 1987) illustrates this point. We know that ina restricted or fully skeptical upwards reasoner a will be seen as an e, since thepath abd=e, which could be a path that conicts with abce, cannot be formed intoa path; its initial path abd is preempted. Both the restricted and fully skepticalreasoners dened above determine that a potentially conicting path must beunpreempted. On the other hand, a downwards skeptical11 reasoner will beginchaining at e and will stop at the ambiguity about whether b is e. There is no wayto chain beyond b to notice that the leading path is preempted. If the downwardsreasoner were credulous there would be an expansion in which abce is held, andone in which bd=e is held, but which contains no information at all about a'se-ness since a=d preempts bd and since a=d=e is not a valid path (according tothe denitions given in section 2). Note that the intersection of these credulousexpansions is empty. If fully skeptical reasoners are dened as the intersectionof upwards and downwards credulous expansions, this could be done simply bygiving the denition of a downwards skeptical reasoner. Touretzky et al. pointout the dierences between upwards and downwards chaining (Touretzky et al.,1987) without providing a thorough explanation of why they exist.As a preliminary step to understanding the dierence, notice the topologicalsimilarity between the network depicted in Figure 2.11 from the last paragraph andthe network shown in Figure 2.9 during the discussion of degrees of skepticism. Thenet of Figure 2.11 could be transformed into the net of Figure 2.9 by introducing11It is perhaps slightly confusing to refer to generic skeptical reasoners without indicating theirdegrees of skepticism, but for the present purposes their degrees of skepticism are not relevant.The distinction made is between skeptical reasoners, which for arbitrary degrees of skepticismproduce single expansions when faced with ambiguities rather, and credulous reasoners, whichgenerate multiple expansions in those same circumstances.
Inheritance Reasoning 32an intermediate node in the link a=d (modulo node renaming). Note that therestricted and fully skeptical reasoners reach the same conclusions about Figure2.11, but dierent conclusions about Figure 2.9. This is because Figure 2.11represents preemption|more specic information preempts a conicting chain oflinks. Based on the dierence in behavior when upwards processing these twonetworks, we can say the following: an upwards reasoner12 will sometimes resolve(in cases of preemption) an apparent ambiguity at some point \higher" in thenetwork by using more specic information from lower in the network. \Higher"is just a conception of generality included in inheritance networks|individuals,the most specic entities, are at the bottom or left, and more general classicationsproceed upwards or to the right.In contrast, a downwards reasoner will never reach denite conclusions abouta network where an upwards reasoner resolves to an ambiguity. That is, sincedownwards reasoners begin from general and reason towards specic, it will neverresolve an apparent ambiguity using the more general information already noticed.Faced with ambiguity, it will never be able to chain further towards more specicinformation that could resolve the ambiguity of the whole path. In schematicterms, this can be understood from the nature of the chaining specication givenat the start of this section. Essentially, when using double chaining all subpathsof a permitted path will also be permitted, but that is not necessarily so withupwards reasoning. Consider a single path  =   ! x = y  ! !; Table 2.1depicts the dierence between upwards and downwards reasoning.Upwards Chaining  x ` x 6 ` !y !Downwards Chaining  x ` x  ` !y !Table 2.1: Necessary Permission of Subpaths ( =   ! x = y  ! !.)This is in fact the key dierence between complexity in upwards and down-wards reasoners that Selman and Levesque (1993) identify as the source of in-12For the remainder of this section, \reasoner", in the context of ambiguity resolution, refersto a system that produces a single expansion|be it restricted or fully skeptical.
Inheritance Reasoning 33skeptical credulouso-path on-path o-path on-pathdown NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard NP-hardup P P P PTable 2.2: Complexity of the various forms of defeasible inheritance. (P standsfor `doable in polynomial time').tractability in downwards reasoners, and the reason why upwards reasoners (e.g.Stein's and H90) can be polynomial. Selman and Levesque (1989, p. 1144) sum-marize their results in the table reproduced in Table 2.2. However, these resultsare not completely decisive as they depend on the particular sort of redundancyemployed in H90, discussed above. It is not clear, for example, that a systembased on Boutilier's (1989) notion of redundancy would still be susceptible to thesame construction that Selman and Levesque (1993) use to prove NP-hardness ofdownward reasoning. In fact, their construction relies crucially on the conclusionsmade available through a link which Boutilier would consider redundant (hencemaking the network ambiguous), but which Horty et al. (1990) advocate as adesirable source of instability as a nonredundant link. Further, it is dicult toreconcile Stein's (1989) claim of providing a polynomial time algorithm for ideallyskeptical inheritance with specicity with the further construction of Selman andLevesque (1993) which leads them to conjecture that \any reasonable preemptionstrategy" will make ideally skeptical inheritance intractable. This is a strongerclaim than the one reported in the last section about the complexity of ideallyskeptical inheritance. The reason for pointing it out here is that the strongerclaim, in conjunction with Stein's claim of actually having a polynomial algorithmto compute exactly what Selman and Levesque (1993) conjecture is not possible,indicate that there is a likely interaction of other proof theoretic features of inher-itance not discriminated in the Table 2.2. I have already mentioned the treatmentof redundancy as one example, but there may be others.
Inheritance Reasoning 34Chaining ComplexityOne aspect of downwards reasoning that Selman and Levesque (1993) cite as asource of complexity is double chaining. When using double chaining (see thedepiction in Table 2.1), all subpaths of a permitted path will also be permitted.This is in comparison to upwards reasoning, for which that is not the case. Ipropose to explore an obvious alternative downwards reasoning strategy that ismore symmetric to the upwards. Simple downwards is dened here as the intuitivesymmetric variation: direct links are paths; if  is a path, and r  ! firstnode()is a link, and r does not occur as a node in , then r  !  is a path as well.Hereafter, `downwards' reasoning will be assumed to mean `simple downwards'reasoning, and what has been traditionally called downwards reasoning will be re-ferred to as `double chaining'. Table 2.3 shows how downwards reasoning comparesto upwards reasoning and double chaining in connection to subpaths. Clearly, thisform of downwards reasoning has the same property as upwards reasoning in thatall subpaths of a path need not be permitted. However, this form of downwardsreasoning has not been studied before in the literature.Upwards Chaining  x ` x 6 ` !y !Double Chaining  x ` x  ` !y !Downwards Chaining  x ` y! 6 ` y !Table 2.3: Necessary Permission of Subpaths ( =   ! x = y  ! !.)To understand how downwards reasoning as dened here is dierent, as al-ways, it is useful to consult an example network. Consider the network depictedin Figure 2.12. H90, an upwards reasoner, will conclude that the network is am-biguous about whether As are Gs because there is no permitted path to chainthe link E  ! G onto (because of the ambiguous subpath from B to E). Sim-ilary for double chaining. However, using downwards reasoning, although it isnot possible to construct the path BCDEG due to the same ambiguity, the pathCDEG is available, and it is possible, particularly in a system that uses a type
Inheritance Reasoning 35of redundancy closely related to H90's, to chain the link A  ! C to the left endof that path, yielding an uncontested conclusion that As are Gs. H90's version ofredundancy actually has this link as redundant, as discussed above, but there isa strong sense in which downwards reasoning is an inverse of upwards reasoning(almost, in fact, like reasoning `upwards' from the most general node in the relatedgraphs in which the links go in the opposite direction), and recall from the earlierdiscussion that a topologically similar link was deemed non-redundant by H90(contra Boutilier (1989)). Chapter Four will discuss the properties of downwardsreasoning in relation to the other proof theoretic variations already in the litera-ture. Here it is important to point out just that downwards reasoning can havethe property that Selman and Levesque (1993) identied as crucial to tractablepath-based inheritance.
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Figure 2.12: Downwards vs. Upwards vs. Double Chained Reasoning2.2.4 The Rest of this ChapterThe purpose of this work is to explain how these variations in reasoning styles canbe anchored in the formal denition of a reasoner parameterized to realize thesepossibilities. To this end, H90, the restricted skeptical, upwards chaining, o-path preempting reasoner of Horty et al. (1990) is adopted as standard. ChapterFour of this thesis gives the declarative specication of this system provided byVogel, Popowich, and Cercone (1993), and also provides the parameterization thatgenerates other reasoners and a translation of these denitions into Prolog. Theremainder of the present chapter presents an outline of what I take to be theprincipal open problems in inheritance reasoning, the main of which is a uniedsemantics. This chapter will thus outline a couple of attempts in the literature toprovide a semantics to path-based inheritance reasoning, but these are notable for
Inheritance Reasoning 36being semantics for particular systems, and not general semantics which elucidatethe related proof theories.2.3 Discussion: Open ProblemsThere are quite a number of open problems in inheritance reasoning. This thesisattempts to address a few of these problems which exist in three main areas:1. psychological investigation of inheritance as a plausible model of human rea-soning with generics;2. proof theoretic considerations that identify clear relationships among varioussystems so that it is clear how to, for instance, embed one within another,and particularly including complexity analysis as an evaluation metric; and3. identication of an underlying semantic framework that unites the variousproof theoretic systems that exist in the literature.2.3.1 Plausibility of the ModelThe plausibility of inheritance reasoning has been investigated hardly at all. Elioand Pelletier (1993) present results from the rst pilot experiment designed toinvestigate how people reason about exceptional objects in the context of a largerstudy designed to test predictions of default logics. Hewson and Vogel (1994)present the rst study that considers assumptions of inheritance reasoning di-rectly. The next chapter of this thesis will elaborate those results on transitivity,negativity, preemption, and redundancy, and will extend those results by reportingon replications of their original experiment as well as by considering some of themore theoretically interesting features from the perspective of inheritance prooftheory | features like on/o path preemption, and other specic styles of reason-ing with generic information. These studies are dierent from the approach takenby Elio and Pelletier (1993) in that they were interested in how people reasonedabout an object in light of defaults, given that it was known to be exceptional ornot in particular ways. The method used by Hewson and Vogel (1994) and fol-lowed here is to consider which patterns of argument participants found decisivein general, without grounding those arguments in specic individuals.
Inheritance Reasoning 372.3.2 Complexity ConsiderationsDue to the proliferation of inheritance reasoners, it is important to determineprecisely how dierent classes of reasoners are related. Chapter Four develops adeclarative specication of inheritance reasoning to mediate the \clash of intu-itions" about elements in the space of possible inheritance reasoners. The rela-tionships among various classes of reasoners are illustrated by dening the variousreasoners through modications to a basic set of denitions. This exploration al-lows us to identify a spectrum of skepticism in dening reasoners. Chapter Fourwill also provide Prolog specications that implement the denitions of all of thereasoners considered. This Prolog specication is in close textual correspondenceto the formal denitions of the reasoners, unlike the algorithmic specication of theupwards restricted skeptical reasoner of Horty, et al. (Horty et al., 1990). Textualcorrespondence allows each of the modied denitions to be similarly specied inProlog, with changes to the code corresponding textually to the modications inthe denitions.2.3.3 SemanticsThe most glaring gap in the literature is in the provision of a unied semantics forinheritance reasoners. Dimopoulos (1992) claims that a series of `process models'will do exactly that via procedural semantics but does not specify the processes northe intended family of reasoners covered. Semantics have been oered for isolatedsystems{credulous or skeptical, upwards or downwards, and on-path preemptinginheritance, but no attempts have been made to generalize these approaches tocover more than the individual system licensed. Interestingly, these approacheshave all been developed using conditional logics as a starting point. Delgrande(1987) provided a conditional logic called N as a basis for limited reasoning withand about rst order defaults. This work was extended by Delgrande (1988) to ad-mit general chaining of defaults through making additional assumptions about themodels. Delgrande (1990) provides an algorithm for constructing those models,and thereby provides a semantics to a nearly-equivalent class of inheritance reason-ers (credulous and downward). Boutilier (1989) oers a conditional logic called Ederived from Delgrande's N (diering in allowing nested conditionals) and extends
Inheritance Reasoning 38this (Boutilier, 1993) to develop a semantics for fully stable inheritance reasoning(fully skeptical, downwards and on-path). He suggests that his approach can bemodied to accommodate o-path preemption as well, though he does not spec-ify the details, and it is not clear that such a modication would be consistentwith the rest of his approach, as will be described below. Finally, Veltman (1994)is also inuenced by the conditional logic interpretation of defaults, particularlyDelgrande's (1990) logic, but Veltman develops this extensively into a dynamicinterpretation framework called update semantics. Using update semantics, Velt-man attempts to provide a semantics for the inheritance reasoner proposed byHorty et al. (1990); however, the features of Veltman's system create importantdierences. Veltman's (1994) system can be seen as providing a semantics for thesame class of inheritance reasoners as Boutilier's (1993). The next sections givefurther informal detail about the mechanics of these three approaches. It probablywould be possible to extend these approaches to obtain the general parameterizedsemantics that this thesis provides in Chapter Five, but, it would certainly requirefoundational changes to both Delgrande's and Boutilier's systems. Veltman's up-date semantics, having more complex machinery to work with could require lessprofound modication. However, developing a correspondence between update se-mantics and the channel-theoretic semantics provided here is outside the scope ofthis thesis. As I have said in Chapter One, I adopt the channel-theoretic approachbecause it provides a convenient ontology for detailing precisely and perspicuouslya parameterized semantics for inheritance.Delgrande/Boutilier | conditional logicThe main idea behind the conditional logic approach to defaults (Delgrande, 1987,1988, 1990) is to use a modal logic with a conditional operator ), where A) Bmeans, \Unless there is an exceptional state of aairs, if A then B." Delgrandedevelops a rst order modal system (which is thus able to represent strict as wellas default information using the modal necessity operator for strict relations),and the propositional subset of this logic is equivalent to S4.3. The accessibilityrelation (E or ) associated with the logic is reexive, transitive, and forward
Inheritance Reasoning 39connected,13 where wiEwj denotes that wj is `at least as unexceptional as' wi (wj`is at least as normal as' wi). Given a sentence , [[]]M denotes the set of worlds inthe model M in which  is true and that set is identied as the proposition givenby . Delgrande provides a world selection function f that maps from a particularworld and the set of worlds given by a proposition to the set of E-accessible worldsthat are at least as unexceptional (most normal). Truth (j=) is relative to a worldand model.Denition 3 f(w; [[]]M) =fwijw  wi and j=Mwi ; and 8wj such that wi  wj and j=Mwj ;wj  wigThus the truth conditions for A ) B can be articulated as in Denition 4.This just means that A) B is true at a world w if the worlds at least as normalas w where A is true are a subset of the worlds where B is true; that is, in theworlds more exceptional than w where A is true, B need not be true.Denition 4 j=Mwj A) B i f(w; [[A]]M)  [[B]]M .Denition 5 j=Mwj A  B i if j=Mwj A then j=Mwj B.Given that the truth conditions for implication are standard (see Denition 5),it would be consistent to have for some constant c, A(c) ) B(c) and A(c) :B(c), because this just entails that there are no normal worlds where A(c) istrue. However, this means that the logic cannot support modus ponens for theconditional operator.Since default reasoning depends on a version ofmodus ponens Delgrande (1988)oers two equivalent methods for restricting models to render modus ponens ap-plicable. The rst method is called the assumption of normality, which holds thatthe modeled world is among the least exceptional, and the assumption of rele-vance, in which only those sentences known to have import for the truth value ofa conditional actually do aect the conditional's truth value. The ecacy of thenormality method is intuitive enough. The relevance method also assumes thatthe world being modeled is among the most normal|among those worlds onlythose facts known to impinge on the truth of a conditional actually do, thus, for13A relation R is forward connected i wiRwj and wiRwk implies either wjRwk or wkRwj .
Inheritance Reasoning 40example it is possible at those worlds to strengthen antecedents of conditionalslike raven ) ying thing to raven ^ albino ) ying thing although raven^ albino 6) black. Both of these methods are dened relative to default theo-ries which are modeled as tuples hD;Ci, where D is a set of formulae from thelogic N and C is a nonempty set of rst order formulae, with the intent that Dencodes default possibilities about how the world might be and C represents theway the world is known to be. The normality method entails adding formulae toD, including implications corresponding to conditionals (under the assumption ofnormality, if A ) B then A  B); then, a sentence  follows by default if fromthe extended D it can be derived that the most normal worlds where the sentencesof C are true are worlds where  is true. The complementary method augmentsC, the way the world is known to be, with contingent information from D so thatsentence  follows by default if it is a rst order consequent from the intersectionof possible extensions of C (since D can lead to conicting extensions). I have notdetailed the algorithms used by either of the two reasoning methods but they workin an intuitive way by consistently expanding D or C as appropriate. Delgrande(1988) shows the methods to be equivalent in terms of the conclusions sanctioned,and notes that the algorithm given for the second method leads most easily to animplementation which he also provides (Delgrande, 1990).Thus, the logic N augmented with the methods for generating maximal ex-tensions to be used in making conclusions by defaults yields a clear semanticsfor credulous, on-path preempting, coupled inheritance reasoners, mainly becausethose systems make roughly similar assumptions as those built into the prooftheory and semantics of N . Credulity falls out of building maximal consistentextensions|because of directly conicting defaults there may be more than onemaxima. Coupling, the agreement of subclasses on properties of superclasses, fol-lows from Denition 4 which holds that conditionals are true just when the mostnormal worlds containing the subclasses are a subset of the worlds containing thesuperclasses. Given transitivity of  and the assumption of normality, this entailsthat subclasses and superclasses will agree. In fact, the system's tight couplingis what establishes on-path preemption in addition to the stance on redundancymentioned in x2.2.2. Recalling the graphs that distinguish a reasoner's position onboth these properties, DA B CE and DA B C , respectively, it is clear that
Inheritance Reasoning 41with tight coupling there is no way for the negative path from a to the rightmostnode to be permitted without a and the intervening nodes on the positive chainhaving properties distinct from their superclasses. Thus, the system implementsonly on-path preemption without stability with respect to the addition of `redun-dant' links. Since the desire to have stability with respect to redundant links doespervade the inheritance literature and since it is further unclear how to achievedegrees of skepticism in this framework, Delgrande's system cannot be regardedas a generalizable semantics for inheritance reasoning.Boutilier (1989, 1993) presents an alternative conditional logic semantics forinheritance reasoning that is inuenced directly by Delgrande's work but paysattention to providing a semantics to a specic class of inheritance reasoners.Boutilier uses an extension of N called variously E or CT4D which admits nestedconditionals. To provide a semantics for inheritance that has a more standardtreatment of redundant links, Boutilier lters models with a topological denitionof redundancy and uses the minimal models in a derived preference relation. Idescribed Boutilier's (1993) notion of redundancy informally in x2.2.2. It is notnecessary to give further formal detail here, except to mention that it is a mod-ication of Touretzky's (1986) inferential distance ordering which measures the`betweenness' of nodes to enable preference for paths through the nearest nodeto the node in question (see Chapter One for a denition). It is the inferentialdistance ordering which identies certain links as redundant. As described earlier,Boutilier's modication just ensures that all links which have that same topologyare redundant, thus achieving greater stability than is possible in the system ofHorty et al. (1990) which is based on Touretzky's denition. Given a specicationof a coupled, credulous, on-path preempting denition for a network   to supporta link , CL( ) denotes the closure of   with respect to the supports relation. Amodel of a network   determines the truth of a positive, negative, or neutral linkbetween any two nodes. If  denotes the negation of a link through the path  in , it is possible to dene the set of links contradicted in   (Denition6).14Denition 6 CONTRA( ) = f :  2   and  is supported in CL( )g14Boutilier (1993) does not actually dene this through the closure operator, using this expres-sion instead: CONTRA( ) = f :  2   and  is supported in  g. However, this conates a lotof important issues: networks with their expansions and with their interpretations in models.
Inheritance Reasoning 42Because a model determines the truth of connections between all possible pairsof nodes, the articulation of a model determines a network. The preferred mod-els of a network   are those that satisfy the greatest amount of CL( ). Thus,the preference relation on models of networks is dened to minimize the set ofcontradicted links:Denition 7 If M1 and M2 are models of  , then M1 is as preferable as M2(M1 M2) i CONTRA(M1)  CONTRA(M2)A minimal model M for a network is one that satises   and for which no M 0exists such that M 0 < M . Nonmonotonic consequence is dened in terms of truthin all minimal models of a network.The lter on the topological structure present in a set of sentences supportedby a model is the main device for obtaining a semantics for inheritance reason-ing which comes closer to any of the extant inheritance systems than Delgrande's(1990) semantics. However, the semantics provided, which does not cope withparaconisistency, prevents Boutilier from oering an exact-t semantics for anyof the main inheritance systems. Boutilier's denition of redundancy, which dif-fers from Touretzky's (1986) as well as that of Horty et al. (1990), follows fromthe requirement of stability during closure under the supports relation. Withoutthe guarantee of stability, CONTRA( ) would be impossible to dene, and thus,the minimized relation would be lost. A second issue is that Boutilier's systemfails to dierentiate networks containing local inconsistencies. All direct-link con-icts lead to global inconsistency for the network. This is by at since actually(A) B)^ (A) :B) `CT4D 2:A, which means that direct conicts yield emptycategories that can only vacuously combine with other arguments, unlike the be-havior expected by inheritance proof theory. Modulo these caveats, Boutilier(1989, 1993) provides a semantics for stable, coupled, fully skeptical reasoningwith on-path preemption. Coupling is looser than in Delgrande's system becauseof the structure used to lter preferred models. Skepticism follows from deningconsequence in terms of truth in all minimal models of a network. On-Path pre-emption follows as in Delgrande's system; further, Boutilier (1993, p. 104) arguesthat o-path preemption is \fundamentally at odds" with redundancy.
Inheritance Reasoning 43Veltman | update semanticsVeltman's (1994) update semantics is also inuenced by the conditional logic ap-proach to defaults of Delgrande (1987, 1988). A formal precis of the mechanicsof Veltman's system is given in the appendix of this thesis. It is an interestingcontrast to the other approaches named here which both determine consequencefrom a set of sentences taken en masse; instead, update semantics focuses onthe sequential eects of sentences when applied to successive information states.The basic tenet of update semantics is that the meaning of sentences, defaultsincluded, is in the eect they have on a hearer's information state. This proce-dural view makes the update semantics framework an excellent candidate fromwhich to achieve a general semantics for path based inheritance, even though theformulation that Veltman (1994) gives does not provide an exact t to any of themain inheritance systems.The main idea is to model information states as sets of sentences `true' or `be-lieved' in those states (using the power set of proposition letters, so that at the un-informed state, any describable situation is possible). The semantics of sentencesis understood in terms of the sentences' eect in rening the current informationstate: a sentence can result in an update, which eliminates some of the possibil-ities (worlds); a test, which leaves the state alone but determines whether somesentence is consistent with the current state; or a `downdate' (revision), which canreinsert previously eliminated possibilities. Klein, Moens, and Veltman (1990) andVeltman (1994) focus on the rst two operations (see Lemon (1995) for an anal-ysis of revisions). Statements of propositions and defaults eliminate possibilitiesfrom the current information state. Tests correspond to inference. The problemof stability is tackled, thusly, by distinguishing explicit information contained in aset of updates from implicit information gleaned from tests. Closure of the set ofsentences under the test operation is not computed. In fact, closure is antitheticalto the idea of the update semantics framework which species the update prop-erties of dierent forms of sentences taken in sequence|given that the approachlocates the meaning of a sentence in its eect on information states and that thisexact eect is dependent upon the context which precedes it, any sort of closureover implicit information would yield inconsistency. The process-orientation of theframework makes it tenable as a procedural semantics for inheritance as hinted
Inheritance Reasoning 44by Dimopoulos (1992). Nonetheless, Veltman takes his views on the structure ofa default's eect on the state of information from Delgrande's approach to theconditional operator for defaults.Veltman (1994) translates defaults like \birds y" into sentences of the form ;  , `if  then normally  .' In his system, this means that the proposition  is a default in the domain of worlds (subsets of information states) described by, and defaults induce preferences in the information state for worlds where thepropositions they express are taken to hold. Since a default can have exceptions, itis clear that this has a strong relationship with the conditional logic interpretationin which the accessibility relation gives the conditional operator the meaning, \inthe least exceptional worlds where  then also  ." A more formal recount ofVeltman's work is given in the appendix, but briey I overview his approach andits relation to the others described above.Veltman's (1994) exposition is incremental, beginning with translations of theform \normally " which are less expressive, disallowing exceptions to rules. Inthe more complex formulation, an information state  is modeled as a tuple h; sirelative to W , a model of the universe (the powerset of possible sentences; thusa world in W is the set of sentences held true there). The elements of the tupleare s, a nonempty subset of W , and , a coherent frame (see appendix) on W .Essentially,  is a complex function that assigns a partial ordering to every subsetof W . Thus, for every domain  denes the set of preferences for the domain.This subsumes the world selection function of Delgrande's system. If [[]] is theset of worlds where  is held to be true, then for any sentence  containing onlythe classical connectives and for any information state , the update incited by ([]) is ? if s\ [[]] = ; and otherwise the update yields a new information statewith the elements of s not in [[]] eliminated. That is, processing a non-defaultsentence provides more information, eliminating possible ways the world mightbe. In contrast, processing a sentence like  ;  holds s constant in resultinginformation states, but induces a change in the preferences given in . Formally,this is achieved with a composition operator () on preference relations such that[ ;  ] is ? if the domain of worlds specied by  and  are disjoint as wellas if it is incoherent (see appendix) to compose the associated preferences, andresults in a rened set of preferences otherwise.
Inheritance Reasoning 45The net result is a powerful system which, like Delgrande's, puts the work ofpreferences for particular defaults in the semantics. The complexity of preferencemakes it easier to imagine a semantics tuned in this framework to the proof the-ories of a number of inheritance reasoners. However, also like Delgrande's andBoutilier's systems, the proof theory licensed by the most straightforward speci-cations as proposed by Veltman is distinct from the proof theory associated withany of the extant reasoners. In response to the question, Does Update Semanticsform a semantics for any of the extant reasoners?, Veltman writes:For all inference algorithms I am acquainted with, the answer to thisquestion is no. The algorithm for which the answer comes closest to yesis the one presented in Horty et al. (1990).Update semantics does not provide a sound or complete semantics for thatsystem since it licenses cascaded ambiguities as well as defeasible modus tollens(the former makes H90 unsound with respect to this semantics, and the lattermakes H90 incomplete). Stability does not emerge as a problem in this frame-work because Veltman distinguishes explicit and implicit knowledge using updatesand tests. Updates, as described above, create new information states with morerened information. Tests, sentences like `Presumably ', do not alter informa-tion states but rather test whether  is reasonable to assert in a given informationstate. Thus, implicit information is never added to the current state of knowledge.While there is reason to think that as Boutilier was able to bring Delgrande's con-ditional logic closer to being a semantics for inheritance, further study of updatesemantics might also yield a semantics for inheritance reasoning (indeed, this is atopic I intend to pursue in the future), the argument of this thesis is that ChannelTheory provides a more convenient set of tools for articulating a comprehensiveand parameterized semantics. Since this framework has also been studied as amodel of conditional reasoning (Cavedon, 1992) there is good reason to think thatit can provide at least a similar handle on the phenomena. Chapter Five of thisthesis will spell out the parameterized semantics in detail.
Chapter 3Psychological Plausibility ofInheritance Reasoning
3.1 IntroductionInheritance reasoners purport to provide a psychologically plausible model of rea-soning with defaults, partially motivated by the idea that tangled hierarchies areubiquitous in the organization of information, and partly for the descriptive powerthey provide in the semantic analysis of natural language generics. However, thereis considerable debate in the AI literature about the \correct" denition of inher-itance reasoning (Touretzky et al., 1987). Most of this discussion is based on logi-cians' introspective analyses of what conclusions can be drawn from any particularnetwork of propositional default statements. Conicting intuitions, perhaps prej-udiced by interest in proof-theoretic features like computational complexity (cf.Selman & Levesque, 1989; Horty et al., 1990), are in part responsible for the lackof an accepted unifying semantics for inheritance reasoning (see Boutilier, 1989).Given the absence of a parameterized model theory, it is surprising that until veryrecently there have been no psychological investigations designed to elucidate thesemantics of reasoning with generics with respect to the idealizations of inheritancetheory. Elio and Pelletier (1993) present results about the way people classify ex-0Deep thanks to Claire Hewson for collaborating on Experiment One; this chapter couldnot have existed without her. Thanks to Tyler Burns for connecting us with the students andteachers on SchoolNet (Lisa Callaghan and her students Christine and Kelly were quite helpful),as well as to Dianna Laurent and Norman Walker each for giving access to their undergraduates.46
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 47ceptional objects in light of default theories in relation to the way general defaultlogics (alternative nonmonotonic systems) classify the same exceptional objects.They also present the rst pilot study applying similar scrutiny to inheritancereasoners, but they do not consider other foundational claims of inheritance rea-soning. This chapter presents experimental work designed to ascertain whetherassumptions of inheritance reasoning about transitivity, negative reasoning, struc-tural preemption and structural redundancy are predictive of human reasoningwith generics. This same experiment was also designed to test the degree of tof extant theories of inheritance reasoning, and those results are reported here aswell. Some of the material reported here was rst presented by Hewson and Vogel(1994).3.1.1 Dening PlausibilityI take the psychological plausibility of a logic to be the degree to which it capturesthe reasoning patterns that people ordinarily use. Thus, I nd the modeling taskcloser to that of theoretical linguistics in nding the right level of grammaticalrepresentation to capture linguistic phenomena as it occurs, rather than as it isprescribed. That is, just as for natural language where a prescriptive grammaris no more `correct' than a descriptive one, neither is there a `correct' logic ofhuman reasoning. One can of course dene logics of `ideally rational agents',however those logics are nearly always undecidable, and therefore are perhapseven farther from the ideal for a rational agent to be driven by them. Goldman(1986) also argues that the concept of rationality should be dictated more by whathuman behavior demonstrates, instead of rating human reasoning as defective. Iam not concerned with whether logics provide a closer morphism to the processesthat actually govern human reasoning than some other formal framework (likemental models, for instance); rather, I am interested in the sort of logic thatprovides the best description language for expressing exactly those sentences thatpeople are likely to agree are true or worth acting upon. This position can ofcourse be assailed for methodological reasons by people with dierent goals: ifthe goal is to build a machine that's a `better' or more reliable reasoner thanhumans are then there is little reason to develop logics with an eye on psychologicalplausibility. On the other hand, if the goal is to describe human reasoning in
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 48a generative formal system, then I feel this is a reasonable way of proceeding.Moreover, even if the goal is to develop a machine that reasons more correctlythan humans, if it is to interact with humans it will have to have a model ofhuman reasoning. From this perspective, plausibility can be measured in terms ofthe degree of t between the conclusions licensed by a logic about a set of premises,and the conclusions reached by people. Depending upon the logic, there may be acorrespondence between proof theoretic parameters and reasoning strategies thatpeople use. There may be a partition on people's reasoning such that dierentsorts of logics capture the inferences of dierent elements of the partition, orequally possible, it may be that a person's reasoning is best described by onesort of logic in some cases and a dierent sort of logic in others. Because suchpartitioning involves a degree of consistency in people that is dicult to obtaineven in experimental conditions, I believe that the within-subject multiplicity oflogics is the best description. This assumption makes it reasonable to considerrelative proportions of response categories between subjects as indicative of therelative proportion of within subject variation as well.3.1.2 The Plausibility of Classical LogicThis chapter investigates the relative plausibility of various inheritance reasonerswith defaults in terms of their ability to capture the inferences that people make.Chapter Two of this thesis demonstrated that the inferences licensed by the mainfamily of reasoners I'm interested in are not classically valid. However, default in-heritance does seem to provide a better model of what people do. Goldman (1986)presents research of Rips and Marcus (1977), a table summarizing the percentagesof total responses for an assortment of arguments is given in Table 3.1. Thepercentages in each of the columns represent the corresponding proportion of par-ticipants who felt that the conclusion of the syllogism was always true, sometimestrue or never true, given the truth of the rst two sentences. Rips and Marcus(1977) nd that people are competent with modus ponens (arguments 1 and 2) andits potential misapplications (3 and 4) but that they are less adept with modus tol-lens (7 and 8) and its misapplications (5 and 6). Taplin and Staudenmayer (1973)suggest that subjects sometimes interpret the conditional as a biconditional toaccount for behaviors in arguments like 5 and 6 (which are parallel to 1 and 2
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 49under the  direction of the biconditional), however this is inadequate because itdoes not explain the dierence in the modus tollens arguments. Taplin and Stau-denmayer's (1973) experiments presented syllogisms to subjects over twelve trialsand were ltered for inconsistencies in answers over the trials; twenty-one percentof the subjects were removed in this way. Another twelve percent were consis-tent, but logically contradictory with respect to proposals for the truth functiondening the conditional.Argument Always Sometimes Never1. P  QP) Q 100y 0 02. P  QP)  Q 0 0 100y3. P  Q P) Q 5 79y 164. P  Q P)  Q 21 77y 25. P  QQ) P 23 77y 06. P  QQ)  P 4 82y 147. P  Q Q) P 0 23 77y8. P  Q Q)  P 57y 39 4Table 3.1: Percent of total responses for eight types of conditional arguments (ymarks the answer sanctioned by classical two-valued propositional logic)There at least two possible explanations of the lack of crispness in the testsof the other arguments besides modus ponens. One is that the dierences can be
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 50explained in terms of people relying on more than two truth values, such that theydo not feel compelled to make the expected response to the negated conclusion thatthey would under a two-valued system. However, the classical handling of negationin 1 and 2 slightly undermines this explanation. An alternative explanation is thatthey rely on a dierent sort of implication than the material implication, one inwhich it can be the case that P implies Q and where P can be true while Q is false.Default inheritance reasoning supplies exactly such a system: if Ps are typicallyQs and P holds of a but Q doesn't hold of a, it just means that a is an atypicalP , an exception with respect to Q. It is reasonable in such a system to use theinformation that Ps are typically Qs, and that Q fails to hold to conclude thatP holds, because in the absence of information about classes like :P , P can bejust one of those exceptions. Given that exceptions can exist, it may be moreappropriate than speaking of `truth' to refer to how reasonable it is to concludesomething, given the knowledge known.I tested this by partially replicating the Rips and Marcus experiment usingthe arguments presented in 1, 2, 7 and 8, with 4 additional variations on thosearguments designed to examine reasoning with negation. In the study by Ripsand Marcus (1977) subjects were asked to state whether the conclusion was al-ways, sometimes, or never true, given the premises. Subjects each were presentedwith the same set of arguments (in random order) either in the form shown inFigure 3.1, or in the form shown in Figure 3.2. Both versions are equivalent to thepresentation supplied by Rips and Marcus (1977) however without the symbolismfor the logical constants. The dierence between the two forms is in the qualica-tion of the conclusion, subjects were asked either to state whether the conclusionwas always, sometimes or never true given the premises, or reasonable to conclude.The idea is that the criterion reasonable to conclude need not be as strict as true.Thus, there should be a substantial dierence in question responses between thetwo conditions if the non-default (classical) interpretation is the one that peopleordinarily bring to the interpretation of implications and truth assessment. Theresults of this test are illustrated in Table 3.2. Twenty nine subjects participatedvia e-mail or in person. Subjects were either U.K. university students or membersof the general public with access to internet (e-mail participants made themselvesavailable via e-mail after an appeal for participation was posted to a random selec-
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 51tion of general (non-technical) newsgroups (see Laurent & Vogel, 1994)). Subjectswere arbitrarily assigned to exactly one of the two conditions. Between the twoconditions (whether the subject was asked to rate whether the conclusion was trueor whether it was reasonable) there is not a signicant dierence in distributionsof answers to each problem. Examining the answer distributions within each con-dition, it was found that the modus ponens arguments elicited responses that werenot likely to be random, but this is less true for the modus tollens arguments. Thelack of signicance in distributions between the two tables indicates that the nullhypothesis that there is no dierence in interpretations of \true" and \reasonableto conclude" cannot be rejected. However, the surprise nding is the result thateven in the modus ponens case, people were almost as likely to respond that ifP implies Q, and if P is true then Q can sometimes be false. This is in strikingcomparison to the results obtained by Rips and Marcus (1977) as well as by Taplinand Staudenmayer (1973) for the same problem. They found subjects much morelikely to behave as predicted by material implication { Table 3.1 demonstratescomplete conformance for that problem (Rips & Marcus, 1977), while Taplin andStaudenmayer (1973) had about ninety-two percent correct.This leads me to conclude that default inheritance reasoning captures humanreasoning with implications better than classical two-valued propositional logic.The observed behavior (nding Q potentially false, when P implies Q and P istrue) is coherent within a default logic perspective since the P in question cansimply be exceptional. There is a dierence between Taplin and Staudenmayer's(1973) experiment and mine in that they tested argument classications using\If-Then" sentences rather than \Implies" | it seems that If A then B is moreclassical than A implies B. I ran another version of my experiment on thirty-fourundergraduate and graduate students in special education at Bualo State Collegein New York using \If-Then" rather than \Implies" and did in fact obtain resultscloser to theirs: only nine percent gave a defeasible interpretation ofmodus ponens.However, a number of subjects changed their initial responses; considering rstresponses rather than nal answers eighteen percent answered that Q is sometimestrue when it is true that If P is true then Q is true and that P is true, whichis the defeasible interpretation. Unfortunately, it is dicult to base analyses onpatterns of answers that have been canceled. Even more interesting is the classical
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 52inconsistency exhibited in response (using nal answers) to the following syllogismin comparison to the modus ponens case:(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is falseWhen asked if the third sentence is true given the truth of the rst two, half of thesubjects replied that (3.) is sometimes true, thirty-eight percent found it alwaystrue, and only twelve percent `correctly' identied it as never true. Asked of thesame syllogism whether (3.) is reasonable to conclude on the basis of the rsttwo sentences a very dierent pattern of response emerged: eighty percent found(3.) never reasonable to conclude; fteen percent found it sometimes reasonableand ve percent found it always reasonable (each subjects received all sixteensyllogisms in this experiment | thus, the subjects were dierentiating `truth' and`reasonable'). This strongly implies something at work other than a two-valuedinterpretation of truth. It is also direct evidence for defeasibility if people tendto think that Q can sometimes be false when it is true that if P then Q andP is true. Where Taplin and Staudenmayer (1973) was concerned to eliminatesubjects who did not conform to the truth-functional denition of a conditionaloperator, I am more interested in nding a logic that captures the patterns ofreasoning that are not valid within the classical two-valued framework but whichpeople nonetheless deem reasonable. Of course, it is obvious that quantication isnot propositionally formalizable, but the implication results should hold roughlyfor the rst order case of both systems, classical two-valued systems and defaultsystems. It remains, given the space of possible inheritance reasoners sketched inChapter Two, to determine which proof theoretic variations of default inheritanceprovide the most complete coverage of the arguments that people see as reasonable.
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Let P and Q be arbitrary propositions | propositions are sentences that can potentiallybe asserted as true or false (like squares have four sides). Please answer the belowquestions in which it does not matter what the propositions P and Q are.Please respond to the four three-sentence problems that follow by indicating whetheryou think the third sentence is a true sentence all the time, some of the time, or never(check only one answer to each question).(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is true Always Sometimes Never3 is a true sentence:(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is false Always Sometimes Never3 is a true sentence:(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is neither true nor false Always Sometimes Never3 is a true sentence:(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is either true or false Always Sometimes Never3 is a true sentence:(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is false Always Sometimes Never3 is a true sentence:(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is true Always Sometimes Never3 is a true sentence:(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is neither true nor false Always Sometimes Never3 is a true sentence:(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is either true or false Always Sometimes Never3 is a true sentence: Figure 3.1: `True'
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Let P and Q be arbitrary propositions | propositions are sentences that can potentiallybe asserted as true or false (like squares have four sides). Please answer the belowquestions in which it does not matter what the propositions P and Q are.Please respond to the four three-sentence problems that follow by indicating whetheryou think it is reasonable to conclude the third sentence from the rst two all the time,some of the time, or never (check only one answer to each question).(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is true Always Sometimes NeverIt is reasonable to conclude 3 from 1 & 2:(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is false Always Sometimes NeverIt is reasonable to conclude 3 from 1 & 2:(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is neither true nor false Always Sometimes NeverIt is reasonable to conclude 3 from 1 & 2:(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is either true or false Always Sometimes NeverIt is reasonable to conclude 3 from 1 & 2:(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is false Always Sometimes NeverIt is reasonable to conclude 3 from 1 & 2:(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is true Always Sometimes NeverIt is reasonable to conclude 3 from 1 & 2:(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is neither true nor false Always Sometimes NeverIt is reasonable to conclude 3 from 1 & 2:(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is either true or false Always Sometimes NeverIt is reasonable to conclude 3 from 1 & 2:Figure 3.2: `Reasonable'
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True (\3 is a true sentence").Problem Always Sometimes Never Total 2, d.f.=2 Signicance(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is true 8 7 0 15 7.599 p < :05(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is false 0 6 9 15 8.4 p < :02(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is neither true nor false 1 1 13 15 19.200 p < :01(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is either true or false 12 1 2 15 14.8 p < :01(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is false 7 7 1 15 4.799 no(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is true 0 6 9 15 8.4 p < :02(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is neither true nor false 2 4 9 15 5.2 no(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is either true or false 9 3 3 15 4.799 noReasonable (\It is reasonable to conclude 3 from 1 & 2")Problem Always Sometimes Never Total 2, d.f.=2 Signicance(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is true 6 6 2 14 2.286 no(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is false 1 4 9 14 7 p < :05(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is neither true nor false 2 1 11 14 12.999 p < :01(1.) P implies Q(2.) P is trueTherefore, (3.) Q is either true or false 9 2 3 14 6.143 p < :05(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is false 5 6 3 14 0.999 no(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is true 2 6 6 14 2.286 no(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is neither true nor false 3 3 8 14 3.571 no(1.) P implies Q(2.) Q is falseTherefore, (3.) P is either true or false 8 4 2 14 4 noTable 3.2: Ratings of Argument Validity
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 563.1.3 Other Investigations of Default SystemsTo my knowledge Elio and Pelletier (1993) and Hewson and Vogel (1994) have beenthe only investigators to address the plausibility of arguments from researchers inthe various default logics about the conclusions that should be reached in canon-ical examples. In some areas there is a consensus on the conclusions that shouldbe reached (Lifschitz, 1989; Dorosh & Loui, 1989) although there is open debateon how complex problems should be resolved as well as controversy over sim-pler problems in the subset of the literature that deals with default inheritance(Touretzky et al., 1987). Pelletier and Elio (1993) give an overview of applicationsof nonmonotonic reasoning, and (p.21) point out:Despite the acknowledgement by the articial intelligence communitythat the goal of developing non-monotonic systems owes its justicationto the success that ordinary people have in dealing with default reasoning,there has been no investigation into what sorts of default reasoning or-dinary people in fact employ. Instead, articial intelligence researchersrely on their introspective abilities to determine whether or not theirsystem ought to embody such-and-so inference. And even the 25 Bench-mark Problems of Lifschitz were formulated with absolutely no regardto whether ordinary people in fact do reason in the way prescribed!Elio and Pelletier (1993) present results of experiments in which they presentedsubjects with concrete instances of some of the benchmark problems. Specically,they studied the literature prediction that the existence of an object that is anexception to a default should have no inuence on the application of the default toother objects. They considered two factors which might interact with conclusionsabout what they call the object-in-question given the existence of an exceptionobject. One factor is the specicity of the information that relates the exceptionobject to the default, and the other is the degree of similarity between the twoobjects. Note that it is dicult to imagine approaching this investigation usingabstract categories and objects; however, their between-subject variation betweenhaving the individual make a judgement and determining what would be reason-able for a robot to decide does probably approximate abstract reasoning. A sampleproblem (low similarity, positive form,1 human reasoner) is given below:1This means that the way in which the exception object is exceptional is specied; negativeform does not detail the way the default rule is violated|in negative form, this example wouldnot have specied where the exception object, the Craftsman drill, is.
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 57You know There is a Craftsman electric drill andthere is also a Black & Decker electric drill.Electric drills are normally stored in theutility cabinet.The Black & Decker drill is a cordlessmodel.You also know The Craftsman drill is on the workbench.What is reasonable to decide about where the Black & Decker drill is?The literature would predict that specicity of information known about theexception-object should not aect decisions about the object in question. Neithershould the degree of similarity between the two objects. However, it was foundthat answers did in fact vary with specicity and similarity. Subjects favored thebenchmark response more under low similarity than when the objects were highlysimilar. Also contrary to the predictions of the literature, subjects preferred thebenchmark response more when there was low specicity about the exceptionalnature of the exception-object. Elio and Pelletier (1993) also applied the sametechnique (reasoning about exception objects and distinct objects) in a pilot ex-periment about inheritance reasoning but did not report denitive ndings. Inone case they found ninety percent conformance to benchmark predictions andin another only fty-three. However, the highly polarized case was one in whichthe prediction was a negative classication, animals other than birds cannot y,and in the more divergent case it was a positive classication, birds other thanostriches can y. Additionally, the problems were quite complex (ten inheritancelinks in the former case and twelve in the latter). There is reason to think thatwhen problems are suciently complex subjects will opt for negative conclusionsas a denial of the the availability of a positive conclusion (see below). In any case,I am not aware of further results in the area, apart from quite specic ndingsabout a particular inheritance problem which will be made clear when appropriatelater in the chapter. Elio and Pelletier (1994) have also studied belief revision, arelated area of nonmonotonic reasoning.
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 583.2 Experiments3.2.1 OverviewTwo experiments are presented in parallel. The rst was conducted by Hewsonand Vogel (1994) and further analysis of their data is presented here. The secondexperiment utilizes exactly the same materials, but balances the conditions dif-ferently in order to match imbalances in the rst experiment. Analyses based onpooled data have not been constructed but would be a valuable exercise with theaccumulated mass of data.3.2.2 MethodIn Experiment One, seventy-two subjects were each presented with 40 problemsthat were designed to elicit responses which would determine whether people rea-son in accord with particular inheritance reasoners. The problems were comprisedof sets of statements about abstract classes, as in the tests of classical logic de-scribed in the introduction. Abstract classes were used to forestall respondentsfrom utilizing world knowledge or opinion to resolve problems on the basis ofinformation not given in the premises. In Experiment Two, ninety-eight under-graduates were each presented with the same 40-problem questionnaire used in therst experiment. The experiment was intended to replicate the rst experiment,validating the pooling of conditions in the rst experiment.Materials.Each problem presented a set of default statements about abstract classes, followedby a question in multiple choice format; the question asked what conclusions couldbe drawn, based on the stated information, about the relationship between twoof the classes represented (see Figure 3.3). In each problem, the respondent isasked to characterize the relationship between the `leftmost' and `rightmost' classmentioned in the premises. The full questionnaire contained all 40 problems, andtypically took a half hour to an hour to complete.The problems were presented either in graphical form, in sentential form, orwith both graphical and sentential forms together; this created one between sub-
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 59jects factor|mode of presentation|which had three levels (graph, sentence, andgraph+sentence). For each mode of presentation of a problem, the question re-mained the same. Thus, for the sentential presentation that the question is aboutthe `leftmost' and `rightmost' classes is less obvious; however, that does not matterto the answer. Within the inheritance literature the kind of information repre-sented in such problems tends to be presented graphically; the purpose of con-structing a factor `mode of presentation' was to determine whether the responseselicited by subjects would be aected by this factor. This has important method-ological implications for investigating the psychological plausibility of inheritancereasoners. Figure 3.3 shows the graph+sentence version of problem No. 1.1
A B C As are normally Bs. Bs are normally Cs.What can you conclude from these statements? As-terisk (*) the appropriate answer.(a) As are normally Cs.(b) As are normally not Cs.(c) As are normally Cs and normally not Cs.(d) It isn't denite whether As are normally Cs ornormally not Cs.(e) I don't know.If you wish, explain why you reach this conclusion.
Figure 3.3: An Example QuestionSubjects.The experiments concentrated on identifying subjects untutored in logic or arti-cial intelligence. Thus, the initial pilot was run on individuals with long waitsbefore their trains at Waverley Station in Edinburgh. In Experiment One, 48Canadian students between 7th and 12th grade participated as a result of a call
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 60for subjects posted to SchoolNet, an electronic network of Canadian schools; 24post-secondary school individuals from North America and Europe participatedby responding individually to a call for subjects sent to an assortment of inter-net newsgroups. Experiment Two relied on undergraduate university studentsenrolled in English literature or composition courses at Southeastern LouisianaUniversity. The analysis below considers the 72 subjects tested electronically inExperiment One and the 96 subjects from Experiment two.Design and Procedure.Experiment One. Each subject was presented with a questionnaire containingall 40 problems, randomly ordered; two random presentations (one random orderand its reverse) were used and subjects were randomly assigned to receive eitherof these. The questionnaire contained full instructions to subjects on how to an-swer the problems; it was stressed that there were no right or wrong answers, andsubjects were to say what they thought could be concluded from the informationgiven. The mode of presentation factor created three experimental conditions: inone condition subjects received each problem in graph format, in a second condi-tion subjects received each problem in sentence format, and in a third conditionsubjects received each problem in both sentence and graph formats together.The materials were distributed electronically. As the Canadian secondaryschool students did not have facilities for previewing graphics, they were assignedto the sentence only condition, as were four of the other people who respondedto the electronic call for participation. Text les containing the questionnairein both orderings were emailed to the relevant teachers who randomly assignedthem to students and organized their return. The graph only and mixed modes ofpresentation were oered to people with access to internet news, upon individualrequest. For each of these conditions, les containing the same orderings of theproblems as in the sentence only condition and corresponding answersheets weremade available via FTP in a unique location, so that no participant had accessto other possible conditions in which to participate accidentally, the answersheetsreturned to us electronically upon completion. A general overview of possiblemethodologies for Internet-based experimentation is given by Laurent and Vogel(1994). Ten subjects received the graph only condition and 10 received the mixed
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 61modes of presentation. No limit was imposed on the time subjects spent on eachproblem. The results were pooled in the analysis; because of the dierent numberof subjects in each mode of presentation and because of the categorical data, anonparametric statistical test was required for the analysis, specically, log-linearanalysis.Experiment Two. Each subject was presented with a questionnaire containingall 40 problems, randomly ordered; two random presentations (one random orderand its reverse) were used and subjects were randomly assigned to receive eitherof these. The mode of presentation factor created two experimental conditions:in one condition subjects received each problem in graph format, in a secondcondition subjects received each problem in sentence format. There was an unequalnumber of subjects in each of the conditions because of an administrative error.Further, eight of the questionnaires were excluded from analysis because one pagehad been duplicated and substituted for another, thus creating a situation inwhich subjects would not all have had the same set of questions. The materialswere distributed and returned via post. Of the ninety subjects whose materialswere analyzed, seventy-six subjects were in the graph-only condition and fourteenwere in the sentence only condition. The analysis utilized the same nonparametricstatistical test as experiment one, log-linear analysis, which is eective when thereis an unbalanced distribution of data points in the conditions. Nonetheless, insome cases the skew compromises the reliability of the resulting 2 analysis of thesignicance of dierences in distributions.3.2.3 Results and DiscussionThe results were analyzed by picking out sets of problems that enabled conclu-sions to be drawn regarding the conformance of subjects' responses to specicpredictions of inheritance reasoners. By this method it was possible to examinethe extent to which people reasoned in accord with particular isolable features ofthese models.Responses were coded in terms of the multiple choice answer categories (a{e,as shown in Figure 3.3), thus making it possible to directly compare subjects'responses with the predictions of inheritance reasoners. Answer `a' always repre-
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 62sented a positive classication of the leftmost node as typically classiable by therightmost node (As are normally Bs). Answer `b' always represented a negativeclassication As are normally not Bs (not the negation of answer `a', that wassupplied by answer `d'). Option `c' classies an assertion of denite inconsistencyrepresented by a set of generic statements, but option `d' expresses indeterminacy.This distinction is important to the inheritance literature since most inheritancelogics classify the statements in Figure 3.4.a as inconsistent, but the ones repre-sented by Figure 3.4.b and Figure 3.4.c are deemed inconclusive. However, bothanswers `c' and `d' can be grouped together to form a general response categorymeaning \not `a' or `b'," since the alternative option `e', \I don't know," wasalso provided and exercised. In analysis of the data, categories `c' and `d' werecollapsed into a single response category, and the category `e' (I don't know) wasexcluded; thus the three response categories used were `a', `b', and `c/d'. Sub-jects' responses are referred to as the predicted answer (the answer to a problemas predicted by H90 when it is `a' or `b'), the complement answer (when it is `a'or `b'), or an indeterminate answer (when it is `c or d').
A Ba. Inconsistency A B CDb. Ambiguity
A B C Dc. VacuityFigure 3.4: Category `c/d': IndeterminacyTransitivityTo test whether people reason in accord with transitivity subjects' responses tothe problems with just one linear path, or a linear path with a redundant link,were compared with the responses predicted by the inheritance literature. The sixproblems considered were comprised of four for which the predicted answer was `a'(positive classication), and two for which the predicted answer was `b' (negativeclassication).
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 63Experiment One.It was found that 66% of subjects' responses conformed to the literature pre-diction; of the remaining 35% of responses, 11% fell into the complement categoryand 23% fell into the indeterminate category `c/d'. A chi square analysis showedthis dierence in the proportion of responses in each category to be signicant(2(2) = 199:6; p < :01).These results indicate that people do tend to reason in accord with transitivity.This means that people tend to conclude from the facts that As are normallyBs and Bs are normally Cs that As are normally Cs. Having said this, therewere still a remaining 35% of responses which did not accord with the transitiveconclusion; this result may reect the inuence of considered statistical validity|indeed, a number of subjects indicated this as the motivation for their answers.Inheritance reasoners generally admit transitivity, although as noted in ChapterTwo, some systems limit the length of chaining. For linear graphs the tendency toreason transitively t up to the maximum length tested|three links (i.e. subjects'responses did not vary as a function of number of links). This nding supportsthe basic assumption of inheritance proof theory that some chaining should beadmitted. More complex tests below examine the relationship between transitivityand other properties assumed by the inheritance literature.Considering the question of whether the mode of presentation aects the waysubjects respond, the proportion of responses in each category for the graph, sen-tence, and graph+sentence conditions were compared. Log linear analysis showedthat mode of presentation did aect responses to problems for which the pre-dicted answer was `a' (2(4) = 33:87; p < :01), but not those for which the pre-dicted answer was `b'. For the former, the graphical conditions (graph only andgraph+sentence) elicited mainly predicted responses, no complement responses,and very few indeterminate responses; however, in the sentence only conditionsubjects were less likely to give the predicted answer and more likely to give boththe complement and indeterminate answers. Note that for each mode of presen-tation answers were more likely to conform to the predictions of transitivity, butthe `cleaner' conformance in the graph-only condition is stark. It suggests thatthe graphs lend interpretive strategies in addition to simply denoting the equiv-
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 64alent generics. This suggests that the natural semantics of graphs interacts withreasoning about problems when they are expressed as graphs, but problems withcertain structures might lead to signicantly diverging responses. This is an im-portant point because inheritance proof theory has been developed largely withtopological features of graphs in mind, and for that reason may have been misledinto devices that conict with human reasoning with generics. Although therewas no signicant eect of mode of presentation on responses to the problems forwhich the predicted answer was `b', a similar trend was observed.Experiment Two.It was found that 88% of subjects' responses followed the literature prediction.The remaining 12% of responses split as follows: 5% fell into the complementcategory and 7% fell into category `c/d'. A chi square analysis revealed a signicantdierence in the proportion of responses in each category (2(2) = 381:225; p <:01).These results bolster those from the rst experiment in supporting transitivityin simple problems. People tend to conclude from the facts that As are normallyBs and Bs are normally Cs (or Bs are normally not Cs) that As are normallyCs (As are normally not Cs). Note that this result is in fact stronger than theone reported in Experiment One where only 66% conformed to the literature'sprediction. Loglinear analysis in that case revealed a signicant eect from themode of presentation, however that did not occur in the present experiment.Summary. Table 3.3 summarizes the results of this section. The problem de-picted there is typical of the section: the others diered solely in the numbers oflinks. The numbers in the columns indicate the percentages of the participantswho responded to that question in each answer category. The predicted answerwas positive classication (answer category `a'): As are typically Ds. The captionasks a question about the graphs to make clearer what relationship subjects werelooking for, but it must stressed that this is just for expository purposes here |the questions were always articulated as described in the Methods section, using amultiple choice based on a relationship about the endpoints of the set of statements(always, `a' represented the positive classication; `b', the negative classication;
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 65`c/d' indeterminate classications). That is, never did the questionnaire actuallyask simply, \Are As typically Ds?" (see Figure 3.3 in x3.2.2).TransitivityProblem Indeterminate Negative PositiveExp. 1 23 11 66
A B C D Exp. 2 8 5 87Table 3.3: Percentages of Responses in Each Answer Category: Are As typicallyDs?Negative PathsNegative paths can be distinguished from negative chains by dening the latteras sequences of links containing one or more negative links but which are notalso negative paths. The predicted classication of negative paths is negative(answer category `b'), and of negative chains is indeterminate (category `c/d'). Totest whether people reason in accordance with this distinction, responses to thoseproblems with one negative path only were compared with responses to those withone negative chain only.Experiment One.For both chains and paths subjects gave very few `a' responses; since `a' rep-resents positive classications as in As are typically Cs, few `a' responses werepredicted as the problems tested contained negative links. However, whereas fornegative paths there were a lot more `b' (65%) than `c/d' (27%) responses, fornegative chains there were roughly equal numbers of `b' (41%) and `c/d' (47%) re-sponses. Subjects were more likely to say `b' and less likely to say `c/d' for negativepaths than for negative chains (2(6) = 32:91; p < :01), thus indicating that theydo distinguish between the two. This suggests that people dierentiate the validityof transitivity and general negative chaining. However, the results present somesurprises: although people largely reason in accord with predictions for negativepaths, the answers elicited with respect to negative chains show greater devia-tion from literature predictions. The equal proportion of `c/d' (predicted) and
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 66`b' answers to negative chains indicates a substantial tendency for people to optfor the answer predicted by set theoretic interpretations. One speculation, whichprovides a basis for follow-up studies, is that less abstract problems would alterthis pattern of responses.Log linear analysis revealed that mode of presentation had an eect on subjects'responses for negative chains (2(4) = 19:36; p < :01) but not for negative paths.For chains, in the graph only condition subjects responded `c/d'(64%) more oftenthan `b'(33%), but in the sentence only condition there were equal numbers ofresponses in these categories (43%). (The graph/sentence condition had slightlymore `c/d'(54%) responses than `b'(42%) responses). This result reinforces thetrend observed in the preceding discussion of transitivity for responses to be morepolarized in the graph conditions than in the sentence condition.Experiment Two.In response both to problems containing just a negative path and to those con-taining just a negative chain, subjects gave very few `a' responses (3% in responseto negative paths and 6% in response to negative chains), slightly more indeter-minate responses (`c/d'; 11% for negative paths and 19% for negative chains),and mainly `b' responses (86% for negative paths and 75% for negative chains),indicating a sort of `transitive' conclusion that there is a denite negative rela-tionship between the endpoints of the chain. This gives a dierent nding fromExperiment One in that there is less distinction in between response patterns fornegative paths and negative chains, although the 11% dierence in `b' responsesis met mainly by an increase in `c/d' responses, thus creating the same directionof the trend found in Experiment One. In fact, subjects were more likely in thecase of negative chains to answer `a' or `c/d' than they were in the case of neg-ative paths (2(2) = 9:12; p < :02). Moreover, this nding amplies the surprisefound in Experiment One: whereas in that experiment an equal amount of `b' and`c/d' answers were noticed, here substantially more answers were `b' for negativechains, but by denition, negative chains are those that the literature predictsshould be `c/d'. Given the principle dierence between experiments in subjectsbeing average age, this means that the younger population from the earlier ex-
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 67periment peformed closer to the set-theoretic ideal of correctness. Given that theage group in Experiment Two is more representative of the adult population, thismeans that inheritance reasoners in general do not implement basic patterns ofreasoning with negative information.Mode of presentation was found to have had an eect on subjects' responses(2(5) = 21:36; p < :01). As in Experiment One, this eect existed for negativechains but not for negative paths, even though more people selected `b' than `c/d'in Experiment Two. For negative chains, in the graph only condition, `b' wasanswered 78% while `c/d' was given 16%; in the sentence only condition, therewas a more even distribution: `b' | 60%, `c/d' | 37%. This result reinforces theobservation that graph-only conditions yield more highly polarized responses.Summary. Table 3.4 summarizes the results of this section. The problems thereare representative of the set of problems tested in this section; the others dieredsolely in the numbers of links. The numbers in the columns indicate the percent-ages of the participants who responded to that question in each answer category.The predicted answer was negative classication in the case of negative pathsAs are typically not Cs. The literature predicted that the second set, negativechains, would be classied as indeterminate rather than with either the positiveor negative classication. Negative PathsProblem Indeterminate Negative PositiveExp. 1 27 65 8
A B C Exp. 2 11 86 3Negative ChainsProblem Indeterminate (Pred) Negative PositiveExp. 1 47 41 12
A B C Exp. 2 19 75 6Table 3.4: Percentages of Responses in Each Answer Category: Are As typicallyCs?
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 68Preemptive LinksAs described in Chapter Two, preemptive links are treated almost uniformly in theliterature as providing more specic information that should override longer pathswhose endpoints they connect. To test whether subjects dealt with preemptivelinks as predicted by the literature, 5 pairs of problems were compared; eachcomparison involved a graph and its sister graph which was identical except forthe addition of one preemptive link. Thus, the task was to determine whetherthere was a signicant dierence in the patterns of responses to the two problems.Experiment One.The rst comparison involved the graph ( A B C ) and its sister ( A B C ); theinheritance literature predicts that subjects should answer `b' (negative classica-tion) to the rst of these and `a' (positive classication) to its sister. Subjects gavemainly the predicted answer (68%) to the rst graph, but there were also a fairnumber of indeterminate responses (27%); however, for the sister graph subjectswere as likely to give an indeterminate response (42%) as the predicted response(43%). Log linear analysis showed that the dierence in distribution of responsesto each of these problems was signicant (2(6) = 63:31; p < :01); thus, with theaddition of the preemptive link there was a reduction of `b' (predicted) responseswhich was reected in an increase in both `a' (predicted) and `c/d' responses (withthe increase in predicted responses being greater). This result suggests that theeect of a preemptive link is not to override the existing path, as the inheritanceliterature argues, but rather to add extra information which is considered alongwith the existing path.Log linear analysis showed an interaction between the dierence in subjects' re-sponses to each of the problems and mode of presentation (2(4) = 13:07; p < :01):for the graph only and graph+sentence conditions there was a very large dropin the number of `b' responses (from 90% and 78%, both to 0%) between thegraph and its sister, accounted for by an increase in both `a' and `c/d' responses.However, for the sentence only condition the observed drop in `b' responses wasa lot less (61% to 20%), and was accounted for primarily by an increase in `a'responses. Again this result conrms the observation that the distribution of sub-
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 69jects' responses tends to be more polarized when graphical rather than sententialinformation is presented.A second comparison involved the two graphs ( A B C ) and ( A B C ). Thispair is symmetric to the preceding one, and elicited an almost identical patternof results (in terms of predicted, complement, and indeterminate responses). Theinheritance literature predicts that people will answer `a' to the rst graph and `b'to the second graph. Subjects did mostly answer as predicted to the rst graph(64%), but also answered ambiguous (24%) about a third as often; for the sistergraph there were roughly equal numbers of predicted (49%) and ambiguous (43%)responses. Thus between the rst graph and its sister there was a decrease in thenumber of `a' responses, accounted for by an increase in `b' responses and, to alesser extent, `c/d' responses. As in the preceding comparison, log linear analysisshowed the observed dierence in the distribution of responses to each of thesetwo graphs to be signicant (2(6) = 64:26; p < :01). This sustains the inferencethat people do not treat a preemptive link as overriding an existing path in theway the inheritance literature predicts. Surprisingly, in contrast to the previouscase, no signicant eect of mode of presentation was found for this comparison.The graphs ( A B C D ) and ( DA B C ) were involved in the third com-parison. Again, log linear analysis showed that the distribution of subjects' re-sponses between each of these graphs was signicantly dierent (2(6) = 35:05; p <:01), and this eect interacted with mode of presentation (2(4) = 10:26; p < :05).Subjects gave mainly the predicted answer (60%) to the rst graph, though therewere also about half as many indeterminate responses (31%); for the sister mostresponses fell into the indeterminate category (54%), and roughly half as many ineach of the predicted (24%) and complement (22%) categories. In this case theaddition of the preempting link revealed a decrease in `a' (predicted) responses,accounted for by an increase in both `b' and `c/d' responses; however, the pre-dicted increase in `b' responses was smaller than the unexpected increase in `c/d'responses. Again this result suggests that the eect of a preempting link is notto override the existing information, but to add to it. As for the eect of modeof presentation, for both the graph-involving conditions there was a large drop inthe number of `a' responses|in the graph only condition this drop was accountedfor by an increase in `c/d' responses, and in the graph/sentence condition it was
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 70accounted for by an increase in both `c/d' and `b' responses. In the sentence onlycondition the decrease in `a' responses was less marked, and was accounted forby an increase in `c/d' and `b' responses. Again the graph conditions show morepolarized response.A fourth comparison examined a pair of graphs which are symmetric to theabove pair, ( A B C D ) and ( DA B C ). The pattern of responses elicitedby these graphs was very similar to the pattern described above (in terms ofpredicted, complement, and indeterminate responses). For the rst graph theliterature prediction was answer `b'; subjects did mostly give response `b' (61%),but also responded `c/d' (28%) and `a' (10%); for the sister graph the literaturepredicted answer `a', but in complete contrast subjects responded `a' the least (only15%), `b' slightly more (19%) and mainly `c/d' (66%). Thus with the addition of apreemptive link the number of `b' responses decreased, but rather than this eectbeing accounted for by an increase in `a' responses (as the literature predicts),an increase in `c/d' responses was observed. Again the observed dierence inthe distribution of responses to each of these graphs was signicant under a loglinear analysis (2(6) = 36:21; p < :05). This reinforces the same conclusion, thatpreemptive links do not override existing links of opposite polarity, but tend topush people towards concluding there is a conict, and choosing response `c' or`d'. However, unexpectedly, the eect of mode of presentation in this case was notsignicant though it did approach signicance 2(4) = 8:8; p = :0642.A nal analysis compared graphs ( A B CD ) and ( A B CD ); the distributions ofresponses between these two graph were signicantly dierent (2(5) = 22:00; p <:01). To the rst graph subjects responded mainly `c/d' (65%) as predicted, andto a lesser extent, and each about equally, `a'(15%) and `b' (19%)); to its sisterthey responded mostly `b' (53%) as predicted, but also `c/d' (37%) and `a' (10%).Thus, addition of a preemptive link in this case is reected in a decrease in `c/d'responses, accounted for by an increase in `b' responses. Since this shift from `c/d'to `b' responses was only partial, where the literature predicts a complete shift from`c/d' to `b', this result also conrms the idea that addition of a preemptive linkdoes not override the existing link. There was no eect on mode of presentation onthis result. This test provides a specic point of comparison with the results of thepilot experiment run by Elio and Pelletier (1993); we found for the rst of the two
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 71graphs that people mainly classied the graph as indeterminate (65%) and only15% and 19% in each of the denite categories while in Elio and Pelletier's (1993)study of the same problem (presented with interpretations and with a dierentsort of question) roughly half of the people found the problem determinate, thoughpeople still split about equally between the two determinate categories.Experiment Two.The rst comparison involved the graph ( A B C ) and the related network( A B C ). As mentioned above, the literature predicts that subjects will respond`b' to the rst and `a' to its sister. Subjects gave mainly the predicted answer(86%) to the rst graph, but there were also some number of indeterminate re-sponses (10%) and complement responses (4%); however, for the sister graph, thepercentage of indeterminate response (54%) was much closer to the percentage ofpredicted response (38%). This is the same trend found in Experiment One, al-though there was a smaller percentage of indeterminacy in that study. Log linearanalysis showed that the dierence in distribution of responses to each of theseproblems was signicant (2(2) = 110:912; p < :01). With the addition of the pre-emptive link to the rst graph ( A B C ) creating the second graph ( A B C ),there was a reduction of `b' responses (predicted for the rst) which was reectedin an increase in both `a' (predicted for the second) and `c/d' responses (withthe increase in nonpredicted responses being greater). This result, increased in-determinacy arising from the explicit preemptive link, corroborates the nding ofExperiment One that the eect of a preemptive link is not to override the existingpath, as the inheritance literature argues, but rather to add extra informationwhich is considered along with the existing path. However, contrary to the resultsin the rst experiment, there was no eect of mode of presentation on responses.This is interesting since the eect in Experiment One was an increase in responseslabeling a problem indeterminate when stated in the sentence only condition overthe responses to the same question in the graph only condition. However, in thepresent case, indeterminacy in response to the preemptive link was the majorityresponse under both modes of presentation.The symmetric pair ( A B C ) and ( A B C ) elicited a similar pattern of re-
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 72sponse. If people responded the way the inheritance literature treats these graphs,they would answer `a' to the rst graph and `b' to the second. Subjects did mostlyanswer as predicted to the rst graph (90%), but also answered ambiguous (7%)and a very small percentage gave (3%) the complement response. To the sis-ter graph (which had a roughly equal split in response between predicted andindeterminate classications in Experiment One) subjects classied it mainly asindeterminate (62%), while a quarter of the people gave the predicted answer andabout half as many as that gave the complement response (13%). The dier-ence in response patterns was signicant (2(2) = 102:191; p < :01), suggestingagain that direct explicit links are not treated as preemptive in human reason-ing, but somehow confounding. In comparison to the symmetric pair of problemsgiven above, the preempted link, which was negative in this comparison, yieldedmore complement responses, rather fewer predicted responses and substantiallymore indeterminate responses (however, this dierence was only approaching sig-nicance). This trend suggests a dierence exists in reasoning with additionalpositive and negative preemptive links. There was not a signicant eect of modeof presentation.Response to the graphs ( A B C D ) and ( DA B C ) were quite dier-ent from the previous cases even though structurally they are quite similar. Asin Experiment One, log linear analysis showed that the distribution of subjects' re-sponses between each of these graphs was signicantly dierent (2(2) = 57:720; p <:01), and this eect interacted with mode of presentation (2(5) = 21:95; p < :01).Subjects gave mainly the predicted answer (93%) to the rst graph (cf. 60% inthe rst experiment), and more indeterminate classications (6%) than comple-ment responses (1%) (cf. 31% and 9%, respectively, in Experiment One). For thesister graph most responses were in the indeterminate category (49%) followed bythe complement category (38%), with the smallest amount of people following theactual prediction (13%). By contrast, for experiment one, while roughly half ofthe responses were also in the indeterminate category, the remainder were evenlysplit between the indeterminate and complement categories. The response to theadditional, preemptive, link seems to have been a substantial (but not complete)decrease in `a' responses (predicted for the rst graph) accounted for mainly byan increase in the `c/d' responses. As in Experiment One, the predicted increase
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 73in `b' responses was signicantly less than expected. This reinforces evidence thatadditional direct links do not actually preempt the other information, but augmentit in a way that perhaps leads to ambiguity and inconclusiveness. The mode ofpresentation eect was quite stark, though curiously not demonstrative of greaterpolarization of response in the graph-only condition. Rather the dierence be-tween the two graphs in the graph only condition lead to a fairly even divisionof responses between the indeterminate and complement categories, with a smallpercentage (7%) in the actual predicted category. By contrast, in the sentenceonly condition there was a shift from a fully predicted response (100%) to mainlyindeterminacy (54%) and the rest in the predicted category (46%). There were noresponses in the complement category.The related comparison between graphs symmetric to the above pair, ( A B C D )and ( DA B C ) found a very similar pattern in terms of predicted, complement,and indeterminate responses. For the rst graph the literature prediction wasanswer `b', and subjects did give response predominantly `b' (85%), but also re-sponded `c/d' (13%) while giving a negligible complement response `a' (2%). Forthe sister graph the literature predicted answer `a', but few subjects responded `a'(only 17%), `b' (the complement response for this graph) slightly less (15%) andmainly `c/d' (68%). This is virtually the same breakdown as in Experiment One.Thus with the addition of a preemptive link the number of `b' responses decreased,but rather than this eect being accounted for by an increase in `a' responses (asthe literature predicts), an increase in `c/d' responses was observed. Again theobserved dierence in the distribution of responses to each of these graphs wassignicant under a log linear analysis (2(2) = 85:626; p < :01). This reinforcesthe same conclusion, that preemptive links do not override existing links of oppo-site polarity, but tend to push people towards concluding there is a conict, andchoosing response `c' or `d'. Quite curiously, there was not an eect of mode ofpresentation in this case. This is interesting since there was an eect for the re-lated graphs just above, and there was similarly no eect of mode of presentationfor this particular case in Experiment One either (although in that case the trendwas approaching signicance). It is also interesting to compare the results of thesister graph in this case with the sister graph in the preceding case: for both, theunpredicted `c/d' resonse was the majority (58% and 41%), however in the case in
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 74which a negative link was added to a positive chain subjects were more likely togive the complement answer, `a' rather than the answer predicted by preemption(32% answered `a' and 11% answered `b'), and in the case of the positive linkadded to the negative path, the answer was split roughly equally (13% and 11%).This dierence was signicant 2(2) = 9:213; p < :05, and gives further evidenceto an asymmetry in the handling of positive and negative information.The nal analysis of preemption compared graphs ( A B CD ) and ( A B CD ).the distributions of responses between these two graph were signicantly dierent(2(2) = 14:253; p < :01). The association between the presence or absence of thepreemptive link and answer category was quite strong (predicting the answer onthe basis of the problem structure would have reduced the error of guessing it atrandom by 24% (using y proportional reduction in error)), although this associ-ation is not in the direction predicted by inheritance reasoners. To the rst graphsubjects responded overwhelmingly `c/d' (72%) as predicted, and to a much lesserextent, `b' (18%) and rather fewer responded with `a'(10%). Note that this is evenfurther from replicating the Elio and Pelletier (1993) result (half indeterminate,and an equal split between `a' and `b' on the remainder) than the rst experimentwas. To the sister graph, people responded with mainly `c/d' (52%), slightly fewerwith `b' (43%), and some `a' (5%). That is, with the preemptive link, subjectstended to nd the graph more indeterminate than without, although still mainlyindeterminate. Again, the trend towards indeterminacy is much stronger than inExperiment One where the answer distribution ran thusly, `b' (53%), as predicted,but also `c/d' (37%) and `a' (10%). This nding gives further support to the ideathat preemptive links supply confounding information. As in the rst experimentthere was no eect on mode of presentation on this result independent of the as-sociation between answer category and the presence or absence of the preemptivelink.Summary. Findings of this section are given in a dierent way in Table 3.5.The problems shown in the table are just those with the link that the literaturepredicted would be considered preemptive. The columns indicate the percentagesof the participants who responded to that question by classifying it with the answercategory indicated by the column heading (indeterminate = `c/d', negative = `b',
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 75positive = `a'). The predicted response was positive classication for the rst andfourth networks, and negative classication for the others.PreemptionProblem Indeterminate Negative PositiveExp. 1 42 15 43
A B C Exp. 2 54 8 38Exp. 1 43 49 8
A B C Exp. 2 62 25 13Exp. 1 54 24 22
DA B C Exp. 2 49 13 38Exp. 1 66 19 15
DA B C Exp. 2 68 15 17Exp. 1 37 53 10
A B C
D Exp. 2 52 43 5Table 3.5: Percentages of Responses in Each Answer Category: Are As typicallyCs? Ds?Redundant LinksThe last section discussed preemption, a phenomenon in which a topologicallydistinguished link is supposed to override other information encoded in a set ofsentences. This section considers a similar phenomenon, but one in which theliterature predicts the link to be ignored.The eect of redundant links on subjects' responses was examined by compar-ing the responses to pairs of graphs that were identical apart from one redundantlink; if subjects reason in accord with the predictions of the literature then theiranswers should not be aected by the addition of a redundant link. These pairedcomparisons could be broken into two groups based on the balance of polarityamong paths through the networks|those in which the original graph had anequal number of positive or negative paths and for which the additional link wouldhave oset the balance and those in which the original graph had only paths ofone polarity or the other and the additional link created just another path of thesame polarity. As expected in the latter case, it was found, for each of the paired
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 76comparisons, that subjects' responses were not signicantly aected by the addi-tion of a redundant link, nor was there an interaction of mode of presentation.The former case is more interesting to the inheritance literature since it involvescomparisons between graphs like ( DA B C ) and ( DA B C ), and if the in-heritance literature is correct there will be no dierence in response because theadditional link contains no information that is not already in the original graph.An alternative proof theory in which explicit links are assumed to convey novelinformation might propose a method of `path counting' in which the number ofarguments in favor of one conclusion or the other determines the decision andwould predict a dierent response between the two problems.Experiment One.As it happens, there was not a signicant dierence in response, which in thiscase fails to support path counting. However, it cannot really be taken as evidencefor the predictions of the inheritance literature because the inheritance literaturepredicted no change in answers between the two graphs, but further predicted adenite rather than indeterminate response to the graphs. The response patternsfor the rst graph were stated in the preceding section where it was pointed outthat people behaved contrary to the predictions of the inheritance literature: 24%gave the response predicted by the literature (`b', negative classication) and22% gave the complementary response, while 54% classied it as indeterminatealthough the literature presents strong intuitions that people will give a positiveclassication (answer `b') to conclude that As are normally not Ds. People gavesimilar responses to the sister graph with the redundant link (62% indeterminate,17% predicted and 21% complementary). Log linear analysis showed there to beno signicant dierence between the distributions of responses to each of thesegraphs. This supports the intuition presented in the inheritance literature thatthe additional link is in fact redundant, even though the predicted response to thegraph is not borne out. To understand this, note that a `path counting' systemwhich incorporated a topological denition of redundancy would have predictedthat both graphs be classied as indeterminate since they would have an equalnumber of non-redundant positive and negative paths.
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 77Another comparison examined the pair, ( DA B C ) and its sister ( DA B C )which are symmetric in polarity to the rst comparison. As in that case, peopleanswered contrary to the inheritance literature for the rst graph: 66% indeter-minate, 15% predicted (`a') and 19% complement. For the sister graph responseswere: 53% indeterminate, 11% predicted, and 36% complement. Again there wasno signicant dierence between the distributions of responses to each of thesegraphs. It is interesting that, though not signicant, there was an observed trendin the responses to these two graphs such that with the addition of the redundantlink responses shifted away from determinacy, not to the literature-predicted an-swer (`a'), but to the answer that would have been predicted by a path countingmethod (`b'). However, the nonsignicance of the dierence gives support to theidea that the additional link does not convey novel information.Experiment Two.The responses to the graphs ( DA B C ) and its sister ( DA B C ) werecompared to verify the literature's prediction that there should be no dierence inconclusions between these graphs. In Experiment One, the dierence in responsedistributions were not signicant, however in Experiment Two there was a signif-icant dierence (2(2) = 7:669; p < :05). In the rst experiment, people foundthe rst graph indeterminate (66%) and were roughly equally split between com-plement and predicted responses and found the second graph less indeterminate(53%), giving a small predicted response (11%) and a substantial complement re-sponse (36%). In Experiment Two, response to the rst graph was slightly lessdeterminate (predicted: 17%; complement: 15%; indeterminate 68%), and therewas a shift in response to the graph with a `redundant' link added (predicted: 8%;complement: 31%; indeterminate 61%) parallel to that found in Experiment One.In particular, with the redundant link in place, people were less likely to give eitherthe predicted response or the indeterminate classication, and more likely to givethe complement response. An interpretation of this nding which is aligned withthe ndings of the previous section is that redundant links are not actually treatedas such. If one imagines the redundant link forming part of a second negative pathbetween A and D, then aside from the overwhelming majority who nd the graph
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 78indeterminate to start with, there is a substantial population that might be rea-soning that two negative paths override the single positive path (path counting).Mode of presentation did not have a signicant eect on the association betweenanswer category and the presence or absence of the redundant link.Given the earlier nding that people do not reason with negative informationas predicted by the literature, that they respond paths with nonnal negativelinks (and multiple negative links) as negative paths, it is interesting to comparethe second graph ( DA B C ) with a related one ( DA B C ), also dierentfrom the rst graph ( DA B C ) by one link, although the literature does notnd the additional link redundant in this case because it contains information notalready expressed in the path it spans. The response pattern to this third graphwas quite parallel to the second (`a': 16%; `b': 32%; `c/d': 52%) (there was not asignicant dierence in the distributions between those two), dierent in admit-ting more predicted responses, but still mainly categorized with indeterminacy orcomplementary responses. However, that does give support to H90 uniquely, as itmainly provides further evidence that people reason with negative information dif-ferently than expected by the literature, and one possibility is that people considersequential negations to be an armation, and in that case, a path counting model(which the literature does not advocate for path based reasoning) would also bepredictive of those determinate responses.2 To complete the set of comparisons,the rst graph was compared with the third, and the dierence in distributionswas signicant (2(2) = 6:575; p < :05). This, and the lack of signicance in thedistribution of responses between the second and third graphs, suggests that a`redundant' link carries as much information as other links. This is consistentwith the nding that `preemptive' links do not have overriding status.A comparison was also made with respect to a pair of graphs ( DA B C ) and( DA B C ) symmetric to the rst set, but the results dier somewhat with theoriginal comparison and with the same comparison from Experiment One. Essen-tially, there was no signicant dierence in the distribution of responses to each ofthe problems (for the rst | predicted, `b': 13%; complement, `a': 38%; indeter-2Moreover, it's possible that a partition exists along these lines: those who see sequentialnegations as armations, those who see sequential negations as intensiers, and those who seethem as creating indeterminacy. A path counting model be parameterized for each of theseperspectives.
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 79minate, `c/d': 49%; and the second | predicted, `b': 8%; complement, `a': 39%;indeterminate, `c/d': 53%). This is quite interesting since the literature predictsthat the redundant link should make no dierence. However, this is complicatedby a few issues. Most important is that less than 15% of the people conformedto the literature prediction that the answer should have been `b', favoring mainlyindeterminacy and to a lesser extent, the complementary response. A second issueis that there was an eect of mode of presentation (2(5) = 19:87; p < :01). Underthe graph only condition the results are essentially the same as for the sample asa whole, while under the sentence only condition there was a signicant dierencein the patterns of responses to the two graphs (2(2) = 9:547; p < :01). In thesentence only condition (as in the graph only condition) almost exactly half of theresponse was indeterminacy, but the remaining response was polarized: forty-sixpercent gave the predicted response `b' to the rst graph, and forty-three per-cent gave the complement answer `a' to the second graph, contra to the literatureprediction that answers should not switch between the graphs.3 In sum, this com-parison fails to support the literature prediction that redundant links should notcomplicate reasoning. The sentence only case gives further support for redundantlinks supplying as much information as any other. The signicance of the modeof presentation eect is quite interesting since it suggests a sharper division be-tween the way people reason with the same information presented graphically orsententially. The shift to the complement response was larger for this comparisonthan in the last one, and does replicate the trend observed in Experiment One.As for the rst set of comparisons in this section, it is useful to compare thesecond graph ( DA B C ) to a third related one that has a link of oppositepolarity replacing the redundant one ( DA B C ). In this case, the dierencein distributions is signicant (for the rst | predicted, `b': 8%; complement,`a': 39%; indeterminate, `c/d': 53%; and for the second | predicted, `b': 30%;complement, `a': 25%; indeterminate, `c/d': 45%) over all (2(2) = 13:924; p <:01), as well as at both levels of the mode-of-presentation factor. The literature3One potential explanation of this phenomenon is not that sentential presentation polarizesthe response in itself, but that it makes the problems so much more dicult to reason aboutthat when problems are suciently complex people who reach denite conclusions do so on thebasis of the rst chain of reasoning they are able to make through the sentences. Clearly in thisconnection the order of sentence presentation would have to be explored.
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 80predicts `b' as the response in both cases, and there is an increased proportion of`b' responses for the third graph, though not signicantly more than the number ofcomplement responses. This result can be interpreted as additional evidence thatpeople's reasoning with negative information is quite distinct from the literature'sexpectations: a path counting model that took into consideration the potential fornegative chains to be used as negative paths could predict this trend in the data.The mode of presentation also had a signicant eect on the association betweenthe pattern of response and the presence of the redundant or nonredundant links.The dierence comes mainly from the response to the third graph. In the graphonly condition, the responses were mainly of indeterminacy (43%) with an exactlyequal split of the remainder between the complement and predicted categories. Inthe sentence only condition, the response was more polarized (7% complement,36% predicted, 57% indeterminate) towards the predicted answer. This ndingis quite interesting given the ambiguous nature of the eect of reasoning withsentences and from graphs. The nal relation to consider in this cycle is thecomparison between the rst ( DA B C ) and third graphs ( DA B C ). In thiscase, the distributions of responses are signicantly dierent (2(5) = 23:25; p <:01). The theoretical import of this is subsumed in the above discussion.A nal cycle of comparisons is made between the graph ( A B C D ) and( DA B C ), the latter of which contains a redundant link. Here, the literaturedenes the negative link between B and D in the second graph to be redun-dant; thus, the literature predicts a response of `b' to both graphs. In fact, theobserved response was overwhelmingly according to the literature prediction forboth graphs: mainly the predicted answer (85%), some indeterminacy (13%), anda small amount in the complement category (2%). This contrasts with the relatedcase reported in the preemption section: ( A B C D ) and ( DA B C ).4 Ofcourse, there was also a signicant dierence in the patterns of response to thesecond and third graphs (2(2) = 94:238; p < :01). This cycle of comparisons4The dierence in the distribution of responses to these two graphs is highly signicant(2(2) = 85:626; p < :01). The rst graph was categorized overwhelmingly as predicted (85%),somewhat as indeterminate (13%), and minimally with the complement category (3%), while thesecond was considered mainly indeterminate (68%), least with the predicted category (15%), andslightly more with the complement category (17%). From the rst graph to the second, thereis a tremendous shift towards indeterminacy and a substantial (15%) change in complementcategorization, away from the predicted categorization.
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 81substantiates the literature's predictions to a degree: since the ndings suggestthat where the addition of a topologically redundant link does not have any bear-ing on other conclusions, it is in fact redundant. This is quite dierent from theliterature's notion of redundancy. An additional test of this hypothesis comesfrom comparing responses to the graphs ( A B C D ) and ( A B C D ). Here,the literature predicts symmetrical results to those in the rst pair of graphs inthis cycle. And the trend towards predicted response is preserved, albeit with ajust-signicant (2(2) = 7:774; p < :05) shift towards the complement response(11% rather than 1%) in the graph with an additional link. The same trend alsoexists between the graphs ( A B C D ) and ( A B C D ).Summary. Responses to questions about networks that the literature deemsto contain redundant links are shown in Table 3.6. The columns indicate thepercentages of the participants who responded to that question by classifying itwith the answer category indicated by the column heading (indeterminate = `c/d',negative = `b', positive = `a'). The predicted response was negative classicationfor the rst network, and positive for the second.RedundancyProblem Indeterminate Negative PositiveExp. 1 62 17 21
DA B C Exp. 2 53 8 39Exp. 1 53 36 11
DA B C Exp. 2 61 31 8Table 3.6: Percentages of Responses in Each Answer Category: Are As typicallyDs?O-path/On-path preemptionRecall that a distinction between varieties of preemption presuppose that preemp-tion is an operative constraint. Both experiments found that graphs for whichpreemption would have made a dierence did elicit signicant dierences in re-sponse patterns, but not in the direction predicted by the literature, suggesting
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 82that links topologically identied as preemptive actually supply only as much in-formation as the other links. It is nonetheless interesting to compare graphs forwhich a distinction in types of preemption would make a dierence, to simplergraphs in which preemption would also hold. A second style of comparison exam-ines the potentially preempting graphs, contrasting them with other graphs thatlack the explicit cancellation that preemption would supply.Experiment One.Two problems, ( DA B CE ) and ( DA B C ), were compared to test on-path vs. o-path preemption. The literature prediction for the latter problem wasresponse `a' (positive classication) under both denitions of preemption, and forthe former `a' according to o-path preemption but `c/d' according to on-pathpreemption. Thus on-path preemption would predict a shift in responses to thetwo problems from `a' for the latter towards `c/d' in the former, whereas o-pathpreemption would predict no shift from response `a'. In fact log linear analysisrevealed that there was no dierence in the distribution of subjects' responses tothese two problems; however, this result cannot provide support for either theory ofpreemption since subjects responded mainly `c/d' to both problems. The patternof responses ran as follows: for the rst problem { `a' (o-path predicted) 9%, `b'(complement) 32%, `c/d' (indeterminate) 59%; for the second problem | `a' 11%(predicted), `b' 36% (complement), `c/d' 53% (indeterminate). Even though H90predicts no change in answer pattern between the two graphs, this result does notsupport that theory since the answer pattern for the base case (given in the secondgraph) confounds predictions to start with. The preponderance of `c/d' answersin the second case is likely the result of some other factor like complexity of theproblem leading to the conclusion that the graph is indeterminate, rather thansomething constrained by preemption simpliciter. There was a signicant eectfrom mode of presentation on the association between the answer category andthe presence or absence of the additional link. This eect was signicant over allthree levels of mode of presentation (2(10) = 24:68; p < :01) (where the trendwas polarization with answers shared between the predicted and indeterminatecategories in the graph only condition, wide distribution (but with focus on the
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 83complement and indeterminate categories) in the sentence only condition, andpolarization shared between the complement category and indeterminate categoryin the graph+sentence condition) as well as over the graph only and sentenceonly modes alone (2(5) = 19:82; p < :01). A second, symmetric, comparisoninvolved the graphs ( DA B CE ) and ( DA B C ). The literature predictionfor the latter problem is response `b' in both sorts of preemption. The predictedanswer for the former problem diers: the o-path preemption prediction for thatgraph is `b', whereas the on-path preemption prediction is `c/d'. Again therewas no signicant dierence in the distribution of subjects' responses to each ofthese problems (rst problem: `a', 17%; `b', 27%; `c/d', 56/regarding the relativeplausibility of the two versions of preemption. There was no eect of mode ofpresentation in this case.A second set of comparisons involved the graph ( DA B C ) and ( DA B CE )were compared. The literature prediction for the former is `a' whether using onor o-path preemption. For the latter graph, the o-path preemption predictionis `a', whereas the on-path preemption prediction is `c/d'. For the rst graph, theobserved pattern of response was mainly indeterminacy (`c/d', 66%), and roughlyequal amounts of `a' (positive classication) and `b' (negative classication) re-sponses (15% and 19%, respectively). For the second, there was less indeterminateresponse (59% in total), more `b' responses (32% in total) and fewer `a' responses(9% in total). There was no signicant dierence in the distribution of subjectsresponses to each of these problems. However, since again the most frequent re-sponse to the former was `c/d' and not `a' as predicted, it is not possible forthe results to distinguish between on-path and o-path preemption. There wasnot an overall signicant eect of mode of presentation on the distribution of re-sponses, but there was a signicant eect at the graph only and sentence only levels(2(5) = 15:72; p < :01). Similarly, the graph ( DA B C ) and ( DA B CE )were compared. The literature predicts response `b' for the latter graph using ei-ther on or o-path preemption, while for the former o-path preemption predicts`b' whereas on-path preemption predicts response `c/d'. There was no dierencein the distribution of responses between these problems (the rst graph: `a', 22%;`b', 24%; `c/d', 54%; the second graph: `a', 17%, `b', 27%, `c/d', 56%), nor was
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 84there a signicant eect from the mode of presentation. Again since response `c/d'was predominant in both cases it is not possible to distinguish between on-pathand o-path preemption. Essentially, neither of these sets of comparisons is ableto arbitrate between on-path and o-path preemption as a more plausible proof-theoretic device in modeling human reasoning. This seems to be the result of thecomplexity of the problems at stake | very likely other issues are determining the`c/d' responses. Evidence that this is the case comes from the ndings about themore foundational assumptions about redundant links and basic preemption builtinto inheritance reasoners.Experiment Two.The rst comparison was between ( DA B CE ) and ( DA B C ). The lit-erature prediction for the second problem was response `a' (positive classication)under both denitions of preemption, and for the former `a' with o-path pre-emption but `c/d' (indeterminacy) with on-path preemption. There was not asignicant dierence in the distribution of responses to either of these graphs.There was a slight shift away from indeterminacy (61% reduced to 54%) towardsanswer `a' (8% increased to 16%) between the rst problem and the second, butthe main responses were indeterminacy and the complement category. This wasthe basic nding in Experiment One as well. Note the substantial number ofcomplement category responses to both problems (about 30% in each case): thiswould seem to be additional support for the predictions of a path-counting modelsince both graphs have two negative paths and a single positive path. The othertrend is that the more complex the problem, the more indeterminate the response.There was an eect of mode of presentation approaching signicance: essentially,in the sentence only condition virtually all of the responses were indeterminacy forboth graphs. A second, symmetric, comparison involved the graphs ( DA B CE )and ( DA B C ). The o-path preemption prediction for the rst graph is `b',whereas the on-path preemption prediction is `c/d'. The literature prediction forthe second graph is response `b' in both sorts of preemption. There was only avery small dierence in the pattern of responses to the two problems: about half ofthe participants rated both graphs indeterminate, only ten percent gave the pre-
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 85dicted response, and the remaining forty percent answered with the complementresponse. The focus on the complement response occurred in the symmetric caseas well, and strengthens support for path counting models since in this case thereare two positive paths and only one negative path. Again no conclusions can bedrawn regarding the relative plausibility of the two versions of preemption sincepreemption seems not to be a good predictor of responses in the rst place. Therewas a just-signicant eect (2(5) = 14:14; p < :05) of mode of presentation inthat of the ten percent of the predicted responses to the rst graph, sixty percentof them occurred in the sentences only condition.A second set of comparisons examined whether there was a dierence in re-sponse to the graphs for which on or o path preemption would make a dierenceand basic graphs without the extra chain of statements. These graphs were alsoused in testing basic preemption in the earlier section. Based on the lack of sig-nicance in the dierence between response patterns to the complex and simplerpreemptions in the preceding paragraph, one would expect the same results tohold in this set of comparisons which obtained for the basic preemption examina-tions. Consider ( DA B C ) and ( DA B CE ). The literature prediction for theformer is `a' whether using on or o-path preemption. For the latter graph, theo-path preemption prediction is `a', whereas the on-path preemption predictionis `c/d'. More than half of the response to both graphs was indeterminacy (68%for the former and 54% for the latter). For the rst graph, the remainder of theresponse was nearly evenly divided (about 16%) between the predicted and inde-terminate categories. About that same percentage responded with `a' to the sec-ond graph as well, but about twice that many categorized the second graph usingthe complement response (the dierence coming from the reduction in indetermi-nate responses). Again, this is supportive of a path-counting model as the secondgraph has two negative paths and only one positive path. However, this trend wasnot statistically signicant. Neither was there an eect of mode of presentation.A nal comparison in this section used graphs ( DA B C ) and ( DA B CE ),structurally similar to graphs used for a comparison in considering redundancy.As with the last comparison, and the one concerning redundancy, there was nota signicant dierence in the distributions of responses (for the rst graph, 38%
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 86`a' responses, 13% `b' responses, and 49% `c/d'; for the second, 41%, 12%, and47%, respectively). The literature predicts `b' for the rst graph with either styleof preemption, and also for the second graph in the case of o-path preemption.The on-path prediction for the second graph is `c/d'. Again, the preponderance ofindeterminate responses in both cases make it impossible to adjudicate betweenon-path and o path preemption. The lesser but nearly equal choice of the com-plement category for both graphs is rather interesting because apart from beingcontrary to the literature's prediction, it also is a surprise to the path-countingmodel, which would predict a dierence between the two graphs. There was asignicant eect of mode of presentation (2(5) = 33:76; p < :01) in which thetrend actually went in the opposite direction under the sentence only condition(roughly equal proportions in the indeterminate and predicted categories and fewin the complement). This gives more reason to believe that dierent strategies arein place for reasoning with sentential and graphical presentations.Summary. Responses to questions about networks that dierentiate reasonerswith respect to on-path and o-path preemption are summarized in Table 3.7. Thecolumns indicate the percentages of the participants who responded to that ques-tion by classifying it with the answer category indicated by the column heading(indeterminate = `c/d', negative = `b', positive = `a'). The predicted responseusing o-path preemption was positive classication for the rst network, andnegative for the second. Using on-path preemption, the predicted response to theboth problems is indeterminacy.On-Path/O-Path PreemptionProblem Indeterminate Negative PositiveExp. 1 59 32 9
DA B C
E Exp. 2 54 30 16Exp. 1 56 27 17
DA B C
E Exp. 2 47 12 41Table 3.7: Percentages of Responses in Each Answer Category: Are As typicallyDs?
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 87Cascaded ambiguitiesA nal group of comparisons was intended to determine the most plausible ap-proach to nested ambiguities.Experiment One.The rst minimal pair compares a graph that has just a negative path anda second chain that the literature would not dene as a path ( E C F DA B ) withanother graph with a nested set of conicting chains ( E C F DA B ). Inheritancereasoners tend to agree that people should say `b' for the former problem, be-cause there is only one proper path, and it is a negative path. H90 is distinct inits approach to the latter problem; if people behaved as predicted by H90 theyshould respond `b' to the latter problem whereas if they followed the prediction ofcascaded ambiguities in other reasoners they would respond with answer category`c/d'. Thus between the two problems H90 predicts no shift from response `b',but other reasoners predict a shift from `b' to `c/d' responses. It was found thatsubjects did respond `b' less (67% reduced to 31%) and `c/d' more (26% increasedto 58%) for the latter graph, as compared with the former (log linear analysis,2(2) = 17:345; p < :01) (the `a' responses remained few | 7% and 11%). Thusthis result challenges H90 and favors the prediction of other reasoners on this issue.There was not a signicant interaction from the mode of presentation.A second comparison examined one of the same graphs from above ( E C F DA B )with another graph in which there is a pair of conicting paths embedded in alarger graph ( E C F DA B ). Both H90 and other reasoners predict response `a' forthe latter problem (as there are no conicting paths between the extreme end-points); however, H90 predicts response `b' for the former problem whereas otherreasoners predict response `c/d' (as mentioned above). The observed responsedistributions ran thusly: for the rst problem { `a', 11%; `b', 31%; `c/d', 58%;for the second problem | `a', 35%; `b', 12%; `c/d', 53%. The distribution ofresponses to these two problems were found to be signicantly dierent (log linearanalysis, 2(2) = 13:793; p < :01); although subjects responded mainly `c/d' toboth, response to ( E C F DA B ) was marked by a decrease in `a' responses made
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 88to ( E C F DA B ), accounted for by an increase mainly in `b' responses but also in`c/d' responses. This favors the H90 reasoner which predicts that a decrease in`a' responses should be accounted for by an increase in `b' responses (as opposedto `c/d' responses as predicted by other reasoners), given that the increase in`c/d' responses was not signicant. However, the large number of `c/d' responses(the dominant response) provides better support for non-H90 reasoners in general.Thus this result provides mixed evidence, and no clear support for either theory.There was not a signicant interaction from the mode of presentation.A nal comparison looked at the second of the previous two problems ( E C F DA B )which had an embedded pair of conicting paths and compared it with a relatedone ( E C F DA B ) which contains nested conicting paths. There was a signicantdierence in the distribution of responses 2(2) = 8:95; p < :05: `a' responses de-creased (from 35% to 16%) and `b' responses increased (from 12% to 28%) betweenthese two problems. The indeterminate response remained roughly constant forthe two problems (53% and 56%, respectively). All reasoners predict that subjectsshould respond `a' to the rst problem, but whereas H90 predicts an `a' response tothe second other reasoners predict `c/d' (meaning that the nested conicts cascadeinto nested ambiguity). In fact, `c/d' was the most frequent response (equally) toboth problems (which, again, undermines support for H90 in general). There wasa shift from `a' responses as predicted by reasoners which cascade ambiguities,but this was accounted for by an increase in `b' responses rather than the inde-terminacy cascaded ambiguity would predict. The shift to `b' responses is alsocontrary to the H90 prediction, but is compatible with a theory about negativechains being counted. There was not a signicant interaction from the mode ofpresentation.These results suggest a partitioning of respondents into the group that fol-lows H90's prediction and the group that nds both graphs in the minimal pairsindeterminate. To the extent that such a partitioning is possible, there is somesupport for H90 through the second and third comparisons. However, this supportis undermined by the rst comparison which favored cascading ambiguities. Theoverwhelming percentage of `c/d' answers perhaps indicates that when problemsget complicated then they are increasingly likely to be found indeterminate, but
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 89the best metrics of complexity are dicult to identify. Alternatively, another ex-planation may be lurking in the data. Clearly more work needs to be done onthis. It is interesting, however, to compare the signicance of the results found inthis section with the lack of signicance in the preceding section: it does suggestthat there is some systematicity to discover.Experiment Two.The rst comparison was again between ( E C F DA B ) and ( E C F DA B ), whichdier in whether there is a nested ambiguity. The literature for the most partpredicts the response `b' for the former problem. H90 is distinct in its approach tothe latter problem; if people behaved as predicted by H90 they would respond `b' tothe latter problem, but if following cascaded ambiguities they would respond withanswer category `c/d'. Thus between the two problems problems H90 predictsno shift from response `b', but other reasoners predict a shift from `b' to `c/d'responses. As in Experiment One, it was found that subjects did respond `b' less(by 51%) and `c/d' more (by 36%) for the latter problem in comparison to theirresponses to the former, and the trend was highly signicant (log linear analysis,2(2) = 46:073; p < :01). The association between the presence or absence of thenested ambiguity and answer category was quite strong (predicting the answeron the basis of the problem structure would have reduced the error of randomguessing by 51% (using y proportional reduction in error)). Thus, this resultchallenges H90 and favors the prediction of other reasoners on this issue. Therewas not a signicant interaction from the mode of presentation.As in Experiment One, the second comparison examined one of the samegraphs from the preceding paragraph ( E C F DA B ) juxtaposed with another graphin which a pair of conicting paths is embedded in a larger graph that lacksa conict ( E C F DA B ). Both H90 and other reasoners predict response `a' forthe latter problem (as there are no conicting paths between the extreme end-points); however, H90 predicts response `b' for problem the former whereas otherreasoners predict response `c/d' (as mentioned above). The distribution of re-sponses to these two problems were found to be signicantly dierent (log linearanalysis, 2(2) = 21:615; p < :01); although subjects responded mainly `c/d' to
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 90both, response to ( E C F DA B ) was marked by a decrease in `a' responses madeto ( E C F DA B ) (from 44% to 20%), accounted for by an increase mainly in `b'responses (from 6% to 28%). Experiment One made a similar nding. There wasnot a signicant interaction from the mode of presentation.The nal comparison was between the second of the preceding two networks( E C F DA B ) which had an embedded pair of conicting paths (but no conictat the endpoints) and ( E C F DA B ) which contains nested conicting paths, bothinternally and at the endpoints. There was a highly signicant dierence in thedistribution of responses 2(2) = 8:95; p < :05: `a' responses decreased (from 44%to 6%), `b' responses increased (from 6% to 18%) and `c/d' responses increased(from 50% to 77%) between these two problems. The association between thepresence or absence of the nested ambiguity and answer category was quite strong(predicting the answer on the basis of the problem structure would have reducedthe error of guessing it at random by 35% (using y proportional reduction inerror)). Thus this result challenges H90. The literature agrees in predicting thatsubjects should respond `a' to the rst problem, but whereas H90 predicts an`a' response to the second other reasoners predict `c/d' (meaning that the nestedconicts cascade into nested ambiguity). In fact, `c/d' was the most frequent re-sponse (as in Experiment One, though to a dierent degree) to both problems(which, again, undermines support for H90 in general). There was again an in-crease in `b' responses as well, though the shift to `b' was far less pronouncedthan the shift to `c/d'. Neither H90 nor the extant systems which cascade am-biguities predict an increase in `b' responses. These ndings are also consistentwith a path-counting model. In this case there was a signicant eect of modeof presentation (2(5) = 18:95; p < :01) in that a smaller precentage rated thesecond graph indeterminate in the sentence only condition, preferring the answercategory `b'.Summary. Table 3.8 summarizes responses to questions about networks thatdierentiate reasoners with respect to whether ambiguities in subpaths are cas-caded. The columns indicate the percentages of the participants who respondedto that question by classifying it with the answer category indicated by the col-








A B Exp. 2 76 18 6Table 3.8: Percentages of Responses in Each Answer Category: Are As typicallyDs?
3.3 General DiscussionExperiment One nds human reasoning consistent with the inheritance literaturein terms of its basic assumption of transitive reasoning with defaults, but foundthat people do not satisfy the literature's predictions about negative chains. Morefundamentally, there was a tendency for people to take `preemptive' links as addi-tional information leading to indeterminacy rather than preemption as predictedby the literature. This renders adjudication between on-path and o-path preemp-tion moot. On the other hand, there was support for the idea that links whichexpress the same information that is contained in longer paths do not change re-sponses to problems when added to graphs and are eectively `redundant,' as theliterature predicts. Under the assumption that it is possible to partition respon-dent categories, there was also support for H90's approach to nested ambiguities ina substantial minority. Graphic presentation of the problems polarized responsesto problems in a way that suggests that the syntax of inheritance reasoners hasinuenced its proof-theory beyond its initial motivations for capturing humanreasoning with generics. However, it is interesting to note that participants in
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 92the sentence only condition would occasionally make use of the space providedto work out their answers. Of the thirteen whose materials were returned withthat space lled, or with accompanying paper, four subjects independently devel-oped a graphic notation that was isomorphic to the inheritance graph that wouldhave accompanied the corresponding problems; Elio and Pelletier (1993) foundsimilar behavior. It could be argued that the mode of presentation eect whichoccurred here perhaps obtained because the sentence-only condition was assignedto a substantially younger population than the other twenty people tested. Ex-periment two addresses that criticism. Finally, the present analysis suggests thatpath-counting should also be studied in closer detail to determine its ecacy as apredictor of human reasoning with generics as a model of weighted evidence.Table 3.9 summarizes the ndings of both Experiment One and Two to fa-cilitate an evaluation of inheritance proof theory. The numbers underneath theheadings \Indeterminate," \Predicted" and \Complement" represent percentagesof responses to each graph in those categories based on the total number of re-spondents who answered the question. Whether the predicted answer was thedenite positive conclusion `a' or the denite negative conclusion `b' depends onthe specic problem. The section of the table referring to the data on negativechains has slightly dierent headings since indeterminacy was the prediction inthat case. \Negative" refers to answer category `b' and \Positive," to `a'. Thepredictions are those made by H90 as a theory of inheritance reasoning. The rstthree blocks of the table summarize the ndings on transitivity, negative paths,and negative chains. The problem indicated is only a sample, as there were anynumber of longer or shorter problems than the one indicated; thus, the associatedpercentages are compiled over the appropriate set of problems in that case. Theremainder of the results are the exact percentages accorded to the relevant prob-lem depicted on the corresponding row. Results are indicated for both ExperimentOne and Experiment Two. Mode of presentation results are not included in thistable because that aspect of the investigation is somewhat (although not entirely)orthogonal to the main issue of how people categorize the information implicit ina set of default sentences; instead, those results are briey discussed later in thissection. For each problem, the graph that represents it is given, rather than theset of sentences, because the graphs are the most visually concise index.
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 93TransitivityProblem Indeterminate Predicted ComplementExp. 1 23 66 11
A B C D Exp. 2 8 87 5Negative PathsProblem Indeterminate Predicted ComplementExp. 1 27 65 8
A B C Exp. 2 11 86 3Negative ChainsProblem Indeterminate (Pred) Negative PositiveExp. 1 47 41 12
A B C Exp. 2 19 75 6PreemptionProblem Indeterminate Predicted ComplementExp. 1 42 43 15
A B C Exp. 2 54 38 8Exp. 1 43 49 8
A B C Exp. 2 62 25 13Exp. 1 54 24 22
DA B C Exp. 2 49 13 38Exp. 1 66 15 19
DA B C Exp. 2 68 17 15Exp. 1 37 53 10
A B C
D Exp. 2 52 43 5RedundancyProblem Indeterminate Predicted ComplementExp. 1 62 17 21
DA B C Exp. 2 53 8 39Exp. 1 53 11 36
DA B C Exp. 2 61 8 31On-Path/O-Path PreemptionProblem Indeterminate Predicted ComplementExp. 1 59 9 32
DA B C
E Exp. 2 54 16 30Exp. 1 56 27 17
DA B C








A B Exp. 2 76 6 18Table 3.9: Percentages of Responses to Inheritance Networks
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 94Table 3.9 makes some interesting facts clear. The most sharply dened resultsconforming to the literature predictions are in the top two chunks of the table. Inboth experiments subjects mainly behaved as predicted by the theories | thattransitive reasoning is possible over positive paths, and that negative paths licensea negative conclusion about the relationship between the endpoints of the path.The next result is also fairly sharply dened in Experiment Two: negative chainsalso license negative conclusions about the relationship between their endpoints.However, this result is contrary to the predictions of the literature which expectedindeterminacy. Those results test rather foundational assumptions of the inher-itance literature, rather than discriminating between particular proof theoreticproposals. Given the last of those ndings a bit of doubt is cast upon the morecomplex aspects of proof theoretic debate | researchers have been arguing aboutthe most intuitive ways to reason with highly complex graphs as if reasoning withtheories that have the structure given by ( A B C ) is completely straightforward.Further exploration of this is required to ascertain how negative information isbeing used.The next two sections of the table, on preemption and redundancy, are alsofoundational, but at a more conscious level of debate in the literature than thepreceding issues. Assumptions about the nature of preemption and redundancyare what motivated Touretzky's (1986) original indictment of shortest path rea-soning. Thus, these issues are closer to the ongoing debate in the proof theoryof inheritance reasoning. However, they are still foundational since the literatureassumes some topologies do involve preemption and redundancy; the argument isjust about which ones. The results of Experiment One and to a larger extent, Ex-periment Two, indicate that mainly indeterminate responses were observed whenthe literature predicted some link to override a conicting path and even more in-determinacy when the literature predicted a link to be ignored as redundant withrespect to some path. In fact, this summarizes the results to the remainder of thetable as well. For the more complicated problems the observed categorization wasmore than fty percent `indeterminate'. Interestingly, the remainder was split insuch a way as to come closer to satisfying the predictions of the literature mainlywith regard to simple preemption. Denite responses to problems involving re-dundancy and more complex forms of preemption tended to favor the complement
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 95response more than the predicted one. Denite response to problems involvingnested ambiguities seems virtually random.It is important to qualify these results with methodological considerationssince, as mentioned above, the conditions were not balanced and in the rst ex-periment subjects were not randomly assigned to the sentence only condition.The rst point is not problematic given the sensitivity of log linear analysis. Thesecond point does perhaps raise an issue since the Canadian pre-university stu-dents could for practical reasons participate in just the sentence only condition.Therefore, there was not a balance of subjects in the same age range in the theother conditions. For other uncontrollable reasons the second experiment was notbalanced in terms of numbers of subjects in each condition, although it was bal-anced in terms of age and expertize of the students. This makes it interestingto consider the mode of presentation eects. Recall that in Experiment One themain eect was polarization of responses in the graph only condition, relative tothe sentence conditions. Considering just the eect of the mode of presentationon category of answer there was a signicant eect (2(4) = 35:67; p < :01) for allthree levels. Basically, in the graph only condition there were roughly half as manydenite responses (`a' or `b' answers) as indeterminate (`c/d'), the denite answersshared equally between the two categories. In the sentence only condition therewere one quarter more denite responses than indenite responses. Twenty-onepercent gave a denite positive classication, thirty-ve percent gave a denitenegative classication and forty-four percent gave an indeterminate classication.At the sentence+graph level there were again as many denite as indeterminateresponses, however there were half as many denite positive classications as therewere denite negative classications. Note that H90 would have predicted roughlyequal numbers of answers in each of the three categories over the full questionnaire.Given that, and since at both levels of the mode of treatment that involved senten-tial presentations subjects were more likely to answer with the indeterminate ornegative category, and further since the sentence+graph condition was balancedfor ages, it seems reasonable to conclude that the age dierences were insigni-cant. Rather, the conclusion might be that for whoever the audience the sentencecondition is much more dicult to participate in than the graph only condition,and in that case a negative classication could be actually mistakenly applied as
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 96the denial of the positive classication (which is intended to be supplied by `c/d').Alternatively, some other reasoning strategy may be at work. Interestingly, thesecond experiment which was also balanced for age and background of subjects inthe dierent modes of presentation (though unfortunately not in number) did nothave an overall signicant eect of mode of presentation on answer category (recallthat these were undergraduates enrolled in composition or literature courses at astate university in Louisiana). In the sentence only condition of that experimentforty-three percent of the answers were in the indeterminate category, thirty-sevenpercent were negative, and twenty percent were positive, and virtually the samepercentages existed for the graph only condition. Note that this is also nearlyexactly the distribution that occurred in the sentence only condition of Experi-ment One. This gives additional reason to believe that the age unbalance in therst experiment was inconsequential (or it is an indictment of higher education inLouisiana).Given these considerations, it is useful to reconsider the data with the goal ofarticulating a proof theory for inheritance that is in accord with human responseto these problems. One thing that is clear is that classications are sensitiveto complexity. The more complex the problem the more likely the subject is toclassify it as indeterminate, if that's an option. It would be worth investigatinga condition in which there is more encouragement to reach denite conclusions,as in some sort of betting scenario or another situation that requires subsequentaction on the basis of the conclusion. This does in fact correlate with a distinc-tion made in the inheritance literature between skeptical and credulous reasoning.The results of the experiments reported here indicate that most people opt for anextreme skepticism when there is no need to act on the conclusions reached. Inthe context of having the option to be skeptical, the skeptics can be partitionedaway to consider potential strategies for the remainder. One possibility that hasbeen raised throughout the earlier discussion of the results is some version of pathcounting. Referring back to Table 3.9, note that the pattern of denite responsesto problems testing redundancy and discriminations of preemption went in the op-posite direction of the predictions of H90 as well as the rest of the literature (H90predicted denite responses of one sort, and the rest of the literature expectedindeterminacy). Recall from earlier discussion that each of those cases went in
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 97the direction that would have been predicted by a proof theory that advocatesmaking a classication corresponding to the polarity of the greatest cardinality ofpaths through the network of sentences. Thus, some sort of weighting of amountof evidence seems most appropriate. The interesting thing from the point of viewof the discussion within the inheritance literature is that this weighting wouldseem not to take into account particular kinds of sentences (when that kind istopologically dened, anyway) having preferred or inferior status | preemptionby a shorter path is not allowed, although clearly some element in the partitionof reasoners does behave in accordance with the predictions of preemption; topo-logically identied links are not disregarded as redundant. Another possibility,however, based on the distribution of negative and indeterminate classications,has been suggested above | it is also possible that people use the negative classi-cation as a form of denial of the positive one, even though the denial classicationwas an option, or that there is some other asymmetry in reasoning with positiveand negative information. It would be useful for further work to be done (evenusing the data already amassed by Hewson and Vogel (1994) and this thesis) tostudy the combination of these strategies that produces a proof theory which hasa `best-t' to the data.This chapter has presented an experiment which provides data about humanreasoning with generics and the degree to which human reasoning makes inher-itance reasoning a plausible formal model. The focus has been on foundationalassumptions of inheritance reasoning as well as some more controversial proof the-oretic issues. The issues have been tested using abstract concepts and genericrelations among them articulated in representative problems. Follow-up studiesshould investigate the interaction of less abstract interpretations. The present re-sults factor out the dicult to control inuence of personal knowledge and beliefsabout real classications like `pacist' or `birds'. The inheritance literature wouldmodel the eect that specic background knowledge has on the conclusions derivedfrom a set of generics involving concrete interpretations by encoding those beliefsas direct links and invoking preemption. Transitivity may accurately describepeople's behavior in certain abstract cases as well as for interpreted instances inwhich inference is performed rather than direct recall: without further contextualinformation, people should reason transitively with the information represented
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 98in Fig. 3.5.a to conclude that penguins are iers. The inuence of world knowl-edge which might prevent this inference is modeled by inheritance reasoners withpreemption by an explicit link, as represented in Fig. 3.5.b. However, the resultspresented here oer little support for preemption in ungrounded reasoning. Ta-plin and Staudenmayer (1973) cites the work of Wilkins (1928) as demonstratingdenite eects of the degree of abstractness or concreteness on reasoning. Othershave noticed eects of attitudes (Morgan & Morton, 1944; Kaufmann & Goldstein,1967). Taplin and Staudenmayer (1973) also cites an argument of Henle (1962)that the existence of those eects does not invalidate formal logics as models ofreasoning: she essentially makes the same claim that Hahn and Vogel (1995) pointout about the possibility of formalizing legal knowledge and reasoning | the logiccannot be faulted for sanctioning conclusions that do not t with context if thecontext has not been formalized in the rst place.a.
Penguins Birds Fliers
b.
Penguins Birds FliersFigure 3.5: Representing ContextThe nature of the conicting intuitions on inheritance proof theory is such thatit is informed more by studies that discriminate the inuence of the abstract struc-ture of a set of sentences than by the determination of which facts are explicitlyrepresented and which are implicit. However, a more interesting set of contex-tual eects given the model of reasoning supplied by the inheritance literaturewould be those factors that have an impact on the abstract patterns of reasoningrather than the presence or absence of explicit information|for instance whetherreasoning with known quantities (as opposed to using sets that have fuzzy cardi-nality, like `chairs') eliminates the applicability of transitive reasoning. Studies ofboth abstract and grounded reasoning are important parts of the general problemof determining whether there is abstract systematicity in human reasoning withgeneric information.Further studies should explore more of the proof-theoretic claims in greaterdetail. The initial result presented here on redundancy should also be examinedfurther, especially given the conicting intuitions in the literature about what the
Psychological Plausibility of Inheritance Reasoning 99appropriate topological denition of redundancy should be (see Boutilier, 1989).For example, Horty et al. (1990) use a more complex denition than the onewe suggested using informal terms in this paper; in theirs certain links that areredundant in the simpler terms are in fact deemed by them to convey novel infor-mation. We have not tested these problems. Finally, the present analysis suggeststhat path-counting should also be studied in closer detail to determine its ecacyas a predictor of human reasoning with generics as a model of weighted evidence.
Chapter 4Parameterized Proof Theory forInheritance Reasoning
4.1 IntroductionThis chapter gives a declarative specication of a popular inheritance system andshows how simple changes to this specication can result in dierent path-basedreasoners. This provides a deeper understanding of the fundamental dierencesbetween some of the more popular path-based inheritance reasoners. In particular,it allows the clarication of some of the results on the complexity of reasoning inthe various systems. The declarative specication of H90 and its Prolog implemen-tation was rst presented by Vogel et al. (1993). That work set the foundationsfor parameterization of the proof theory into a uniform set of denitions whichhas not appeared before.4.2 A Basic SystemThis section gives a logic based denition of the H90 system following Vogel et al.(1993). The plan is to dene the notion of a permitted path, since it is the implicitlink between the endpoints of a permitted path that expresses a conclusion of a0Thanks to Fred Popowich of Simon Fraser University in British Columbia and Nick Cerconeof the University of Regina for collaborations in this area, some of the material in this chapter,where indicated, is the fruit of that work. 100
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 101reasoner with respect to a network.4.2.1 PermissionThe paths permitted in an arbitrary network by an inheritance reasoner are givenhere in terms of upwards construction of paths of increasing degree. It is alsopossible to state things in terms of downwards constructions (Touretzky et al.,1987) or double chaining (Touretzky, 1986). The formal denition follows:Denition 8 (Permission)1. Let  be a path.(a) If  is a direct link, then  is permitted.(b) If the degree of  is one then  is a direct link by the denition of degree,hence  is permitted.2. Let  be a compound path of degree n. Assume that all permitted paths withdegree less than n are known.(a) If  is a positive path then it has the form z (i.e., lastnode()  ! z isa link in the network). The path  is positive, and by Proposition 1 inChapter Two the degree of  is less than n. The path  is permitted ii.  is permitted,ii. firstnode()  != z is not a direct link in the net,iii. All negative paths 0 = 0=z, where 0 is a permitted positive path (withdegree less than n) and firstnode() = firstnode(0), are preempted.(b) If  is a negative path (it has the form, =z), then  is permitted onlyunder the conditions symmetric to those stated in (a). That is, i:i.  is permitted,ii. firstnode()  ! z is not a direct link in the net,iii. All positive paths 0 = 0z, where 0 is permitted positive path (withdegree less than n) and firstnode() = firstnode(0), are preempted.Denition 8 follows the inductive structure of the path-based denition forH90 despite the change from their network notation. Consistent with the H90denition, the above denition proceeds with upwards construction of paths of
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 102increasing degree. According to these denitions, if conicting paths intersectonly at their endpoints, they will cancel each other. Cancellation is stipulated bycondition (iii) on the permission of  in Denition 8. This condition states that is permitted only if all conicting paths are preempted. Since  has degree n,we know of all paths which could conict with . By the denition of degree,none of the conicting paths is longer than n. The degree of a path becomessignicant only during the examination of compound paths for the existence ofconicting paths. Conicting paths are handled trivially in the case of direct links.All direct links are sanctioned as paths through a network, even conicting links.If a direct link conicts with a compound path then the denition of preemption issatised and the direct link preempts the compound path. In the case of conictingcompound paths, it is known that none of the conicting paths has a degree greaterthan n, and all shorter paths between the same endpoints are known, becauseDenition 8 proceeds on the basis of increasing degree.4.2.2 PreemptionPath preemption allows (more specic) information that is contained in a directlink to override conicting information in a (more general) compound path. Thistopological ordering of paths is called the inferential distance ordering (Touretzky,1986).Only direct conicting links can preempt other paths, although a preemptinglink may be part of a longer path.Denition 9 (Preemption) Let  and 0 be positive paths, and let p and y benodes. A positive path y is preempted by a link p  != y or a negative path =y ispreempted by a link p  ! y if there exists a permitted path 0 such that1. firstnode() = firstnode(0),2. lastnode() = lastnode(0),3. p occurs in 0, and4. p 6= lastnode(0).When a path is preempted by a link p  ! y, it is also said that the node ppreempts the path. In the case where p = lastnode(0) (i.e. where condition 4
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-path preempted by the link c  != e. 

       
:-- ea b dFigure 4.2: Link a  != e preempts the path abde.is violated), we would have two conicting links p  ! y and p  != y. Instead ofallowing preemption, the network is said to contain an inconsistency.An example of preemption is presented graphically in Figure 4.1, in which apositive path is preempted by a negative link. Matching the denition to thenetwork in Figure 4.1,  corresponds to the path abd, 0 to acd, p to c, and y toe. The endpoints of  and 0 coincide, p  != y is a link in the network, so abdeis (o-path) preempted by the link c  != e. Essentially, ac=e is said to be morespecic than both acde and abde. Another straightforward example of preemptionis given in Figure 4.2: there is a similar matching between nodes and links of thenetwork and the denition, except that in this case  and 0 are identical.Compound paths which conict are subject to cancellation. The dierencebetween cancellation and preemption is that neither conicting path is permittedafter cancellation, but preemption does permit one of its conicting paths (namely,the path consisting of the direct link). Consider the network depicted in Figure4.3 which has a topology similar to Figure 4.1. Although paths  and 0 existwhose endpoints coincide, no 0 exists that contains a node participating in apreempting link. Neither ac=e nor abde is favored over the other. In the networkshown in Figure 4.1, preemption resolves an apparent ambiguity, but this does nothappen in the network of Figure 4.3. Since this is a skeptical reasoner the pathscancel each other|neither is permitted. A credulous reasoner would resolve totwo extensions from the network, one in which a's are e's and another in which
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 104   XXXXXXXXXz:- - -c edbaFigure 4.3: Paths ac=e and abde cancel each other.a's are not e's.4.3 Other SystemsThe formal denitions of path permission can be altered to provide alternativestyles of inheritance reasoning. First it is helpful to restate Denition 8 in moreschematic terms:Denition 10 (Permission)1. Let  be a path.(a) If  is a direct link, then  is permitted.(b) If the degree of  is one then  is a direct link by the denition of degree,hence  is permitted.2. Let  be a compound path of degree n. Assume that all permitted paths withdegree less than n are known.(a) If  is a positive path then it has the form z. The path  is positive.The path  is permitted ii.  is permitted,ii. firstnode()  != z is not a direct link in the net,iii. no conicting path matters.(b) If  is a negative path (it has the form, =z), then  is permitted i:i.  is permitted,ii. firstnode()  ! z is not a direct link in the net,iii. no conicting path matters.
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 105Denition 11 (Conicts that Matter) Restricted Skepticism, O-PathPreemptionNo path conicting with  matters i1. if  has the form, z, and all negative paths 0 = 0=z, where 0 is a permittedpositive path and firstnode() = firstnode(0), are O-Path preempted.2. if  has the form, =z, and all positive paths 0 = 0z, where 0 is a permittedpositive path and firstnode() = firstnode(0), are O-Path preempted.O-Path preemption is exactly that sort which was specied in Denition 9.In the sections that follow I will modify this schematic denition to illustrate therelationships among the various proof theories for inheritance under consideration.The relationships among these styles of reasoning have not before been made ex-plicit. Later in the chapter, a Prolog implementation is oered which has theadvantage of perspicuous encoding since there is a direct textual relationship be-tween the denitions given here and the Prolog code. The Prolog implementationof the O-Path preempting, restricted skeptical reasoner (H90) was rst presentedby Vogel et al. (1993)4.3.1 On-Path PreemptionUsing on-path instead of o-path preemption, the nodes of the preempting linkmust occur on the path that is being preempted (as is the case depicted in Figure4.2). On-path preemption is rather directly related to o-path preemption as just amore restricted form of preemption. Without changing the structure of Denition9 we can dene on-path preemption by adding the additional restriction that0  . Note that Vogel et al. (1993) erroneously state that to obtain on-pathpreemption, the relationship between 0 and  should be equality. However, asdiscussed below, that restriction actually implements an alternative treatment ofredundant links.Denition 12 (On-Path Preemption) Let  and 0 be positive paths, and letp and y be nodes. A positive path y is preempted by a link p  != y or a negativepath =y is preempted by a link p  ! y if there exists a permitted path 0 suchthat
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 1061.   02. firstnode() = firstnode(0),3. lastnode() = lastnode(0),4. p occurs in 0, and5. p 6= lastnode(0).Recall that reasoners which use o-path preemption conclude from the networkin Figure 4.1 that As are not Es. On-path preemption leads to ambiguity in thatnetwork because c, the preempting node, does not occur on the path abde; thusthat positive path conicts with the negative path. Because preemption is aboutletting paths of opposite polarity override each other, using on-path preemptionyields ambiguity where o-path preemption allows a denite conclusion.4.3.2 RedundancyRedundancy and PreemptionThe literature assumes that certain topologically dened links are redundant andthat a path through a set of redundant links should be preempted if the longerpath with respect to which redundancy is determined is also preempted.Denition 13 (Redundancy) A path  is redundant with respect to a longerpath 0 if and only if they have the same polarity and:1.   0;2. rstnode() = rstnode(0)3. lastnode() = lastnode(0)Intuitively, Denition 13 says that a path  is redundant with respect to 0 if is a subsequence of 0 and they have the same endpoints. This just means that contains direct links where 0 has compound paths, so it is assumed that thedirect links each contain no more information than is already in the correspondinglonger path.Thus, Denition 12 could have been given as follows:Denition 14 (On-Path Preemption) Let  and 0 be positive paths, and letp and y be nodes. A positive path y is preempted by a link p  != y or a negative
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 107path =y is preempted by a link p  ! y if there exists a permitted path 0 suchthat1.  is redundant with respect to 02. p occurs in 0, and3. p 6= lastnode(0).However, under the assumption that each link in a network conveys rst-classinformation, preemption can still occur. Obviously, in a system without redun-dancy there is no need to stipulate preemption for paths that are redundant withrespect to preempted paths. This means, in the above denition that  and 0 areidentical. Thus, on-path preemption for inheritance without redundancy reducesto the following:Denition 15 (On-Path Preemption without Redundancy) Let  be a pos-itive path, and let p and y be nodes. A positive path y is preempted by a linkp  != y or a negative path =y is preempted by a link p  ! y i:1. p occurs in 0, and2. p 6= lastnode(0).Using this denition, it is possible to conclude of the network in Figure 4.4 thatAs are not Ds, but not for the network in Figure 4.5. That is, the path abcd is still
DA B CFigure 4.4: A Simple Inheritance Network
DA B CFigure 4.5: The Link a  ! c Is Redundantpreempted, but the path acd is not since b, the preemptor, does not occur in acd.
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 108Since acd and ab=d conict, there is ambiguity, therefore it cannot be concludedthat As are not Ds.It is not coherent to dene o-path preemption without redundancy since re-dundancy is actually just a special case of an o-path preemption, as the last ex-ample illustrates. This entails that in terms of relative numbers of paths deemedpreempted, there is a total ordering such that o-path preemption is strictly morepreemptive than on-path preemption which is in turn strictly more preemptivethan on-path preemption without the assumption of redundancy. Eliminatingpreemption altogether is the only form of reasoning less preemptive than on-pathpreemption without redundancy. Thus, there are four possible forms of preemp-tion that can be slotted into the denition of `conicts that matter'.Redundancy and PermissionA nal remark on redundancy is necessary in order to parameterize the denition ofpermission fully with respect to redundancy. Recall from Chapter Two that thereare conicting views (Boutilier, 1989) about how uniformly stable inheritancereasoners should be with respect to redundant links. For example, given thenetwork in Figure 4.6, H90 would conclude As are typically Es, although if thenetwork did not contain c  ! e H90 would reach no conclusion about whetherAs are Es because in the smaller network the subpath abcd is not permitted sincea b;= d, and its paths are assumed not to have nonnal negative links. Nonethelessby Denition 13, c  ! e is redundant with respect to the path cde. Boutilier(1989) argues that because c  ! e is redundant, there should be no conclusionabout whether As are Es, just as a  ! c does not aect the conclusion thatAs are not Ds. He asserts that the presence of neither link should change theallowable conclusions. The other possibility, of course, is to accept the argumentthat both links be treated uniformly but to treat them both as non-redundant.
DA B C EFigure 4.6: Are both a  ! c and c  ! e Redundant?
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 109Denition 16 (Informational Redundancy) A path  in a network   is in-formationally redundant with respect to a longer path 0 if and only if they havethe same polarity and:1.   0;2. rstnode() = rstnode(0);3. lastnode() = lastnode(0);4. 8ha; bi such that a  ! b 2 ; 9 such that a ; b 2 (   ( n 0))The denition of informational redundancy is more complicated than simpletopological redundancy (Denition 13) in having an extra nal condition whichbasically states that all of the links in the redundant path correspond to permittedpaths (the implicit links) in the network even when reasoning is performed on thenetwork minus those links. Using this denition and considering the network inFigure 4.6 again, it is clear that ace is redundant with respect to abcde (since botha ;; c and c ;; e are implicit links, permitted even when the network doesn'tcontain them explicitly). Using H90 on the network shown in Figure 4.7, thepath fae is informationally redundant with respect to both face and fabcde.However, using Boutilier's (1989) system fae is informationally redundant withrespect to neither face nor fabcde; this is because his system does not sanction apermitted path between a and e. Therefore in the network without the explicit linka  ! e there will not be an implicit link between the two nodes either. Clearly,informational redundancy ignores fewer paths than redundancy simpliciter.
DA B ECF
Figure 4.7: Is a  ! e Redundant?It is possible to amend the denition of conicts that matter when chaininga path together to determine if it is permitted. Denition 17 incorporates thealternative view of redundancy of Boutilier (1989), but casts his system into theterms used within this thesis rather than utilizing the double-chaining mechanismthat he used to achieve the same eect.
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 110Denition 17 (Conicts that Matter: Boutilier (1989)) No path conict-ing with  matters i1. if  has the form, z and there is no unpermitted path with respect to whichz is informationally redundant, then all negative paths 0 = 0=z, where 0 isa permitted positive path and firstnode() = firstnode(0), are preempted.2. if  has the form, =z and there is no unpermitted path with respect to which=z is informationally redundant, then all positive paths 0 = 0z, where 0 isa permitted positive path and firstnode() = firstnode(0), are preempted.The apparent circularity between the denitions of informational redundancyand the conicts clause of the preemption denition is not vicious because theappeal to preemption in the informational redundancy denition is with respect toa smaller graph which has links under scrutiny removed. Informational redundancyis still a topological denition | it employs only a very weak form of informationand is sensitive to the other constraints on reasoning within some system. That is,it basically asserts that a link which is redundant simpliciter may not be redundantwhen considered by a reasoner which would not have actually licensed an implicitlink between the endpoints of the longer path. If the longer path is not permitted,then a link which spans its endpoints actually does add information to the network.However, this is still quite a weak form of information to consider. Given thenetwork in Figure 4.6, both a  ! c and c  ! e are informationally redundant,but since H90 dierentiates them, ignoring a  ! c to conclude a b;= d but regardingc  ! e as evidence for the conclusion a bc; e, there is reason to feel there shouldbe an intuitive way of dening redundancy such that a  ! c is redundant butc  ! e is not. As it stands, both links are informationally redundant, and certaintopological congurations that the redundant link can exist in have an impact onwhether the reasoner is stable.1It should be clear that there is no point in integrating informational redun-dancy into o-path preemption, because the notions are antithetical (the basicidea of o-path preemption being that even compound paths, essentially `redun-dant links' with intervening nodes can be redundant). Integrating informational1Recall that stability is the property of a reasoner reaching the same conclusions with orwithout redundant links explicitly present.
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 111redundancy into on-path preemption, as in Denition 18 yields a quite skepticalsystem. Essentially, there will not even be preemption as in Figure 4.1 since  and0 are identical in that case, and a lone path cannot be informationally redundant(if its links were removed there would be no other path to license them as implicitlinks). While paths like acd in Figure 4.5 are preempted using this denition,by virtue of the fact that acd is informationally redundant with respect to abcd,the path abcd is not preempted (and therefore the network is ambiguous). Thedierence between this and the previous application of informational redundancyis that here it is integrated into the denition of preemption, but there it wasjust used as a check on allowable conclusions. Perhaps it seems futile to dene aversion of on-path preemption which does not actually admit preemptions in theusual sense. However, it is useful to have this system as a point in the spectrumbetween considering all paths as containing rst class information (as in somescheme in which numbers of paths of each polarity determine the nal conclusion)and other systems in which preemptions occur without regard to the number ofconicts. That is, the systems dened so far have used preemption to reach def-inite conclusions and assumed that some paths can be discounted, disregardingthe numbers of each; the system just dened still discounts some paths as wellas numbers in conicting polarities, but it does not preempt anything to reach adenite conclusion; systems dened later will not discount any path, will considerrelative cardinalities and will reach denite conclusions where possible.Denition 18 (Preemption with Informational Redundancy) Let  and 0be positive paths, and let p and y be nodes. A positive path y is preempted by alink p  != y or a negative path =y is preempted by a link p  ! y if there exists apermitted path 0 such that1.  is informationally redundant with respect to 02. p occurs in 0, and3. p 6= lastnode(0).SummaryThis section has outlined three forms of redundancy which exist in a decreasingorder of dismissiveness of paths. Redundancy in H90 eectively includes certain
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 112compound paths through the way o-path preemption is specied. On-path pre-emption utilizes a slightly tighter form that labels paths as redundant solely if theycontain redundant links, where redundant links are just those that span a longerpath of the same polarity. Informational redundancy is a more restricted versionin which the paths spanned by redundant links must be permitted. Incorporat-ing informational redundancy into preemption yields a form of preemption whichpreempts only redundant paths but not the longer paths with respect to whichthe smaller ones are redundant. Because preemption is invoked only in contextswhere there are paths of conicting polarity, this implies that using preemptionwith informational redundancy will yield fewer denite conclusions than preemp-tion based on strictly topologically dened preemption. Preemption without theassumption of redundancy leads to a similar state of aairs. Figure 4.8 illustratesthe consequences of tting these various denitions together in terms of the pathspreempted by the various systems. H90 preempts the most paths, and hence moreoften reaches denite conclusions (this of course is dependent upon the networkreasoned about, for some networks all four will reach the same conclusions). Us-ing on-path preemption instead of o-path preemption in H90 yields a system inwhich only direct links (and the paths comprised of them) can be redundant|sucha system preempts strictly more paths than either on-path preemption withoutthe assumption of redundant links and on-path preemption with informationalredundancy. The last two systems are not in a subsumption relation as has beenseen in the examples above: the former still allows paths to be preempted whenthere are no `redundant links' but yields ambiguity in other cases, and the latterpreempts paths comprised of redundant links, but does not allow paths to be pre-empted that do not contain redundant links, yielding ambiguity.









(informational redundancy)Figure 4.8: Paths Preempted by Various Systems4.3.3 SkepticismFully Skeptical ReasoningRecall the network which dierentiates restricted skeptical and fully skeptical rea-soners. For convenience, this gure is reproduced in this section as Figure 4.9.






XXXXXXz ::XXXXXXz XXXXXXz:: fedbcaFigure 4.9: A Network with Potentially Cascaded Ambiguity.The reasoner dened and implemented in the previous section was a restrictedskeptical reasoner: ambiguities do not cascade through a network. Restrictedskepticism is independent of a choice of preemption methods. In the network ofFigure 4.9 we can conclude that a is f because there is no path permitted whichconicts with abef . The chain of links abd=f , which appears as if it could conict,is not actually permitted because abd is not permitted, and it is impossible to builda path by extending a chain that is not itself a permitted path. In Denition 8,this was stipulated inside condition (iii) which determines what it means for aconicting path to matter (Denition 11): 0, part of the conicting path 0 mustbe a variable over positive paths.A fully skeptical reasoner demands that ambiguities cascade through a network.Thus, a fully skeptical reasoner should reach no conclusion about a's f -ness, be-cause a non-preempted negative path conicts with the positive path abef . Inthe denition, 0 is a variable over positive paths without regard for whether 0 isactually permitted, so long as it is not preempted by more specic information.Denition 19 (Conicts that Matter: Subpath Credulity) No path conict-ing with  matters i1. if  has the form, z, and all negative paths 0 = 0=z, where 0 is a positivepath and firstnode() = firstnode(0), are preempted.2. if  has the form, =z, and all positive paths 0 = 0z, where 0 is a positivepath and firstnode() = firstnode(0), are preempted.This dierence is orthogonal to the question of which form of preemption getsused, therefore the specication of which conicts matter is referred to as subpathcredulity. That is, the restricted skeptical reasoner is skeptical about ambiguoussubpaths, and ignores them. A reasoner that uses subpath credulity will assume
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 115that ambiguous subpaths are actually positive when considering the potential am-biguity of longer paths. The eect is that ambiguity cascades through the networkto the longer path, and in the end, it's the subpath credulous system that con-cludes indeterminacy more than the restricted skeptical reasoner. For want of abetter term this is called fully skeptical reasoning, but since either form of preemp-tion can be used with subpath credulity and since on-path preemption will resultin more indeterminacy than o-path preemption, there is strong motivation forcalling a fully skeptical reasoner that uses on-path preemption even more skepticalthan one that uses o-path preemption.Ideally Skeptical ReasoningOne good reason for calling fully skeptical reasoning, reasoning in which ambigu-ities cascade, something other than \fully skeptical" is that it is not coextensivewith ideally skeptical reasoning, even though it seems to be at rst glance. Ideallyskeptical reasoning is taken to be the intersection of credulous expansions (seeStein, 1989). However, there can be elements of the intersection of all credulousexpansions of a network that are licensed by unique paths which do not occurin all credulous expansions. For example, Stein (1989) provides a network as inFigure 4.10 with the following interpretation to the nodes: a =seedless grape vine,b =grape vine, c =infertile thing, d =fruit plant, e =vine, f =arbor plant, g =tree,h =plant. Stein (1989, p.1156) points out, \Whether a seedless grape vine is afruit plant or an arbor plant, it is certainly a plant!" That is, a; h is an elementof each credulous expansion. However, it is by virtue of a bef; h in the expansions inwhich seedless grape vines are not fruit plants (ac=d is the permitted path, henceabd=f isn't available to conict with the subpath abef), and by virtue of a bdg; hin the expansions in which seedless grape vines are fruit plants. Restricted skep-ticism does get the desired conclusion here, but does not correspond to ideallyskeptical reasoning as discussed in Chapter Two (because it licenses some con-clusions that ideally skeptical reasoning would not). Surprisingly at rst glance,fully skeptical reasoning does not capture ideally skeptical reasoning either, as canbe seen from the fully skeptical expansion of the network shown in Figure 4.10:because the subpath abd is not permitted (due to ambiguity), the path abdgh isnot permitted; because the subpath abef is not permitted (due to ambiguity), the






Figure 4.10: Ideally Skeptical Reasoning: a; hStein (1989, p.1156) concludes:There are facts which are true in all credulous extensions, but whichhave no justication in the intersection of those extensions. This is whywe cannot generate a \skeptical extension"|no particular set of edgesof   from seedless grape vine to plant is in every credulous extension,so no such path can be in the \skeptical extension." Thus every path-based approach to skeptical inheritance will always be either unsoundor incomplete with respect to ideally skeptical inheritance. We can onlycompute the always-true inferences by, in eect, reasoning about all of thecredulous extensions. Fortunately, in acyclic hierarchies, such reasoningis tractable.Stein (1989) proceeds to build a truth-maintenance system which does reasonabout all of the credulous extensions.Note that in spite of the subpath ambiguity it is possible even in the fullyskeptical reasoner to conclude e f; h and d g; h. That is, the property of being aplant inherits all the way down to node b, regardless of the ambiguity between band f . The only reason it doesn't inherit all the way to a, of course, is becauseof the subpath ambiguity between a and d. However, note that from the vantagepoint of node b, if h is inherited all the way to d and to e, then even if there isa subpath ambiguity about whether b; f holds it is nonetheless reasonable toconclude that b; h, since b can get to h through either d or e. Contrast this withthe network in Figure 4.11, which is just a subset of the one from Figure 4.10. The




Figure 4.11: Ideally Skeptical Reasoning: :9(b; h)Denition 20 (Conicts that Matter: Subpath Credulity + Cases) No pathconicting with  matters i1. if  has the form, z, and all negative paths 0 = 0=z, where 0 is a positivepath and firstnode() = firstnode(0) are (i.) preempted or (ii.) for eachnode i in  where i 6= rstnode(), 9!, i !; z.2. if  has the form, =z, and all positive paths 0 = 0z, where 0 is a positivepath and firstnode() = firstnode(0), are (i.) preempted or (ii.) for eachnode i in  where i 6= rstnode(), 9!, i !; z.Denition 20 species this new form of skeptical reasoning, which implementsreasoning with cases, here in the context of cascaded ambiguity. Essentially, theonly dierence is that for all paths that conict with the subpath under extension
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 118(into a longer chain), each node but the rst one already permits the endpointof the chain. Thus, this denition incorporates reasoning by cases into skepti-cal path-based reasoning, and I argue that it is complete with respect to ideallyskeptical reasoning. Stein's point, quoted above, still stands, since by sanctioningpaths that yield the implicit link as permitted, it licenses paths that are not con-tained in all credulous expansions, and is thus not sound with respect to ideallyskeptical reasoning. It would be possible to generalize the system along the linesof Veltman's (as discussed in Chapter Two), to distinguish syntactically betweenexplicit and inferred links, for instance by incorporating abstraction over paths inbetween endpoints (;). Thus far I have been using the symbolism i; j, withoutexplicit mention of a path as in i ; j, as an abbreviation for \a path permittedbetween i and j". Denition 21 formalizes this, but notice that it does not havean `only-if' condition: a denition of weak permission (see Denition 22) suppliesthe other conditions on the weak permission of an implicit link between the end-points of a path that is not itself permitted. If this sort of distinction is madeuse of in dening inheritance, then it is straightforward to license the conclusioncorresponding to the endpoints of the path without actually requiring support ofthe path itself, as in Denition 22. This achieves soundness with respect to ideallyskeptical reasoning as well, although it is in a system slightly more expressive thanpath-based reasoning.Denition 21 (Implicit Link Abstraction) Given a network   and a reasonerR: x; y if 9; x ; y x;= y if 9; x ;= yDenition 22 (Ideally Skeptical Permission (;))1. Let  be a path.(a) If  is a direct link, then  is permitted (x ;; y, where rstnode() = xand lastnode() = y).(b) If the degree of  is one then  is a direct link by the denition of degree,hence  is permitted (x ;; y, where rstnode() = x and lastnode() =y).
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 1192. Let  be a compound path of degree n, with rstnode() = x. Assume thatall permitted paths with degree less than n are known.(a) If  is a positive path then it has the form z. The path  is positive.The path  is permitted (x ; z) ii.  is permitted,ii. firstnode()  != z is not a direct link in the net,iii. no conicting path matters (in the fully skeptical sense).(b) If  is a negative path (it has the form, =z), then  is permitted (x ;= z)i:i.  is permitted,ii. firstnode()  ! z is not a direct link in the net,iii. no conicting path matters (in the fully skeptical sense).(c) If  is a positive path then it has the form z. The path  is positive.The path  is weakly permitted (x; z) ii.  is at least weakly permitted (x; lastnode()),ii. firstnode()  != z is not a direct link in the net,iii. no conicting path matters (in the extended skeptical sense).(d) If  is a negative path (it has the form, =z), then  is weakly permitted(x ;= z) i:i.  is at least weakly permitted (x; lastnode()),ii. firstnode()  ! z is not a direct link in the net,iii. no conicting path matters (in the extended skeptical sense).While Denition 22 does capture ideal reasoning, it does so by utilizing ab-stractions over paths (using the network in Figure 4.10 as an example, it does notlicense a bef; h, but it does license a; h), and is therefore not strictly a path-basedinheritance reasoner, yet it does this without reasoning about all credulous expan-sions. However, I have argued that there is reason to feel the paths licensed bythe extended skepticism (with both subpath credulity and reasoning with cases)are in fact supportable, even though they do not occur in all credulous expan-sions (note, for example that it only licenses some of the paths whose endpointsare represented in the implicit link). For the remainder of this thesis I will focus
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 120on strictly path based accounts. I will not provide an implementation of ideallyskeptical reasoning, but will implement full skepticism extended with reasoningby cases.A reasoner that uses subpath credulity and reasoning by cases will not cascadeambiguity to the same extent that the unextended skepticism will, however it willin many cases reduce to exactly the same thing. Just as in skeptical reasoningwith subpath credulity, adding reasoning about cases is compatible with bothforms of preemption. However, because it licenses conclusions about paths (whichin ideal skepticism we can call weakly permitted) that have ambiguous subpaths,the extended skepticism yields less ambiguity than fully skeptical reasoning.SummaryThis section has presented a series of skeptical reasoners with dierent degreesof skepticism. The literature makes its sharpest distinction between credulousreasoning in which ambiguities are resolved one way or another in two or more ex-pansions and skeptical reasoning in which there is always just one expansion (andfaced with a genuine ambiguity, no determinate conclusion is made). Clearly,though, there is more than one kind of skepticism to work with. To t with tradi-tional notions of skepticism, it makes sense to consider the possibilities in terms oftheir relative capacity for classifying a network as ambiguous. H90 reaches a def-inite conclusion when at all possible. Allowing ambiguities to cascade (requiringsubpath credulity) gives the opposite end of the spectrum in which a network ismore likely to be considered ambiguous. The two possibilities in between are sub-path credulity augmented by reasoning with cases or ideally skeptical reasoning.The preceding section described how ideally skeptical reasoning licenses conclu-sions that correspond to no path that exists in the intersection of all credulousexpansions. The other system introduced here, cascaded ambiguities with casereasoning, approximates ideally skeptical reasoning, but is not identical since itlicenses paths as well as the implicit links they justify. A summary of these rela-tionships is depicted in Figure 4.12. The variation discussed in the next section,downwards reasoning, is orthogonal to skepticism associated with paths and sub-paths, and for each combination of the preceding systems yields a system that ismore likely to nd ambiguity.






(cascaded ambiguity)Figure 4.12: Paths Preempted by Various Systems4.3.4 Direction of ReasoningRecall from Chapter Two that the direction of chaining also aects the conclu-sions that are sanctioned by a reasoner. Chapter Two surveyed a few approachesto direction of chaining, and pointed out that the negative complexity results areattached to a form of double chaining. H90, a polynomial system, utilizes forwardsingle chaining, but both Touretzky (1986) and Boutilier (1989) rely on doublechaining. The complexity results of Selman and Levesque (1989, 1993) for down-wards reasoning actually apply to double chaining. Actually, downward reasoningneed be no more complex than upwards chaining, which ts with the observationalso pointed out in Chapter Two that a downwards reasoner will never resolve toa single expansion where an upwards reasoner would nd ambiguity (ambiguitiesare easier to identify than denite conclusions).Denition 23 (Downwards Permission)1. Let  be a path.(a) If  is a direct link, then  is permitted.(b) If the degree of  is one then  is a direct link by the denition of degree,hence  is permitted.
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XXXXXXz :XXXXXXz:: ecdbaFigure 4.13: Preemption by a  != d Permits the Conclusion a bc; e.2. Let  be a compound path of degree n. Assume that all permitted paths withdegree less than n are known.(a) If  is a path then it has the form x  ! . The path  may be positiveor negative. The path  is permitted ii.  is permitted,ii. x  ! lastnode() is not a direct conicting link in the net,iii. no conicting path matters.Note that this denition assumes the standard denition of path construction:a negative link can occur only as the last link of a path. This makes it easier tocollapse the specication of permission of positive and negative paths. Just as inthe forward chaining denition of permission, the path being chained onto has tobe allowable, it's just that in this case it's the back half of the path rather thanthe front half. Everything else remains the same. This is sucient to obtain thedierence in reasoning about the network depicted in Figure 4.13: even thoughthe path abd=e is preempted in an upwards reasoner, thus allowing the conclusiona bc; e, for a downwards reasoner it is not possible to chain past the ambiguityat b about whether b c; e or b d;= e, and therefore no conclusion is reached aboutwhether there is an implicit link between a and e. The various forms of preemptioncan also be slotted into downwards reasoning.4.3.5 What People Really UseAt this point, denitions have been provided for twenty-one reasoners,2 althoughthey are not all distinct. The possible combinations are indicated in Table 4.1.There is overlap among the twenty-one: for instance, o-path preemption with2Actually, forty-two if you include upwards and downwards chaining.
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 123only link redundancy is just on-path preemption. The advantage of setting thereasoners out in these terms is that it lays the foundation for inspecting the rela-tionships among them so that essential equivalences and dierences can be iden-tied. Degree of SkepticismPreemption Restricted Fully ExtendedOn-PathRedundancypath/link linkinformationalnoneO-PathRedundancypath/linklinkinformationalnoneTable 4.1: A Space of Possible Default Inheritance ReasonersRecall that Hewson and Vogel (1994) and Chapter Three tested people for pat-terns of response to sets of sentences and compared the observed responses withthe predictions of various reasoners. It turned out that none of the reasoners did aperfect job of it. Even though people did tend in the majority to classify problemsas ambiguous, that is insucient evidence to opt for the most skeptical possiblesystem (presumably, downwards reasoning without even preemption) since theremay be other factors, like problem complexity, that interact with people's clas-sications. The concentrations of responses to problems after the indeterminateclassications are set aside yield evidence for less skeptical systems, or at least astronger foothold from which to explore the factors that aect their classication.It is equally interesting to dene reasoners which yield a closer approximation toobserved behavior. Before oering a parameterized implementation for the sys-tems discussed in the last three sections, I'll dene a few more systems whichcome closer to tting with the responses that people actually made to the salientgraphs.
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 124In general terms, people's behavior was in accord with transitivity for simpleproblems. However, a denition of complexity was not provided, although itseems that whatever denition is provided interacts with at least: the number oflinks in network, and the number of paths through a network. These two factorsare not inter-reducible, though they tended to be related in the problems tested.Essentially, with greater complexity there was an increased trend to classify thenetwork as indeterminate, which, interestingly, implies that people reason moreclosely to the way predicted by full skepticism than either extended skepticism orideal skepticism. People rarely behaved as would have been expected if reasoningwere guided by preemption. Rather than `more-direct' links obtaining priorityfor one path over another, they seemed to provide conicting information whichrendered the whole problem indeterminate. Recall that this is the net eect ofbasing the denition of preemption on something like informational redundancy,although that denition does not capture the issues at stake (since it does stilllicense disregarding some paths as redundant). A denition which comes closer ineect and classication would be one that assumes no link redundant, and rulesout preemption as well in most cases. Shortest path reasoning (with which mosttheories of preemption agree on certain networks) was not supported at all byobservation, although there was a tendency to accept direct preempting links asdecisive; this supports on-path preemption without redundant links. However,that support as well also falls away with more complex problems. There didseem to be some support as well for conclusions based on counting the number ofpaths of each polarity, more support with respect to complex problems than wasavailable for most of the other strategies, in fact. However, that strategy itselfonly holds if a rather fundamental assumption of the inheritance literature is setaside, in particular, the assumption that paths can contain negative links only astheir last links. Observations suggest at least three possible alternatives, the rsttwo seeming to t better than the last.Denition 24 (negative path threshold)Let intensity() = ( 1 i it contains at least one negative link0 otherwiseDenition 25 (negative path intensity)Let intensity() = the number of negative links in 
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 125Denition 26 (negative path algebra)Let intensity() = ( 0 i it contains an even number of negative links1 otherwiseDenition 27 (psychologically plausible inheritance (path-counting))1. Let  be a path.(a) If  is a direct link, then  is permitted.(b) If the degree of  is one then  is a direct link by the denition of degree,hence  is permitted.2. Let  be a compound path of degree n. Assume that all permitted paths withdegree less than n are known.(a) If  is a positive path, then  is permitted i j rstnode()  ! !  !lastnode()j  j0j for which rstnode() = rstnode(0) and lastnode()= lastnode(0) where for each 0 intensity(0)  1(b) If  is a negative path, then  is permitted i j rstnode()  ! ! ! lastnode()j(where intensity(0)  1)  j0j for which rstnode() = rstnode(0)and lastnode() = lastnode(0).4.4 ImplementationAnother advantage of spelling out the denitions of various inheritance reasonersin common terms is that it facilitates implementation as well as just abstractinterclassication. The rst order specications translate fairly directly into logicprograms, oering a further advantage in making the relationship between thedenitions and their implementation more clear. This section details a Prologimplementation of the various systems from the preceding section. The basicsystem was rst presented by Vogel et al. (1993).4.4.1 H90: upwards chaining, o-path preemption, restrictedskepticismPermissionA restatement of Denition 8 in Prolog is shown in Figure 4.4.1. This restatementis slightly dierent in structure from Denition 8; the Prolog denition is not
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 126stated explicitly in terms of increasing degree, although it relies on the relationshipbetween the degree of a path and the degree of a subpath as stated in Proposition 1of Chapter Two. The Prolog denitions consider only links that are relevant to thequery which participate in some path sharing an endpoint with one of the queriednodes. Degree is just the length of the longest generalized path between thosenodes; in the present system that concept can be accessed directly by referring tothose paths directly as paths rather than indirectly via their lengths.The base case (shown below) is the rst permitted clause which states thatall direct links in a network are permitted. The empty list in the middle positionof the term for the basis indicates that no intermediate nodes lie on the path. Anadditional base clause to permit paths of degree one is unnecessary since the set ofpaths whose degree is one is a subset of the set of paths that are direct links. Thesecond clause of the Prolog program below denes permission in the general casewhere  is the path from From to To. The relation complement is used in deningthis clause; thus, the same clause stipulates the permission of both positive andnegative paths. The path from From through SubPath to Last maps to  in theformal denition of permission, and To maps to z (uppercase tokens are assumedto be variables). The relations, link and lastnode, verify that lastnode(a) ! z is alink contained in the network. Note that if a directly conicting link is contained inthe network, then due to the presence of the restriction not(link(From,NotTo)),the path from From to To is not allowed (according to condition (ii) from Deni-tion 2). The reference to permitted species that the subpath  must itself bepermitted. Finally, the relation no_other holds when the path specied as inputthrough its arguments is actually a chain of links through the network which isnot itself preempted. Thus, the specication not(unpreempted) stipulates thatno conicting, unpreempted paths exist. This is equivalent to the specicationin the formal denition that is expressed: for all paths that conict with a  ! z,there exists some path which preempts each conicting path. The clauses whichmake up the denitions of unpreempted and permitted implement Denition 8even though a dierent ordering is stated on those constraints. The order of therestrictions stated in the Prolog denition is guided by eciency considerations inlimiting the search space.
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 127permitted(From,[],To) :-link(From,To).permitted(From, Path, To) :-nonempty(Path),path(From, Path, To),lastnode(SubPath, Last, Path),complement(To, NotTo),not(link(From,NotTo)),permitted(From, SubPath, Last),no_other(From, NotTo).no_other(From, To) :-not(unpreempted(From, _, To)).unpreempted(From,[],To) :-link(From,To).unpreempted(From,Path,To) :-nonempty(Path),path(From, Path, To),lastnode(SubPath, Last, Path),positive_path(From, SubPath, Last),allowed(From, SubPath, Last),not(preempted(From,Path,To,By)).allowed(From, Thru, To) :-permitted(From, Thru, To).
Basis is a compound path...... from From through Path to Tofor for 0(ii), no direct link conicts(i),  is permitted(iii), just give endpoints of 0All 0 (compound conicts) are pre-emptedA link isn't preemptedIs a compound path 0 not pre-empted?It must be compound...It must be a path (0 = 0 + z)Such that 0 exists,where 0 is a positive paththat is allowed (ie. permitted).The well-formed 0 is unpreemptedif itis not preempted.Figure 4.15 depicts a Prolog translation of the network given in Figure 4.1(reproduced in Figure 4.16 for convenience). Links are encoded as two placerelations. The polarity of a link is indicated in the second argument. A positivelink x  ! y is encoded as link(x,y), and the negative link x  != y is encodedas link(x,not(y)). Figure 4.14 includes a Prolog session that applies the Prologdenitions given above to the network shown in Figure 4.1 and translated to Prologin Figure 4.15. In a Prolog terminal session, user input is entered after a question
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 128| ?- permitted(From, Through, To).From = a,Through = [],To = b ? ;From = a,Through = [],To = c ? ;From = b,Through = [],To = d ? ;From = c,Through = [],To = d ? ;From = c,Through = [],To = not(e) ? ;
From = d,Through = [],To = e ? ;From = a,Through = [b],To = d ? ;From = a,Through = [c],To = d ? ;From = a,Through = [c],To = not(e) ? ;From = b,Through = [d],To = e ? ;noFigure 4.14: \Which Paths Are Permitted?"
link(a,b). link(a,c). link(b,d).link(c,d). link(c,not(e)). link(d,e).Figure 4.15: A Prolog Translation of Figure 4.16.
   @@RXXXXXXXXXz:- - -c edbaFigure 4.16: Path abde is O-Path Preempted by the Link c  != e.
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 129preempted(From,Path,To,Preemptor) :-path(From, Path, To), % Define Pilastnode(SubPath, Last, Path),complement(To, NotTo),link(Preemptor, NotTo), % Preempting linkrelation(OtherPath, SubPath), % On or Off path preemptionpositive_path(From, OtherPath, Last), % Define Pi'permitted(From,OtherPath,Last), % Pi' is permittedmember(Preemptor,[From|OtherPath]). % P is on Pi' (but not Last)Figure 4.17: The Denition of O-Path Preemption in Prolog.mark. The entry of a semicolon indicates the user's request for the interpreterto nd another way to satisfy the query. The only negative paths permittedare ac=e and c=e. Six of the ten permitted paths correspond to direct links.This example shows the exibility obtained by the Prolog specication from thelogic programming paradigm in that none of the queried nodes need be specied(although, some or all nodes may be) in order to investigate the implications of thenetwork. A more important advantage of the logic specication is its immediatemutability into other instances in the space of possible inheritance reasoners.O-Path PreemptionFigure 4.17 depicts a restatement the denition of o-path preemption as aProlog relation between a path (specied in the arguments From, Path, To) and apreempting link from Preemptor to To. While From, Path, and To are all variables,it is assumed that From and To vary over nodes, and that Path varies over lists ofnodes with positive, not negative, links implicitly connecting those nodes in theorder of occurrence in a given list. The path from From to Last through SubPathcorresponds to  in Denition 9, since the lastnode of Path is stipulated tobe Last. The preempted relation can hold only if the chain of links describedby the path From !Through ! To is actually a chain of links in the network.The relations complement and link determine whether there is a conicting pathterminating at the node To. The path from From to Last through OtherPathcorresponds to 0 in Denition 1| and 0 have the same rst node First andthe same last node Last. O-path preemption obtains if relation does not imposeany restrictions on its arguments. The relation lastnode veries that lastnode()
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 130| ?- preempted(From,Through,To,Preemptor).From = a,Preemptor = c,Through = [b,d],To = e ? ;From = a,Preemptor = c,Through = [c,d],To = e ? ;
From = c,Preemptor = c,Through = [d],To = e ? ;no| ?-
Figure 4.18: \Which Paths Are Preempted?"= lastnode(0), and the invocation of permitted (dened above) veries that 0 isactually permitted. Finally, the call to member is used to determine if some node p(Preemptor) other than LastNode(0) (Last) participates in the conicting link.The Prolog session reproduced in Figure 4.18, shows the application of therelation preempted to determine what paths between the nodes From and To ofFigure 4.15 are preempted and what the preempting node is. Three preemptedpaths are returned: abde, acde and cde. All of these paths are preempted by the(negative) link from c to e|the rst path is o-path preempted (since c is not onthe path abde) while the last two paths are on-path preempted.4.4.2 Other SystemsOn-Path PreemptionAbove, o-path preemption was implemented through the relation predicatewhich articulated the relationship, apart from coincidence at the endpoints, ofthe paths under consideration (a path and its potential preempting path). Recallthat the dierence between o-path and on-path preemption is that in on-pathpreemption one path must be a subpath of the other|the preempted path cannotcontain nodes that the preempting path does not contain, although the preemptedpath can contain fewer nodes. This is implemented just by imposing strongerconstraints on the relation predicate, as shown in Figure 4.19. Figure 4.20depicts a Prolog session with the reasoner running on the same network as usedto illustrate o-path preemption. In particular, note that ac=e is not a permitted
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 131% OtherPath and Path are the same orrelation(X, Y) :- sublist(Y,X). % Path is redundant to OtherPathFigure 4.19: The Denition of On-Path Preemption in Prolog.| ?- permitted(From, Through, To).From = a, From = b, From = a,Through = [b], Through = [d], Through = [c],To = d ? ; To = e ? ; To = d ? ;no Figure 4.20: \Which Paths Are Permitted with On-Path Preemption?"path. However, Figure 4.21 is one for which on-path preemption does disallow apath. The network translation is obvious; a prolog session showing the preemptionof both abcd and acd is given in Figure 4.22 (permission of direct links has beenedited out).
DA B CFigure 4.21: On-Path Preemption: a b;= d
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| ?- permitted(From, Through, To).From = a,Through = [b],To = c ? ;From = a,Through = [b],To = not(d) ? ;no
| ?- preempted(From,Through,To,By).By = b,From = a,Through = [b,c],To = d ? ;By = b,From = b,Through = [c],To = d ? ;By = b,From = a,Through = [c],To = d ? ;noFigure 4.22: \Which Paths Are Permitted with On-Path Preemption?"
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 133No RedundancyObtaining on-path preemption under the assumption that no link is redundantrequires the trivial re-denition of the relation predicate such that it requiresboth paths to be identical forcing on path preemption (relation(X,X)). I will notsupply an implementation for Boutilier's (1989) system using informational redun-dancy rather than the usual topologically dened notion in the check on whetherthere are any conicting paths that matter, nor do I supply an implementationfor inheritance using informational redundancy behind its notion of permission.SkepticismFully Skeptical Reasoning The dierence between restricted skeptical reason-ing and fully skeptical reasoning is in whether subpaths of permitted paths arerequired to be unambiguous. Restricted skeptical reasoners do not require sub-paths to be permitted in all cases, as discussed above. The dierence is encodedin the specication of the relation allowed, which implements part of condition(iii) from the main denition of permission. It is actually invoked in consideringpaths that conict with the path under construction (unpreempted). Thus, theusual case requires that conicting paths be permitted up to their penultimatenode.allowed(From, Thru, To) :- permitted(From, Thru, To).While the fully skeptical reasoner just requires that the chain of links up to thesecond to last node not be preempted.allowed(From, Thru, To) :- unpreempted(From, Thru, To).This completes the modication required to obtain a fully skeptical reasoner.The non-preemption of 0=z must still be veried, as in the denition, becauseotherwise we disregard more specic information provided by a preempting link.A terminal session which reproduces the application of the revised system to thenetwork given in Figure 4.9 (reproduced in Figure 4.23) is shown in Figure 4.24.As expected, the only permitted paths are those corresponding to each of thedirect links and to the compound path ab/e.Extended Skeptical Reasoning Extended skeptical reasoning, as introducedabove, employs subpath credulity and adds reasoning with cases in order to gener-






XXXXXXz ::XXXXXXz XXXXXXz:: fedbcaFigure 4.23: A Network with Potentially Cascaded Ambiguity.| ?- permitted(From, Through, To).From = a,Through = [b],To = e ;no Figure 4.24: \Fully Skeptical Reasoning"ate conclusions allowed in the intersection of credulous expansions, without havingto compute that intersection directly. That required introducing a second clauseinto the stipulation of what conicting paths matter. In the Prolog implemen-tation, that multiplies out into a second clause for permission, dierent solely inthe last line which has a new way of classifying conicting paths irrelevant whichrequires more information about the path under question. Of course, the param-eterization would be considerably cleaner if this was handled by expanding thearity of no other, but that would just be a trivial manipulation of the presentimplementation which does do the job.permitted(From, Path, To) :-nonempty(Path), % Distinguish from base casepath(From, Path, To), % Define Alphalastnode(SubPath, Last, Path),complement(To, NotTo),not(link(From,NotTo)), % No conflicting direct link existsnot(preempted(From, SubPath, Last,P)), % Alpha is not preemptedconflicts_irrelevant(From,SubPath,Last,To).The new predicate, conflicts irrelevant, as stipulated by the denition estab-lishes whether a conicting chain of links exists and requires each intermediatenode to support the inference to the endpoint To of the path under extension
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 135(From  ! Subpath  ! Last which is tested for extendibility to To), even if therewould be conicts on subpaths.conflicts_irrelevant(From,Subpath,Last,To) :-conflict(From,Subpath,Last,BadPath,not(Bad)),all_permitted([Bad|BadPath],To).all_permitted([],_).all_permitted([Node|Path],To) :-permitted(Node,_,To),all_permitted(Path,To).conflict(From,Subpath,Last,BadPath,Bad) :-path(From,BadPath,Bad),complement(Bad,Good),member(Good,[Last|Subpath]).Downwards ReasoningAn initial proposal for turning the Prolog denitions into a specication of down-wards reasoning might involve utilizing the reversibility of logical relations with aquery like permitted(X,Y,n)|for some node n: what paths through the nodesas ordered in Y and beginning at X lead to n. However, this is not a correct in-tuition since the denition of the relation is for an upwards reasoner|with all ofthe variables instantiated the reasoner will attempt to prove the goal stated inthe query as an upwards reasoner would. But, upwards and downwards reasonersbehave dierently (Touretzky et al., 1987). The alterations to the code for thebasic algorithm are much the same as the changes to the denition of permissiongiven earlier. First, it is necessary to specify path construction as in:path(From,[],To) :- link(From,To).path(From,[Mid|Through],To) :-link(Last,To),path(From,Front,Last),lastnode(Front,Last,[Mid|Through]).And then, just supply an alternative main-case denition for permission. In fact,this one requires a bit less computation since it does not require invocation of the
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 136lastnode relation in order to nd the last element of the path being extended.Permission of the extended path is tested against the back end of the path ratherthan the front end.permitted(From, [First|SubPath], To) :-path(From,[First|SubPath], To), % Define Alpha%lastnode(SubPath, Last, Path),complement(To, NotTo),not(link(From,NotTo)), % No conflicting direct linkspermitted(First, SubPath, To), % Alpha is permittedno_other(From, NotTo).The versions of no other and its (potentially, depending on what no other invokesitself) nested call to allowed) can be substituted as with the forward chainingsystem.4.5 DiscussionDue to the proliferation of inheritance reasoners, it is important to determineprecisely how dierent classes of reasoners are related. This chapter outlines adeclarative specication of inheritance reasoning which makes it easier to see therelationships among various systems along axes distinct from the features thatdene them (for instance, downwards reasoning without preemption being themost skeptical sort of system possible). The relationships among various reasonershave been illustrated by dening the various reasoners through modications toa basic set of denitions. To my knowledge, the space of reasoners outlined here(which is larger than that considered by the \Clash of Intuitions" paper (Touretzkyet al., 1987)), has never been presented within such a uniform framework. Oneadvantage of this presentation is that it sets the stage for future work to providerigorous analysis of exactly what equivalences exist among these systems. A secondmore immediate advantage is that it leads to an easier implementation of the spaceof reasoners by parameterizing code for the various substitutions required in thedenitions.This chapter concludes with some observations about the complexity of down-wards reasoning as dened in this thesis. It is useful to rst give the basic algo-
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 137rithm:Input: a direct acyclic graph of positive and negative default inheritance linksQuery: For all nodes x; y and through arbitrary paths , 0..., does the networksupport x ; y or x ;= y.Optimized Algorithm for Downwards Permission:1. Let  be a path. If  is a direct link, then  is permitted (O(c)). Record x ;; y or x ;;= y as appropriate (O(c)).2. Let  be a compound path of degree n. Assume that all permitted paths withdegree less than n are known.(a) If  is a path then it has the form x  ! . The path  may be posi-tive or negative. The path  is permitted (so, record x y!; z or x y!;= z asappropriate) ii.  is recorded as permitted ( rstnode() = y, lastnode() = z, y !; z;O(n2)),ii. x  ! lastnode() is not a direct conicting link in the net (O(c)),iii. no conicting path matters.From the above, it is clear that the most expensive xed step is the test onwhether the subpath is itself permitted and therefore extendible into a longerpath. The reason this costs O(n2) (n = number of links in the network), is thatthe length of the list of recorded implicit links is bounded by n2. Similarly, thenumber of times step two gets invoked is bounded by: (n 1)2+(n 1)2 , which is alsoO(n2). Thus, over the whole algorithm, the xed steps cost O(n4). The cost ofdetermining whether conicting paths matter is not xed, and depends on whichversion is used. Consider the following:Input: a direct acyclic graph of positive and negative default inheritance links,a list of permitted implicit links, a putative implicit link in question: either x ; yor x ;= y.
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 138Query: are there any paths x!=y (which conict with xy, if that is the input)or x!y (which conicts with x=y, if that is the input) which are not preempted?Conicts that Matter: Restricted Skepticism No path conicting with matters i1. if  has the form, z, and all negative paths 0 = 0=z, where 0 is a permittedpositive path (O(n2)) and firstnode() = firstnode(0), are preempted.2. if  has the form, =z, and all positive paths 0 = 0z, where 0 is a permittedpositive path (O(n2)) and firstnode() = firstnode(0), are preempted.Assume that the version of preemption in place is on-path.Input: a direct acyclic graph of positive and negative default inheritance links,a list of permitted implicit links, a putative implicit link in question: either x ; yor x ;= y.Query: is xy or x=y (as determined by the input) preempted?On-Path Preemption Let  and 0 be positive paths, and let p and y benodes. A positive path y is preempted by a link p  != y or a negative path =y ispreempted by a link p  ! y if there exists a permitted path 0 such that1.   0 (O(n))2. firstnode() = firstnode(0) (O(c)),3. lastnode() = lastnode(0) (O(c)),4. p occurs in 0 (O(n)), and5. p 6= lastnode(0) (O(c)).Thus, on-path preemption contributes in the worst case O(n) to the complexityof determining whether any conicting paths matter (using restricted skepticism),which does not overshadow the cost of determining subpath permission. Since de-termining whether conicting paths matter iterates over known permitted paths,and that is bounded by O(n2), the overall cost of determining whether conict-ing paths matter is O(n4). This means that for downwards restricted skepticalreasoning with on-path preemption, the time complexity is O(n6). Note that forthis worst case analysis it makes no dierence to substitute o-path preemption.
Parameterized Proof Theory for Inheritance Reasoning 139However, utilizing ambiguity cascading skepticism, there is a slight improvementto O(n5).Input: a direct acyclic graph of positive and negative default inheritance links,a list of permitted implicit links, a putative implicit link in question: either x ; yor x ;= y.Query: are there any paths x!=y (which conict with xy, if that is the input)or x!y (which conicts with x=y, if that is the input) which are not preempted?Conicts that Matter: Subpath Credulity No path conicting with  mat-ters i1. if  has the form, z, and all negative paths 0 = 0=z, where 0 is a positivepath (O(n)) and firstnode() = firstnode(0), are preempted.2. if  has the form, =z, and all positive paths 0 = 0z, where 0 is a positivepath (O(n)) and firstnode() = firstnode(0), are preempted.Tighter bounds are almost certainly possible, but the present results are suf-cient to satisfy the intuition that downwards reasoning need not be intractableif chaining is dened symmetrically to the forward chaining case. In particular, ifH90 inferences, a restricted skeptical, o-path preempting, upwards chaining rea-soner are polynomial computable, then so should a downwards version. The im-portance of this is to be rated in light of the intractability of downwards reasoningreported by Selman and Levesque (1989, 1993): however it should be emphasizedthat a polynomial algorithm for downwards inheritance as dened here does notcontradict their results; rather it emphasizes the asymmetry they assume betweenthe denitions of upwards and downwards reasoning. The downward reasoningthey consider is actually double chaining. It also turns out that downwards fullyskeptical reasoners are more ecient than the restricted skeptical version. Thismakes it worth examining whether the same is true for the upwards case. I will notanalyze that possibility in this thesis; but just point out again that the declarativeframework in which the reasoners are dened here makes it quite possible for suchmodular analyses to be performed.
Chapter 5Channel Theoretic Semantics forInheritance Reasoning
5.1 IntroductionInheritance networks provide a formal tool for reasoning about classications ofindividuals and concepts as an alternative to rst order logic (FOL). Inheritancereasoning is analogous to rst order deduction, but there are important dierences.One major dierence is that the dominant approaches to path based inheritancedo not admit quantication. Additionally, with respect to inferences derivablefrom inconsistent sentences, inheritance reasoners localize inconsistency and do notsanction arbitrary conclusions. Traditionally, relationships between individualsand classes have been stated in terms of the relations is-a and is-not-a, but otherrelations are possible (Brachman, 1983; Touretzky, 1986). The relations maybe strict or defeasible and networks of links that represent those relations maycontain both sorts. By reasoning over such a network, one may determine theproperties possessed by an individual. For a given network, there are numerousreasoning methods. Horty has observed that there are over 72 dierent path-based inheritance reasoners for an inheritance network containing is-a and is-not-a relations (Horty, 1989). These reasoners dier in the manner in which theytreat conicting information. While Touretzky (1986) provided a lattice based0Thanks to Jon Barwise and Lawrence Cavedon for extensive comments on material containedin this chapter. 140
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 141semantics for his rst exploration of the area, it has been pointed out that agreat deal of the literature focuses on proof theory rather than general semanticsof inheritance reasoners (e.g. Boutilier, 1989). Semantics have been providedby a number of researchers for individual reasoning systems (Delgrande, 1990;Boutilier, 1989; Bacchus, 1989), but no formal semantics has been outlined whichprovides a general enough framework to capture a large class of reasoning systems.This chapter hopes to lay the groundwork for such a semantics for the class ofinheritance reasoners dened by Touretzky et al. (Touretzky, 1986; Touretzkyet al., 1987; Horty & Thomason, 1988; Horty et al., 1990) by taking advantage ofthe tools for talking about natural constraints provided by situation theory andchannel theory. (Barwise, 1989, 1991, 1993; Barwise & Seligman, 1994).The axes of variation in the class of reasoners considered are upwards anddownwards, skeptical and credulous reasoning when faced with on-path or o-path preemption. Implications of choices with respect to these axes are outlinedby Touretzky et al. (1987) and in Chapters Two and Four of this thesis. Thischapter intends to oer a channel-theoretic semantics for H90 (a system whichcurrently lacks semantics) and to appeal to the parameterization in the proof the-ory to dene clear semantics for the other reasoners in the class. The next sectionbegins the groundwork for providing a semantics to H90 by outlining the situa-tion theoretic tools which will be used to model inheritance. A channel theoreticmodel of nonclassical feature structures (related to the one presented by Vogel andCooper (1994)) is provided as a preliminary example. I argue that channels pro-vide an ideal level of description for providing a semantics to default inheritancereasoning. The central idea of channel theory is that the connection between to-kens is a real object unto itself, an information channel, and supports informationow (constraints). The idea is applied here by using channel types as the in-terpretation of default inheritance links, and identifying the semantics of variousproof theories for path-based inheritance (which derive conclusions from networksfrom the paths that are permitted through them) with corresponding restrictionson the composition of atomic channels (the denotations of inheritance links) intocomposite channels (the denotations of paths). This technique is demonstratedby providing a model of skeptical inheritance embodied by the H90 system, aswell a number of other proof theoretic variations. The specic channel theoretic
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 142tools specialized for the semantics of inheritance were initially presented by Vogel(1992), but the material has developed considerably since then.5.2 Modeling ToolsDeveloping semantic models for inheritance reasoning is no easy task as is easilyseen from the lack of a general semantics for inheritance. It makes good senseto start out with a theory that oers a great number of modeling tools, andsituation theory seems to have quite a lot to oer in that regard. In particular,the theory of constraints from situation theory (Barwise, 1993) augmented withthe theory of information channels from channel theory (Seligman, 1990; Barwise& Seligman, 1994; Barwise, 1993; Barwise & Seligman, 1993; Seligman & Barwise,1993) provides a promising framework.The components are sites (situations), types, and channels, with relationsamong the three kinds of objects. fT 1; T 2; : : :g are types; fs1; s2; : : :g are sites;fc1; c2; : : :g are channels. Let fC1; C2; : : :g be types associated with channels.Signaling relations pair sites with other sites, relative to a channel (s1 c17! s2). In-dicating relations pair types with other types (T 1 ) T 2). The of-type relation pairssites with types (s1 j= T 1), channels with channel types (c1 j= C1), and channeltypes with indicating relations (C1 j= (T 1 ) T 2)). The of-type relation is some-times written as a colon (:). It is sometimes easiest to refer to sets of signalingrelation 3-tuples in terms of channel types rather than channel tokens (s1 C17! s2).Denition 28 Channel Types. Let CT be a total function (c  C) such thatCT (c0) = C 0 i c0 j= C 0. It is assumed that if CT (c0) = C 0 and CT (c0) = C 00then C 0 = C 00.I is a function that assigns situation types to nodes in an inheritance network.A model is a tuple: hS; T; C; I; j=; 7!i. Restrictions on the elements of this tuplewhich obtain models of various inheritance reasoners will be discussed after someessential denitions are spelled out.It should be made clear that the mathematics of channel theory is not fullyworked out. A series of recent papers has established the potential applicability ofthe theory to a range of philosophical and mathematical problems (Seligman, 1990;
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 143Barwise & Seligman, 1994; Barwise, 1993; Barwise & Seligman, 1993; Seligman& Barwise, 1993) but like situation theory itself, there is no universally acceptednotation nor set of axioms that detail the necessary and sucient conditions for achannel theoretic model to be a channel-theoretic model. Some of the denitionsthat I will use do not correspond exactly with the denitions provided to theconcepts in other works; however, the denitions do intuitively t these conceptsand their present invocation.The basic idea of this chapter is that an inheritance network translates fairlydirectly into an interpretation involving indicating relations. Each default link inan inheritance network is understood as a constraint in situation theoretic terms.Constraints are interpreted as indicating relations on types of situations and aresupported by information channels. Barwise argues that an indicating relationshipmodels constraints that hold between, for instance, the height of columns in ther-mometers and the temperature of the surrounding environments, while signalingrelationships model the connection between a particular thermometer in a partic-ular environment, through the natural regularity that connects thermometers andtemperatures. Constraints that hold in general may or may not hold in particular.The key to reasoning is composition of the relations named above, but this is onlysensible when certain conditions hold with respect to the signaling relations, theactual connections, underneath the indicating relations.5.2.1 Tools from Channel TheoryFirst, it is useful to provide some denitions to constrain models. Essentially,these dene aspects of unimpeded information ow.Denition 29 Given a signaling relation s1 c7! s2, s1 is a signal for s2 relative toc and s2 is a target for s1 relative to c (Barwise, 1993).A signaling relation is a three-place relation between signal and target tokens andchannel tokens. A channel, in this sense corresponds to that of Barwise (1993)and approximately to the sense of link1 used by Barwise and Seligman (1993).1This use of link is again dierent from the sense in this paper|that of a link in an inheritancehierarchy. For Barwise and Seligman (1993), link denotes certain kinds of connections betweenclassication systems.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 144Denition 30 C j= T1 ) T2 i for all c j= C, c j= T1 ) T2.Denition 31 If C j= T1 ) T2 then T1 indicates T2 relative to C (Barwise, 1993).A basic contribution of channel theory is that information channels support con-straints. Channels are essentially conduits of information such that if a particularchannel is of a certain channel type, then it supports a constraint, and links tokensin such a way that if the signal supports the type in the antecedent of the con-straint then the target is classiable in terms of the consequent of the constraint.Thus, channels license classication of target sites in terms of the consequent typesin the constraints supported by the channel type.Denition 32 A channel type C j= T1 ) T2, is informative i there exists achannel c j= C and s1 and s2 such that s1 c7! s2 with s1 j= T1 and s2 j= T2.Denition 33 If C is an informative channel type supporting the constraint T1 ) T2,then for all sites s; s0 such that s c7! s0, s0 Cj= T2.The modeling power of channel theory comes from the potential dierence betweenthe types supported by a token site (s0 j= T2) and the types that a token site canbe classied in terms of due to the constraints that site is connected to throughinformation channels (s0 Cj= T2).Denition 34 A channel type C j= T1 ) T2, is sound i for all c j= C and forall tokens s1 and s2 if s1 c7! s2 and s1 j= T1 then s2 j= T2.A channel type is sound if all the channels of that type support the classicationof targets with types that agree with the types supported by the targets on theirown.Denition 35 A constraint T1 ) T2 is sound i it is the type of some soundchannel, and the constraint is informative i it is the type of some informativechannel.Seligman and Barwise (1993) characterize channel theory as a theory of informa-tion ow. Classication oers the basic unit of information ow: some token isof some type. Channel theory provides a formal means for discussing constraints
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 145because it allows description of some situation being of some type as carrying infor-mation that some other situation is of a particular type by virtue of the connected-ness of the two tokens. I distinguish between sound and informative constraints.Both are types of regularity, but informative constraints are the weaker of thetwo. A sound constraint is one that classies a channel whose signal/target pairsin all of the signaling relations it participates in are classied by types consistentwith those predicted by the constraint. A regularity, embodied by a constraint, isinformative if there is at least one instance of it grounded in a signal/target pairof the predicted types. This condition is stronger than if the constraint did notexist but two situations (corresponding to the signal/target pair) did happen tosupport the same types.Defaults are interpreted as informative constraints. Necessarily exceptionlessstatements (squares have four sides) are interpreted with sound constraints overreexive channels. Defaults are generally unsound. Note that a site can be classi-ed by inconsistent types. Such a site can still be part of an informative channel,but not of a sound channel. Channel theory provides an idea of information ow;this model will take advantage of the information that some situation which sup-ports a particular type can carry about another situation. When types are xedas sentences of rst order logic, sites are worlds, and channels are reexive, thenchannel theory provides a straightforward semantics for classical logic (Barwise,1993). Channel theory has also been used to provide an analysis of Default Logic(Cavedon, 1993).Given a particular sentence, Birds y represented with a link Birds  ! Fliers,the sentence is interpreted using channels in the following way: there is an indi-cating relation between situations of a type Bird and of the type ier; underneaththis indicating relation is a signaling relation:Birds =) F lierscbcb cbcbs1 c7! s2The signaling relation is a connection which is of a channel type that supports theconstraint Birds) F liers and links two situations, one that supports the factthat a bird is present and another that supports the fact that a ier is present.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 146Note that the target site could also support the fact that a ier is not present.Birds =) F lierscbcb Ccbcbs1 c7! s2 j= :F liersIf I watch a bird eating breadcrumbs in a park, then I am in a situation in which aier is present; through the information channel, the bird is classiable as a ier.However, I am also in a situation in which a ier is not present, as the bird iseating breadcrumbs and not ying. The constraint is informative because thereare situations which exist in the signaling relation that support the right types,but it is not sound since there are some situations in which birds are present whichare not also situations in which iers are present.It is perhaps not customary to assume that situations can be inconsistent, how-ever, to provide a proper interpretation to inheritance reasoning it seems essentialto allow this, at least in the weak form of inconsistency advocated here. This isbecause all of the reasoners in the family considered here adopt the position thatall direct links in a network are supported as permitted paths by the reasoners.This means that networks containing directly conicting links contain inconsistentinformation. An advantage of inheritance reasoning over other systems of logic isthat the impacts of inconsistency on reasoning are localized. Since people arguablysometimes maintain inconsistent beliefs even after becoming aware of the incon-sistency, it is important to be able to maintain inconsistent situations as potentialparts of models (cf. Braisby, Franks, & Hampton, 1994). Weak inconsistency isallowed in this model in that it is not required that there be agreement betweenthe direct typing of sites s j= T and the typing of a site that results from itsparticipation in some channel s Cj= :T . That is, a certain constraint may conveyinformation about some token that is inconsistent with the way the token actuallyis. The network depicted in Figure 5.1 is more complex than the case of yingbirds since it represents two contradictory defaults. If both of the constraintsthat interpret those defaults are informative, then there can be situations whichsupport the type B which signal other situations that support both the type Dand the type :D, but necessarily there are some situations that carry D and somethat carry :D (those situations are not necessarily the same ones). However, it
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 147
b c dFigure 5.1: An Inconsistent Network.is possible to assign an interpretation to networks such that we would want toassert that the model includes inconsistent sites. Let b and d both be types oflinguistic information.2 Let the sites be utterance situations, and let the channelsbe the ones pertaining to the constraints of English grammar. Now, the utteranceof the sentence, \The examples is convincing," conveys conicting informationabout the number of the subject. The NP \The examples" on its own suggeststhat the subject of the sentence is plural, while the VP indicates that the subjectshould be singular. Here we have an utterance situation in which the subject isboth singular and plural, by the constraints of English grammar. However, theinconsistency is localized, since other semantic contents of the sentence can beprocessed without diculty.Denition 36 A full model of a network is informative if all of its constraintsare informative, and it is sound if all of its constraints are sound.5.2.2 DefeasibilityInformation does not always ow as it seems it should. The idea of channel theoryis that channels are still able to model regularity in the world, even when infor-mation ow does not correspond to that regularity in particular circumstances.The following denitions are introduced to model the conditions that arise withthe interpretation of defaults.Denition 37 A channel type C j= T1 ) T2 has a pseudosignal s1 i 9 c j= Cand s1 j= T1 but there is no s2 such that s1 c7! s2.Denition 38 A constraint T1 ) T2 has a pseudosignal s1 i the constraint isthe type of a channel c which has s1 as a pseudosignal.2Ignore the node c for the present example.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 148Given a constraint on situation types, a pseudosignal to that constraint canbe understood as an event of the type antecedent to the constraint which is notconnected by that constraint to any event which is of the consequent type. Someother event out there may be of the consequent type, but the pseudosignal is notconnected to it. For example, Opus the penguin is a pseudosignal for the constraintthat Birds y, even if on some particular occasion Opus is ying on a Pan-Amjet. Though the second situation supports the right type, it is not connected viaa channel of the type, Birds y.Proposition 2 A sound channel can have pseudosignals.Proof: Let M = hS; T; C; j=;); 7!i; S = fs1g, T = fT1; T2g, C =fc :T1 ) T2g, j== fhs1; T1ig, )= fhT1; T2ig, 7!= fg. In this model,s1 is a pseudosignal to c. But, c is also a sound channel by vacuoussatisfaction of Denition 34. 2Intuitively, a sound channel has a pseudosignal in any site that is classied by atype that predicts that the site should be a signal, but which is indeed not a signalto any target through the channel.Proposition 3 An informative channel can have a pseudosignal.Proof: Let M = hS; T; C; j=;); 7!i; S = fs1; s2; s3g, T = fT1; T2g,C = fc :T1 ) T2g, j== fhs1; T1i; hs2; T2i; hs2;:T2i hs3; T1i; g, )=fhT1; T2ig, 7!= fhs1; s2; cig. In this model, c is informative sinceit participates in a signaling relationship that is grounded by sites inthe model (s1 c7! s2, s1 j= T1 and s2 j= T2). But, also, s3 j= T1 thoughno other site is signaled by s3; thus, s3 is a pseudosignal for c. 2An informative constraint can have a pseudosignal for the same reasons that soundconstraints can. In the above proof it is shown that the channel can be informativebecause of s1 and s2 while having a pseudosignal in s3.An example of a pseudosignal is given in (5.1).T 1 =) T 2(5.1) cbcbs1
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 149The nature of defaults is that they have exceptions.Denition 39 A channel type C j= T1 ) T2, has an exception s1 i there existsc j= C and there are tokens s1 and s2 such that s1 c7! s2 and s1 j= T1 but s2 6j= T2.An exception is closely related to a pseudosignal in that it is a point of breakdownin classications. In an exception to a constraint, there is an event that is of thetype antecedent to the constraint, and it is connected by a channel that supportsthe type of the constraint to another event, but that connected event fails to beof the consequent type. For example, Jonathan the seagull that I watched eatbreadcrumbs in the park is a signal for the constraint that Birds y, and can beconnected via a channel which supports that constraint to a situation in whichJonathan is eating, one which does not support the consequent type of ight.Examples of two sorts of exceptions are shown in (5.2 & 5.3). In both cases, ifthe channel type C is otherwise informative then s2 Cj= T 2, even though s2 6j= T 2.Since any target of a channel is classiable in terms of the consequent type inthe constraint that the channel type supports, it is not necessary to indicate thatclassication (e.g. s2 Cj= T 2) in diagrams like (5.2 & 5.3).T 1 =) T 2(5.2) cbcbs1 c7! s2T 1 =) T 2cbcbs1 c7! s2 j= :T 2(5.3)Proposition 41. A signal can be an exception.2. A sound channel cannot have exceptions.3. An informative channel can have exceptions.A key feature of default inheritance reasoning is that the meaning of certainlinks is mitigated by the surrounding network. For instance, exceptions to certain
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 150defaults arise from conicting defaults. The next denitions articulate importantrelations that can exist between a constraint and other accepted constraints.Denition 40 A channel type C j= Ti ) Tj, has a dual signal sk i C is infor-mative and there exists an informative channel type C 0 which supports the typeTk ) :Tj and sk j= Tk.Denition 41 A constraint Ti ) Tj has a dual constraint i the constraint is thetype of a channel c which has sk as a dual signal.Dual constraints can be understood in classical logic terms as implications whichcan both be true at the same time only when one of them is vacuously true. Foran informative constraint to have a dual is for there to be another informativeconstraint that carries the opposite information, even though it may be informa-tion about dierent source and target tokens. A graphic depiction of classicationrelations involved in a pair of dual channels is given in Figure 5.2.



















Figure 5.2: Sites s1 and s4 are Dual Signals.Proposition 51. A sound channel can have a dual signal.2. An informative channel can have a dual signal.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 151A condition stronger than the existence of dual signals is the existence ofantisignals. A pair of antisignals is a pair of dual signals that share targets.Denition 42 A channel c j= Ti ) Tj, has an antisignal sk i sk is a dual signalfor C through C 0 and any target relative to C is also a target relative to C 0.Denition 43 A constraint Ti ) Tj has an antisignal sk i the constraint is thetype of a channel c which has sk as an antisignal.An antisignal to a constraint is something which conveys contradictory informa-tion about target tokens. An antisignal is the source of information which mayow through a completely dierent sort of channel that some token has morethan one and conicting types. An example of a set of classications that estab-lishes an antisignal is given in (5.4). Let c1; c2; c3 j= C and c4; c5; c6 j= C 0; thus,C j= T 0 ) T 0 and C 0 j= T 1 ) :T 0. Both C and C 0 are informative: C is becauses0 j= T 0, and C 0 is because s00 j= :T 0, so s4; s5; s6 are dual signals to C and s1; s2; s3are dual signals to C 0. Since s0; s00 and s000 are targets to both C and C 0, s4; s5; s6are antisignals to C and s1; s2; s3 are antisignals to C 0. Note that s0; s00; s000 Cj= T 0and s0; s00; s000 C0j= :T 0.T 0 =) T 0 T 1 =) :T 0cbcb cbcb cbcbs1 c17! s0 s4 c47! s0 j= T 0T 0 =) T 0 T 1 =) :T 0cbcb cbcb cbcbs2 c27! s00 j= :T 0 s5 c57! s00T 0 =) T 0 T 1 =) :T 0cbcb cbcbs3 c37! s000 s6 c67! s000
(5.4)
Proposition 61. A sound channel cannot have an antisignal.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 1522. An informative channel can have an antisignal.A special case of interpretation of conicting defaults arises when it turns outthat the same object is classied in inconsistent ways by these defaults. In channeltheoretic terms this works out with a site supporting conicting types throughopposing channels. The two channels are called antichannels. Antichannels arethe channels employed by signals that are their own antisignals.Denition 44 An informative channel C j= T1 ) T2 has an antichannel C 0 iC 0 j= T1 ) :T2 is informative and all si j= T1 that are antisignals for C 0 are alsosignals for C.Proposition 7 A sound channel cannot have an antichannel. An informative channel can have an antichannel.An example conguration of types and signals that constitutes an antichannel isgiven in (5.5). Let c1; c2 j= C and c3; c4 j= C 0. So, C j= T ) T 0 and C 0 j= T ) :T 0.Both C and C 0 are informative. The signals to C 0 are dual signals to C and viceversa. Since s0; s00 and are targets to both C and C 0, the signals to C 0 are alsoantisignals to C and also vice versa. However, the signals to C are the signals toC 0. Thus, C and C 0 are antichannels. As in (5.4), s0; s00 Cj= T 0 and s0; s00 C0j= :T 0.T =) T 0 T =) :T 0cbcb cbcb cbcbs1 c17! s0 s1 c37! s0 j= T 0T =) T 0 T =) :T 0cbcb cbcb cbcbs2 c27! s00 j= :T 0 s2 c47! s00(5.5)Denition 45 A model is strict if it is informative and if none of its channelshave antisignals or antichannels, and it is defeasible otherwise.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 1535.2.3 InferenceA natural channel theoretic interpretation of inference in classical nonmodal propo-sitional logic requires only a single token. Types correspond to sentences in thelogic. Conclusions from inferences can be looked up in the semantics in the typesassigned to a token. The sentence A  B is true i there is a constraint A) Bthat is the type of an identity channel on the single token. If the channel is sound,then if the token is of type A then the token will also be classied as B. This isessentially the idea of a redescription channel.Inference in inheritance networks with defaults is not classically valid. Thechannel theoretic model that is being sketched in this chapter oers a way toexplain both why it is not valid and why it is reasonable. As has been said,inheritance links are interpreted as informative constraints, and the existence ofa channel type that supports a constraint is sucient to classify target tokensrelative to the channel type with the type that is consequent to the constraint. Thechannels that underlie the constraints generally link distinct tokens. Informationthat some token is one way carries information about another token being someother way. Of course, token identity is possible, but the framework admits muchmore into its descriptive auspices. On the other hand, inference is performedusing inheritance as an ecient way of calculating properties of some object athand,3 and other objects whose properties are conveyed by constraints are notentirely relevant to an inference, although the properties possessed by those objectsare relevant. Inference in default inheritance networks is aptly interpreted bythe projection of types related to tokens via constraints (the types of targets)upon signaling tokens, analogously to the way an informative channel licenses aparticular classication of its target tokens. Thus, inference using the constraintBirds y when applied to the token Opus, which is a bird (and in the absenceof other constraints), leads to the classication of Opus as a Flier. Consider(5.6), with the assumption that s1 is a situation that contains Opus and that s2is a situation that contains Opus as well as ying birds; s2 Cj= Fliers as well ass2 j= Fliers, but also s1 C 1j= Fliers.4 This is distinct from a redescription channel3Assuredly, there are plenty of inecient inheritance reasoners available, but the system ofHorty et al. (1990) is polynomial.4Here C 1 is used informally to denote the inverse ow of information through a channel|this
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 154in which s1 and s2 would actually be the same token (5.7). This is true eventhough the constraint really means that some bird-situations are connected tocertain ier-situations. The room for error in projecting classications accountsfor the classical invalidity of default inheritance, but its reasonableness|apartfrom compact representation|is also arguable from the similarity to the model ofinference in the classical case. The purpose of inference using defaults is to avoidhaving to look up information in a table. In this case it would mean looking upthe Opus token in that related classication to see if Opus is ying in there, andsimilarly for any other object that one could try to reason about.Birds =) F lierscbcb Ccbcbs1 c7! s2(5.6) Celsius =) Fahrenheitcbcb cbcbs1 c7! s1(5.7)Denition 46 Let  = hS; T; C;!;); j=i be a system of constraints on a clas-sication domain. The leftward projection of an informative constraint T1 ) T2down a channel c of type C such that C j= T1 ) T2 upon a specic token so thatis a signal for the constraint yields a new classication and system of constraints,0 such that:1. S 0 = S; T 0 = T; C 0 = C;)0=)2. !0=! except for those elements of the signaling relation that use the channelc. Replace each triple hso; c; sii in ! with hso; c; soi in !0.3. j=0=j= except for those elements of the of-type relation that use sites and typessalient to the constraint projected upon the source. Specically, replace eachhsi; Tji such that hc; Th ) Tji is in j= and hso; c; sii is in !, with hso; Tji.The leftward projection given in Denition 46 formalizes the notion describedabove (see Seligman and Barwise (1993) for alternative forms of projections).Other forms of projection are possible, but this particular form is closer to in-tuitions at stake in modeling default inheritance reasoning. It is focused upon ais an abbreviation for a leftward projection which will be dened presently.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 155specic token so about which reasoning is performed. All of the types, tokens,channels, and constraints from the original classication remain in the projection,but the signaling and of-type relations change. The change in the of-type relationis the essence of the projection: types supported by a target relative to the channelthe constraint is projected along are supported by the source instead. Since theconstraint and channel remain, the leftward projection also redirects the signal-ing relation so that the former target is no longer signaled, but the source whichsupports the target's types is signaled.Denition 46 implements a psychologically plausible model of inference withone important exception: it transfers inconsistency about target tokens to theprojection. Although I have argued the necessity of modeling at least weakly in-consistent situations, a model of psychologically plausible human inference mustaccount for the overwhelming desire to rationalize inconsistencies. Channel the-ory provides a convenient mechanism for doing this. In the most extreme case,suppose there are two directly conicting constraints that have the same sourceand target tokens, and each of the constraints is the type of a distinct channel.As channel theory provides a theory of information ow, it allows the descriptionof one type \owing" by virtue of one channel, and the conicting information byvirtue of the other. However, at the target token, there are simply contradictorytypes. Inference which draws attention to the contradiction must admit a wayof rationalizing it: st j= T because of c and st j= :T because of c0. Eectively,the type of the relevant channel is invoked to explain the source of the informa-tion. Assuming a model for the type of a channel, it is possible to incorporaterationalization into a projection upon a source.Denition 47 Let  = hS; T; C;!;); j=i be a system of constraints on a classi-cation domain. The rationalized leftward projection of an informative constraintT1 ) T2 down a channel c such that c j= C and C j= T1 ) T2 upon a specic to-ken so that is a signal for the constraint yields a new classication and system ofconstraints, 0 such that:1. S 0 = S;C 0 = C;)0=)2. !0=! except for those elements of the signaling relation that use the channelc. Replace each triple hso; c; sii in ! with hso; c; soi in !0.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 1563. j=0=j= except for those elements of the of-type relation that use sites and typessalient to the constraint projected upon the source. Specically, replace eachhsi; Tji such that hC; Th ) Tji is in j= where hso; c; sii is in!, replace hsi; Tjiwith hso; Tj ^ Ci.4. T 0 = T [ fC ^ Tjg for Tj such that C j= Th ) Tj, so c7! si and si j= Tj.An important property of the rationalized leftward projected classication isthat it is a coherent classication i the antecedent classication is coherent andthe channel does not support constraints that would be inconsistent if satised bythe same sites. The latter property means that if the channel c which is projectedalong supports both T3 ) T and T4 ) :T then the rationalized leftward projec-tion will contain an inconsistency (subject to the conditions on the token projectedupon). Because, the information about which channel supplies the projected typeis part of the type that actually gets assigned to source sites, inconsistent typingis never projected from targets. Inconsistencies that are projected in the leftwardprojection simpliciter are rationalized away by invoking the `types' of the channelsinvolved. Instead of s j= T and s j= :T , there is s j= T ^ C 0 and s j= :T ^ C 00.This classication is consistent, but the points of inconsistency are derivable fromthe rationalization.A semantics for default inheritance reasoning must predict exactly which typesshould get projected upon source tokens by virtue of the constraints they underlie.Clearly, since inference is conducted over long paths of links and not just singlelinks, the composition of channels is important to the denition of a model for aspecic inheritance reasoner. Section 5.3.2 will dene the conditions on channelcomposition that dene the closure of a set of informative constraints interpretingan inheritance network. The classication obtained by projecting types along thechannels in the closure will constitute a model for default inheritance reasoning.5.2.4 An Example Application: Feature StructuresBefore proceeding to dene the additional channel theoretic concepts requisite tothe semantics of inheritance reasoning, it is useful to put the tools to an alternativeuse rst. This section will briey sketch a model of typed feature structures usingessentially just the tools outlined so far. The aim is to be able to use bits of


































Figure 5.3: Unicationthe structure behind the utterance, \The artist blow glass." Presumably there isaccess to the consistent information contained in the event, and when the event isembedded in a larger event for which the number of people in question is at stake,the other facts are also available to determine or decide by default whether one
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 158or more person is involved in the glass blowing, but it is known that some glassblowing is going on somewhere.Classical Feature StructuresCarpenter (1992, p.36) presents classical feature structures (assume Feat, a set offeatures, and Type, a set of types):A feature structure over Type and Feat is a tuple F = hQ; q; ; iwhere: Q: a nite set of nodes rooted at q (see below) q 2 Q: the root node  : Q! Type: a total node typing function  : FeatQ! Q: a partial feature value function.Let F denote the collection of feature structures.The usual way to conceptualize a feature structure is as a labeledrooted directed graph where Q is the set of nodes,  determines the labelson the nodes and where there is an arc from q to q0 labeled by f , whichwe write as q f! q0 if (f; q) = q0. In general we write:q :  f! q0 : 0(5.8)if there is an arc labeled with f from q to q0, and the type assigned toq is  and to q0 is 0, or more formally, when (f; q) = q0; (q) =  and(q0) = 0.The notation is suggestive of the channel theoretic interpretation. Features willbe types of channels, instances of which connect nodes that are assigned typeseither directly or via the target classication that follows from the classicationof a channel type with a particular constraint ( Cj=).Subsumption in feature structures is dened in terms of graph morphisms, andunication is information conjunction. In a classical feature structures, unicationof two feature structures gives the least upperbound if one exists.An example of a feature structure in graph notation, also taken from Carpenter(1992, p.37) is given in Figure 5.4













Figure 5.4: An Example Feature StructureA Channel Theoretic InterpretationIn this section the same object is dened using channel theoretic notions fromearlier in the chapter. Nodes will turn into sites, and constraints yield the typesthat will model structure types. This presentation is related to the one givenby Vogel and Cooper (1994), however that work used a dierent formulation ofchannel theory. Channels model features. Let Type be a set of types, and let Featbe a set of channels.Denition 48 A feature structure of Type and Feat is a tuple F = hQ; q; ;; ; irelated to a classication domain hT; S; j=; 7!;=);?i in the following way: Q: a nite set of sites rooted at q (see below) q 2 Q: the root token A set of types T = Type[ =) A set of tokens S = Q [ Feat  : Feat  Q ! Q: a partial function from feature value pairs into valuesdened such that (f; q) = q0 i q f7! q0.  : Q! 2Type is a total classication function into sets of types, such that1. (q) = fg i q j= 2. 8q0 6= q;(q0) = f j 9q; f :q f7! q0, f j=  =)  and (q) = g.  : Q! Type is a partial classication function into types is dened such that8q; (q) = V((q)) if V((q)) is consistent, and is undened otherwise.Let F 0 denote the collection of feature structures.So, here, a feature structure is conceptualized as a set of connections among sites.In particular, sites are typed via the constraints that classify the features which
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 160connect the sites. The relationship between features and constraints correspondsroughly to the appropriateness relation between types and features in Carpenter'spresentation: F j= T ) T 0 i features like F are appropriate for feature structuresof type T and can have values of type T 0. Note that (q) = T if and only if thereexists a feature (channel) f j= F that is connected to q in a signaling relation suchthat q Fj= T . The  mapping is a partial function related to  but which neverclassies nodes inconsistently.The equivalent to Carpenter's (5.8) is:q j=  f7! q0 j= 0(5.9)which means that there is a channel f which connects q to q0, and the type assignedto q is  and to q0 is 0. However it is the typing of nodes that follows from theindicating relations that is important here: =) 0Ccbcb Ccbcbq f7! q0(5.10)As before, proper subsumption will be a morphism, and unication will be infor-mation conjunction.Denition 49 ?0 i  and 0 are incompatible.Figures 5.5 and 5.6 depict classication domains that model feature structuresfor the NUMBER feature. In the rst case, the value of NUMBER is of type Sing and inthe second case it is of type Pl. The dotted lines denote instances of the positiveof-type relation (NUMj= and NOUNj= ). The typing of the feature itself is not actuallydenoted, although the indicating relation that types the feature is depicted.Before dening unication, it is useful to illustrate how it works for feature-value pairs. The unication of feature-value pairs q f7! q0 and r g7! r0 will resultin a new classication which identies the tokens (q = r; q0 = r0; f = g). Theindicating relation in the result is the union of the indicating relations in each ofthe originals.Note that At-Kaci's (1984) formulation admitted inconsistencies at nodes butthen ruled them out via smashing to obtain bottom for the whole feature struc-ture. In this model it is useful to leave the inconsistencies in. It's possible to












s’sFigure 5.6: The Number Channel: Plurallook at just the restricted universe of consistent feature structures, but these areproperly contained in a hierarchy of inconsistent structures. However, it is neces-sary to dene a relative inconsistency ordering so that it is possible to refer to theminimally inconsistent structures.Here it is necessary to introduce a channel theoretic concept which was notpresented earlier; below are denitions for alternative sorts of parallel compositionof channels k.Denition 50 Parallel Composition A channel c is the parallel composition of c1 and c2 (c1kc2) i for all sitess1; s2 2 Q s1 c7! s2 i s1 c17! s2 and s1 c27! s2. A channel c is the consistent parallel composition of c1 and c2 (c1kc2) i forall sites s1; s2 2 Q s1 c7! s2 i s1 c17! s2, s1 c27! s2, and c1 j= T ) T 0 and c2 j=T ) T 0.






Figure 5.7: Restricted Classication of the Unication of Two Feature StructuresTo model classical feature structures, it is required that the unication of two fea-ture structures satisfy consistent parallel composition. But general feature struc-tures need only satisfy unrestricted parallel composition. The resulting structuresare potentially profoundly inconsistent. That is, each token can legitimately sup-port a host of types, some of them conicting. Figure 5.7 depicts a classication forthe inconsistent feature structure resulting from the unication of feature struc-tures represented in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6. Note that s0 is shown to supportboth of the conicting types Pl and Sing.5.2.5 Basic and Composite ChannelsThe example application of modeling feature structures in channel theory leads tothe need for composition of channels. The semantics of default inheritance rea-soning, rather than requiring variations of parallel composition, will make crucialuse of various serial composition operations. Barwise also provides a denitionof serial composition of channels; it is useful to see how this compares with thedenition required for the interpretation of inheritance:Denition 51 A channel c is the putative serial composition of n channels c1 : : : cn(c1; : : : ; ci; : : : ; cn) i for all sites s0; sn 2 S, s0 c7! sn if there are n 1 intermediate
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 163sites such that s0 c17! s1, . . . si ci+17! si+1 : : : sn 1 cn7! sn (1  i < n).Barwise actually refers to Denition 51 as serial composition simpliciter (and de-nes it instead as a binary operator), but given that this thesis requires a numberof dierent potential forms of composition, it is useful to distinguish putativecomposites from those actually to be included in a particular model. Denition 51generalizes to channel types in Denition 52.Denition 52 A channel type C is the putative serial type-composition of nchannel types C1 : : : Cn (C1; : : : ;Cn) i for all i, 1 < i  n and for each ci suchthat ci j= Ci there exists a putative serial composite c0 = (c1; : : : ; ci; : : : ; cn).Denition 53 Let c = (c1; : : : ; ci; : : : ; cn) be the putative serial composition ofn  2 channels such thatc1 j= T 1 ) T i; : : : ; ci j= T i ) T i+1; : : : ; cn j= T n 1 ) T n, then c j= T 1 ) T n.In what follows, various versions of serial composition will be more restrictedin applicability than putative serial composition and will each have analogousgeneralizations to composition of channel types.Given a composite channel c = (c1; :::; cn), it is handy to be able to refer tothe components of the channel fc1; :::; cng. It is also useful to dene the frontof a channel as the sequence hc1; :::; cn 1i and the back of a channel as the se-quence hc2; :::; cni of the n channels that comprise a composite. Given a sequenceof channels, hci; :::; cji, it is meaningful to talk of channels composed from thatsequence hci; :::; cji (i.e., c = hck; :::; ci; :::; cj; :::; cni, k  i  j  n), channels com-posed from behind hci; :::; cji (i.e., c = hci; :::; cj; :::; cni, i  j < n), and channelscomposed from the front of hci; :::; cji (i.e., c = hch; :::; ci; :::; cji, h < i  j).Consider the structure: hS; T; C; I; j=; 7!i. Let hS; T 0; C 0; I 0; j=0; 7!0i be the clo-sure of the former structure under putative serial composition. It is useful todene some simple concepts from these two structures.Denition 54 Let the channels in C be atomic or prime channels. The compositesin C 0   C are nonatomic.Denition 55 Let c be a channel; PRIMES(c) denotes the set of atomic channelsthat comprise c.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 164Denition 56 Let c and c0 be channels; c and c0 are site-equivalent i 8s1; s2,s1 c7! s2 if and only if s1 c07! s2.Denition 57 An atomic channel c j=T ) T 0 is basic i for any c0 which is anonatomic site-equivalent to c, c0 and c support mutually inconsistent constraints.Consider (5.11) with c1; c2 j= C; c3; c4 j= C 0; c5; c6 j= C 00.T =) T 0 T 0 =) :T 00cbcb cbcb cbcbs1 c17! s0 s0 c37! s2 j= T 00T =) T 0 T 0 =) :T 00cbcb cbcb cbcbs3 c27! s00 j= :T 0 s00 c47! s4T =) :T 00 T =) :T 00cbcb cbcb cbcbs3 c57! s4 s5 c67! s6T =) T 00cbcb cbcbs7 c77! s8
(5.11)
Let c0 = (c1; c3), c00 = (c2; c4); then, c0; c00 j= T ) :T 00 (the same as c5 and c6).Also, C4 = (C;C 0). The atomic channels are fc1; c2; c3; c4; c5; c6g, and c0; c00 arenonatomic. PRIMES(c0) = fc1; c3g; PRIMES(c00) = fc2; c4g. The nonatomicchannel c00 is site-equivalent to the atomic channel c5 but not to c6. Therefore, c6is basic but c5 is not (and c1 : : : c4 are all basic). Note that C 00 and C4 both havea dual signal in s7 through C 000.Also consider a notion that can be dened in channel theoretic terms as orig-inality. A channel is original if it is basic, or if it is not basic it is original if itsupports the ow of information that is not supported by its constituent channels.Denition 58 An atomic channel c j=T ) T 0 is original i1. c is basic, or
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 1652. c has a nonatomic equivalent decomposable into fc1 : : : cng such that for somei; 1  i  n, ci j= C and C has a dual signal.In (5.11), although c5 is not basic it has a nonatomic equivalent c00 which has adual signal through c7 in C 000. Thus, c5 is original. The channels c1 : : : c4; c6 are alloriginal because they are basic. The channel c7 is basic as well.Denition 59 An atomic channel type C is original if all c such that c j= C areoriginal.Denition 60 A channel c j=T ) T 0 is eectively original i1. c is original, or2. c is decomposable into atomic channels c1 : : : cn such that each ci is original.Denition 61 A channel type C is eectively original i each c such that c j= Cis eectively original.Eective originality extends the notion of original contributions of informationfrom primes to putative composites. In the denition of composition oered below,composition with eectively unoriginal channels is disallowed. This is sensible,because, by denition, the same information is already conveyed elsewhere if aputative composite is eectively unoriginal.Now it is possible dene the directness of a channel (denoted, jcj) as the numberof original channels in its putative composition; if c is a basic channel then jcj = 1.This admits the possibility of organizing channels into a specicity hierarchy. Theone most useful for interpreting permission in H90 follow:Denition 62 Given two channels c1 and c2, each of the type T1 ) T2 or T1 ) :T2,c1 is at least as direct as c2 (c1  c2) i jc1j  jc2j.Thus, one channel is more direct than another if it connects the same points andis composed from fewer original channels.5.3 A Model of Inheritance ReasoningLet   be an inheritance network. Let M be a tuple: hS; T; C; I; j=; 7!i; S is anonempty set of sites and T is a set of types. I is an interpretation function
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 166which assigns a unique type to each node in the inheritance network. For eachlink n1  ! n2 in   there is an informative channel type C 2 C of the typeI(n1)) I(n2), and for each link n1  != n2 there is exactly one informative channeltype C that supports the constraint type I(n1)) :I(n2). Note that there are noconstraints of the form: : I(n))  for any node n or any type  . For each channeltype C;C 0 2 C, if C supports a constraint whose consequent type is identical tothe antecedent of a constraint supported by C 0, then for some c j= C and c0 j= C 0there exists a site s which is a target to C and a source to C 0. There are no otherchannels in M . A model of inheritance reasoning over   is given by M 0, a tuplehS 0; T 0; C 0; I 0; j=0; 7!0i derived fromM via the closure under the appropriate versionof serial composition of channels (to be dened in the course of this section), withthe assumption that no target to a channel is also a target to a channel composedfrom it. A path  through   is supported by a particular reasoner if and onlyif I( rstnode())) I( lastnode()) is a constraint supported by an informativechannel type C 2 C in the corresponding closure.Proposition 8 Given an inheritance network  ,  is a positive path in   if andonly if there exists an informative channel C such thatC j= I( rstnode())) I( lastnode()) in M 0, and  is a negative path if andonly if there exists an informative channel C such thatC j= I( rstnode())) : I( lastnode()) in M 0.Proof: (For , a positive path; the proof for negative paths is symmetric.) Suppose  is a path in  ; then each link  in  has an informativeatomic channel type C in M supporting the constraint:I( rstnode())) I( lastnode()). Thus, if  is a direct link thenC j= I( rstnode())) I( lastnode()) is in M 0 trivially. If  is acompound path, then by the construction ofM there is an intermedi-ate site to each channel type such that the putative serial compositioncan be formed. Thus, if  is a positive path thenC j= I( rstnode())) I( lastnode()) is in M 0, and C is informa-tive. Suppose C is an informative channel type that supports the constraintI( rstnode())) I( lastnode()) in M 0. Then, by construction of
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 167M , if C is atomic then  is a direct link in  , and is thus a path in . If C is not atomic, then it has a putative serial decomposition intoatomic channel types corresponding to the links in the chain forming. Since there is no constraint of the form: : I(n))  for any noden or any type  ,  must be a well-formed path in  . 25.3.1 RedundancyProposition 9 Given an inheritance network   without directly conicting linksand an inheritance model M 0 = hS 0; T 0; C 0; I 0; j=0; 7!0i closed under putative serialcomposition, a link  2   is topologically redundant i I( rstnode())) I( lastnode())is a constraint supported by an informative channel type C 2 C, and C is not basic.Proof: If  is redundant with respect to a longer path  then  and  havethe same polarity and:1. rstnode() = rstnode()2. lastnode() = lastnode()By construction of M 0, each link in  is interpreted by an infor-mative constraint which is supported by a channel type in C, andI( rstnode())) I( lastnode()) is supported by the channel typeC. Also by construction of M 0, for each pair Ci; Ci+1 1  i < n,where Ci supports the constraint I( rstnode(i))) I( lastnode(i))for i, the i-th link in , there exists ci; ci+1; s; si; si+1 such that ci j= Ci,ci+1 j= Ci+1 and si ci7! s and s ci+17! si+1. Therefore, a putative serialcomposite C exists supporting the constraint:I( rstnode())) I( lastnode()), but because of the constraints (1and 2) above,C j= I( rstnode())) I( lastnode()). Therefore, c j= C has anonatomic equivalent in c j= C; hence, c is not basic. If I( rstnode())) I( lastnode()) is a constraint supported by aninformative atomic channel type C 2 C, and C is not basic, thenthere exists c0 j= C 0 which is a nonatomic site equivalent to c j= C
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 168
    - - - -PPPPPPPqaaaaaaa* HHHHHH *

a c d ebc1 c2c3 c4 c5
c6c7
Figure 5.8: A Network with 7 Atomic Links, 5 Basic Links, 6 Original Links.and the constraints supported by c&c0 are mutually compatible. Theconstruction of M 0 was based on the smallest set of channel typessatisfying the assumptions (about channels of those types, signalingrelations they participate in, and constraints they support), and thereare no nonatomic channels in M . Thus, if there is a nonatomic chan-nel C 0 in M 0 it exists because it is the putative serial compositionof channels from M which were derived directly from  , so theremust be a path  such that C 0 j= I( rstnode())) I( lastnode()).Similarly, if the atomic channel C in M exists, it is from the directinterpretation of a link 0 in  . Then, if c j= C and c j= C 0 are site-equivalent it is because the endpoints of 0 and  coincide. From theinterpretation function, and the fact that the constraints supportedby the two channels are mutually compatible, this actually meansthat the shared sites are classied by identical types. If 0 is a directlink whose endpoints coincide with those of  then trivially the nodesof 0 are a subset of those of . Therefore, 0 must be topologicallyredundant with respect to . 2It is easiest to understand the denitions of basic channels and of original chan-nels given above, in terms of the network topologies that they interpret. Considerthe graph from Figure 5.8. The network in this gure is labeled with channeltypes that interpret those links. The links ac and ce are interpreted by nonbasicchannel types, and the rest are basic. The link b=d is interpreted as original sincethe node c oers a dual signal to c2, and the link ce is original since b yields a dualsignal for c5, but the link ac is not original.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 1695.3.2 Interpreting Permitted PathsJust as there is assumed to be a channel theoretic constraint underlying each linkin an inheritance network, there is also assumed to be a composite constraintunderlying each of the permitted paths in a network. Since permitted paths aredened by the exact specications of the reasoning algorithm, this means that thechannel theoretic interpretation of an inheritance network also provides an inter-pretation to the exact reasoning mechanism applied to that network. For instance,the denition of channel composition that is given in Denition 63 guarantees thatcomposite channels exist for only those paths that are not preempted (by the H90reasoner).Restricted Skepticism, O-Path PreemptionFinally, a denition of serial composition takes these notions into account. Theserial composition of two channels can be formed as a channel if an intermediatesite exists that supports the right types and if no more direct channel spans the twocomposed channels forming an antisignal to their composition; since this denitionis particular to a model of H90 it is called H90 serial composition.Denition 63 A channel c j=T ) T 0 is the H90 serial composition of c1 j=T ) T 00and c2 j=T 00 ) T 0 (c1;c2) i1. c is the putative composition of c1 and c2 where c1 is an original channel oran eectively original H90 serial composite and c2 is original, and2. for any antisignal s through a putative channel ci there exists a channel cjthrough which s is a antisignal and a channel cy supporting the same constraintas c, such that the following conditions are satised:(a) PRIMES(ci) \ PRIMES(cj) 6= ;(b) PRIMES(cj) \ PRIMES(cy) 6= ;(c) cy  cjThe idea behind this restricted serial composition is that it is the completeinterpretation of o-path preemption in H90. Essentially, there is no compositechannel underneath paths composed from redundant links. Redundant links areunoriginal channels. Note that the cy mentioned in this denition could in fact
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 170be the putative composite c itself. If this occurs in the model of an inheritancenetwork, then it is an instance of on-path preemption. Allowing cy to be distinctfrom c in its composition provides an interpretation to o-path reasoning. Notethat the condition on non-empty intersection between the putative composite andantisignal channel (PRIMES(cj) \ PRIMES(cy) 6= ;) can be equivalently expressedin terms of set dierences5 in the following way:PRIMES(cj)nPRIMES(cy) 6=PRIMES(cj)(5.12)The equation in (5.12) indicates just that the prime channels in an antisignalingchannel that are not in a channel of the original type cannot be the entire set ofprimes in the antisignaling channel: there must be an intersection. Expressingthe intersection constraint in this way will be useful for later denition of on-pathpreemption.For a given network  , assume the existence ofM andM 0 as constructed before.Let MH90 be the closure of M under H90 serial composition; MH90 constitutes amodel of reasoning in H90 over  . That is, if  is a positive path in   permitted byH90, then c : I(rstnode())) I(lastnode()) is an informative channel in MH90,and if  is a negative path in   permitted by H90, then c : I(rstnode()) ):I(lastnode()) is an informative channel in MH90. Moreover, if c : )  is aninformative channel in MH90 then a path  in   supports that conclusion underthe reasoning denitions of H90.Proposition 10 Given a network  , if a negative path  in   is o-path preemptedby a positive path 0 then in M 0( ) there exists channel types C, C 0 (where possiblyC = C 0) and C 00 as well as a site s which is an antisignal to all three, where C j= I( rstnode())) I(: lastnode()), C 0 j= I( rstnode())) I(: lastnode()) and C 00 j= I( rstnode(0))) I( lastnode(0)),with c j= C, c0 j= C 0 and c00 j= C 00, and where the following conditions are satised:1. PRIMES(c) \ PRIMES(c0) 6= ;2. c00  c05Recall the denition of the set dierence operator n, A nB = fx : x 2 A; x 62 Bg.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 171Proof: Suppose the negative path  (=y) is preempted by the positivepath 0 (0y) in   using an o-path preempting reasoner. Then thereexists a positive link x  ! y and a positive path 00 in   such that1. firstnode() = firstnode(00),2. lastnode() = lastnode(00),3. x occurs in 00, and4. x 6= lastnode(00).The construction of M 0 provides that there exists:{ C j= I( rstnode())) I(: lastnode()),{ C 0 j= I( rstnode())) I(: lastnode()) (where potentially, C =C 0), and{ C 00 j= I( rstnode(0))) I( lastnode(0)).as well as c00 j= C 00.1. Suppose  6= 00.Since  and 00 coincide at endpoints and are both positive, thenboth can be extended by the last link in . Thus, there existdistinct negative paths: 0=y and  = =y. Then by constructionof M 0 there exist C and C 0 as described above and C 6= C 0 whichsupport the same constraint. Since 0=y and =y have their last linkin common, there exist c j= C and c0 j= C 0 such that PRIMES(c) \PRIMES(c0) 6= ;.Because  is preempted by x  ! y and x occurs as a node in 00at some node that is not lastnode(00) or rstnode(00) (if it wererstnode(00) then  = 00). Thus, 00 must be a compound pathand 00 and 0 coincide up to the node x. From x, 0 has just thelink x  ! y and 00 has one more positive link. Recall that 00 canbe extended by the negative link (the last link in ). Thus 00=y hasstrictly more links than 0; therefore, in M 0, c00 has strictly feweroriginal links (if they were not original a dierent, more direct,channel would have been under consideration since a dierent pathwould have been at issue in the network) than c0, so c00  c0.2. Suppose  6= 00. Then C = C 0.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 172The proof is much the same as above except that x can be the rstnode of 00, as in the case of a preemptive link that spans the entirepath it preempts. In that case, it is obvious that the correspondingchannel types C 00 and C 0 are such that C 00 is more direct. 2The symmetric case of preemption of positive paths by negative paths alsoholds. Note that Proposition 10 does not include an only-if condition. That isbecause it is based on M 0 rather than MH90. In MH90, the only-if condition holdsas well. Essentially, Proposition 10 means that if a path is preempted then in theinterpretation closed under putative serial composition, the corresponding chan-nel type is the less direct channel of conicting channel types. Also note that theconditions on the conicting channel types do not exhaust those of the `conictsthat matter' clause of Denition 63. Consider a pair of conicting channel typesC j= T ) T 0 and C 0 j= T ) :T 0 in M 0. If they satisfy the constraints in Propo-sition 10 with cj j= C and cy j= C, and additionally PRIMES(cj) \ PRIMES(cy)6= ; then the corresponding conicting paths  and 0 in   share only their end-points. If C and C 0 are not in M but are in M 0 then they are putative serialcomposites, and thus  and 0 are compound paths. This means that the neitherpath is permitted, and that clause of Denition 63 prevents either putative serialcomposite from being an H90 serial composite. Thus, neither channel type is inMH90. H90 serial composition is a binary operator (just as is path constructionin H90), which assumes that the rst channel type is either original, or an H90composite (thus, a channel type fromMH90 and not justM 0), and that the secondchannel type is original. This entails that if a channel type C is in MH90 (and notin M) it corresponds to a path in   composed of a permitted path extended bya single link where the resulting path is neither preempted nor conicts with anypath. Therefore, Proposition 11 holds.Proposition 11 Given an inheritance network  ,  is a positive path in   if andonly if there exists an informative channel C such thatC j= I( rstnode())) I( lastnode()) in MH90, and  is a negative path if andonly if there exists an informative channel C such thatC j= I( rstnode())) : I( lastnode()) in MH90.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 173As in Chapter 4, modications to the basic denition which provides an inter-pretation to the H90 system can be provided to create interpretations for the otherpossible modes of reasoning. Recall that the H90 system is restrictedly skeptical(hence skeptical and not credulous), utilizing o-path preemption, and exhibitingstability when faced with topologically redundant links.Fully Skeptical ReasoningDenition 63 proered an interpretation for restricted skeptical reasoning. Asdescribed in Chapter 2, restricted skepticism is manifest in relation to nested am-biguities in an inheritance graph. Essentially, a fully skeptical reasoner avertsconclusions when putative paths conict; restricted skepticism requires that sub-paths of putative paths themselves be permitted before accepting the longer pathsas potential conicts. It is easily seen that the interpretation given here addressesthis by distinguishing putative composition from H90 serial composition. Thus, toachieve an interpretation for fully skeptical reasoning it is necessary to just relaxthe restrictions on H90 serial composition. The result is stated in Denition 64 inwhich the rst condition on channel composition is made nonrecursive.Denition 64 A channel c j=T ) T 0 is the H90 fully skeptical serial compositionof c1 j=T ) T 00 and c2 j=T 00 ) T 0 (c1;c2) i1. c is the putative composition of c1 and c2 where both channels are eectivelyoriginal, and2. for any antisignal s through a putative channel ci there exists a channel cjthrough which s is a antisignal and a channel cy of the same type as c suchthat the following conditions are satised:(a) PRIMES(ci) \ PRIMES(cj) 6= ;(b) PRIMES(cj) \ PRIMES(cy) 6= ;(c) cy  cjProposition 12 Given an inheritance network  ,  is a positive path in   if andonly if there exists an informative channel C such thatC j= I( rstnode())) I( lastnode()) in MH90FullSkeptic, and  is a negativepath if and only if there exists an informative channel C such thatC j= I( rstnode())) : I( lastnode()) in MH90FullSkeptic.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 174On-Path PreemptionBoth Denition 63 and 64 interpret o-path preemption in inheritance reasoning.O-path preemption allows one path to be preempted by the fact that anotherpath with the same endpoints and at least one link in common is also preemptedby a \more specic" path of a conicting type.6 On-path preemption denesspecicity in such a way that paths that have a diverging set of nodes cannotpreempt each other.Denition 65 A channel c j=T ) T 0 is the H90 on-path preemptive serial com-position of c1 j=T ) T 00 and c2 j=T 00 ) T 0 (c1;c2) i1. c is the putative composition of c1 and c2 where both channels are original oreectively original H90 serial composites, and2. for any putative channel ci through which there exists antisignal s to the pu-tative channel c, the following conditions are satised:(a) j PRIMES(ci) n PRIMES(c) j= 1(b) c  ciDenition 65 interprets on-path preemption since it does not consider the com-position that creates the channel c to depend on other channels cy of the sametype as c; thus, the existence of an interpretation for a path depends crucially ona channel underneath it that itself preempts any channels that convey antisignals.The essential fact of preemption is that it involves one path being more specicthan another conicting path|this is captured in the directness relation|andwhen the preemption is on-path it is entailed that the conicting path can dierby at most one link, or else there is simply an ambiguity and not a preemption.Proposition 13 Given an inheritance network  ,  is a positive path in   if andonly if there exists an informative channel C such thatC j= I( rstnode())) I( lastnode()) in MH90OnPath, and  is a negative pathif and only if there exists an informative channel C such thatC j= I( rstnode())) : I( lastnode()) in MH90OnPath.6The scare quotes are important because this is actually oering a structural denition ofwhat more specic means; it is not assuming that the conicting path is more specic for otherreasons.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 175CombinationsDenitions 65 and 64 each change just one parameter to interpret a version ofH90 with the corresponding reasoning method. However, it is of course possibleto combing fully skeptical and on-path reasoning, as in Denition 66.Denition 66 A channel c j=T ) T 0 is the fully skeptical, on-path preemptiveserial composition of c1 j=T ) T 00 and c2 j=T 00 ) T 0 (c1;c2) i1. c is the putative composition of c1 and c2 where both channels are eectivelyoriginal, and2. for any putative channel ci through which there exists antisignal s to the pu-tative channel c, the following conditions are satised:(a) j PRIMES(ci) n PRIMES(c) j= 1(b) c  ciInstabilityIt is dicult to nd a succinct label for reasoners that embody instability sincethey have been frowned upon since Touretzky introduced the inferential distanceordering to \correct" the shortcomings of shortest path reasoning when \redun-dant" links are added to a network. Using a shortest path reasoner, a network inwhich a denite conclusion can be reached, when augmented with links derivablefrom subpaths, ceases to yield denite conclusions. The inferential distance order-ing provides a way to identify which links are redundant in the sense of providingno more information than which can be derived from subpaths, and ignores them.However, this loses sight of the dierence between derived links and links thatdo genuinely represent original information not contained in longer paths. In thissection we provide an interpretation for H90 style reasoners which do not disre-gard the contributions of explicit links. Essentially, the dierence is a relaxationof the requirement that the component channels in a composition be original oreectively original. This form of composition is labeled literalist serial composi-tion to capture the intuition (in networks) that explicit links can be taken literallyas providing information not contained in derived links and (in channels) thatprime channels convey information that is not wholly captured by composites ofthe same type.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 176Denition 67 A channel c j=T ) T 0 is the literalist serial composition of c1 j=T ) T 00and c2 j=T 00 ) T 0 (c1;c2) i1. c is the putative composition of c1 and c2, and2. for any antisignal s through a putative channel ci there exists a channel cjthrough which s is a antisignal and a channel cy of the same type as c suchthat the following conditions are satised:(a) PRIMES(ci) \ PRIMES(cj) 6= ;(b) PRIMES(cj) \ PRIMES(cy) 6= ;(c) cy  cjCredulityFinally, note that all of the preceding denitions have given channel theoreticinterpretations to composition underneath skeptical reasoners. Skeptical reasonersrule out denite conclusions when faced with unadjudicatablely conicting paths.The corresponding channel theoretic interpretations have withheld the existence ofcomposite channels that would have composite antichannels. This section providesan interpretation for credulous reasoning. In credulous reasoning it is assumed thatin some extensions one of the conclusions is applicable and in other extensions,the other.Denition 68 A channel c j=T ) T 0 is the credulous serial composition of c1 j=T ) T 00and c2 j=T 00 ) T 0 (c1;c2) i c is the putative composition of c1 and c2, where both channels are original oreectively original serial composites.Note that Denition 68 is virtually equivalent to the the denition of putativeserial composition alone (see Denition 51) except for the restriction of eectiveoriginality which admits an interpretation for preemption into even credulous rea-soning. An interpretation of full credulity obtains by releasing that restriction aswell.
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 1775.4 ConclusionsChannel theory provides a formal framework which admits distinctions of negranularity attuned to the needs of providing semantics to the family of inheri-tance reasoners under consideration. The sanctioning of a path in a reasoner isinterpreted by the existence of an informative constraint supported by either anatomic or composite channel in the corresponding closure of the atomic model.In using inheritance reasoning to ask if something represented by some node hasa property represented by some other node the question is posed in terms of theexistence of a permitted path between the two nodes. If there is a path andit is positive, the object represented by rst node is assumed to have the prop-erty represented by the second node, and if the path is negative, then the objectis considered to have the antiproperty. In the interpretation provided here, theexistence of a path between the two nodes is interpreted as by the existence ofa natural regularity of the denoted kind. That is distinct from the question ofwhether the object being considered does indeed behave in accordance with thatnatural regularity. It could still be an exceptional object of some sort. To answerquestions about objects in the semantics, it is necessary to simply look at thetypes that classify it. In the case that certain types don't classify it explicitlythen it is possible to perform a leftwards projection of the types that the objectparticipates with in constraints (see x5.2.3). If leftwards projection simpliciter isused (in conjunction with H90 serial composition), the conclusions of skepticalinference are available. If, instead, rationalized leftwards projections are utilizedthen the model interprets the multiple extensions of credulous reasoning.This chapter has provided an interpretation of certain kinds of inheritance rea-soners in the family of path-based reasoners dened by Touretzky et al., usingthe tools provided by channel theory. In summary, the interpretation identiesthe default links of an inheritance network with channels that admit informationow. Paths permitted by reasoners are identied with composite channels in thecorresponding model. The restrictions on path permission imposed by particu-lar inheritance proof theories are modeled by restrictions on the composition ofchannels. To my knowledge, this is the rst time that a unied semantics for thisparticular family of reasoners has been presented. Past work has tended to eitherprovide a semantics to a particular system (Touretzky, 1986), or to work from a
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 178semantic framework to a particular inheritance logic whose proof theory approxi-mates reasoning in the desired models (Delgrande, 1988; Boutilier, 1989; Veltman,1994). An advantage of the channel theoretic approach is that in providing a uni-ed framework it facilitates argument about the intuitiveness of dierent prooftheories for inheritance, by giving their respective assumptions about conclusionsbased on topological considerations clear counterparts in the semantic model. Forexample, it identies the arguable counterintuitiveness of labeling some links ofin a certain topological conguration redundant and others in the same topolog-ical conguration preemptors by using an axiom, which indeed stipulates thatprecedence works in the opposite way than it usually does when a single link iscomposed in parallel with a composite link of the same polarity between the sameendpoints. This is the principle of redundancy.Other work in giving a semantics to inheritance reasoning explains proof the-oretic dierences in terms of dierent \process models" without actually statingwhat the dierent process models are (cf. Dimopoulos, 1992). By stipulating theactual conditions under which channels may compose, this work can be seen asgiving a \process model". However, the basic principle is that channels are ob-jects that oer exactly the right level of description for modeling inheritance prooftheory. And, although the model has its drawbacks, it does oer a successful rstpass at modeling inheritance reasoning; it provides a starting point for furtherexploration of channel theoretic models. For instance, there does seem to be hopethat this approach will permit modeling of cyclic networks as well as acyclic nets(the models constructed in this essay assumed, as did the proof theories addressed,that nets are acyclic), since channel theory has been used as a general theory ofinformation ow to characterize what is happening in situation semantics (Bar-wise, 1993), and situation semantics has been given applications in other puzzlesof circularity (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1987). This would be extremely usefulsince the proof theory of inheritance has not fully addressed circularity since nointuitive semantic interpretations have been available.Clearly, however, this chapter represents only the start of a proper analysisof the semantics of inheritance reasoning. The family of reasoners under con-sideration needs to be broadened by incorporating other axes of proof theoreticvariation. There is not room within the scope of this thesis to provide a semantics
Channel Theoretic Semantics for Inheritance Reasoning 179for all of the possible systems outlined in Chapter Four of this thesis, so extensionsto this work should address that omission. Additionally, this work would benettremendously from detailed comparison of other frameworks for giving semanticsto default reasoning, including minimal models accounts for inheritance networks(Boutilier, 1991, 1993), as well as semantics for other default systems like defaultlogics (Przymusinski, 1989), update semantics (Veltman, 1991, 1994), and Kripkesemantics for conditional logics (Delgrande, 1990) (see Chapter 2 for an outline ofthe approaches taken by Boutillier, Veltman and Delgrande). Given that inheri-tance networks oer a naive semantics for natural language generics, it would bequite useful to compare properties of the semantics provided here for inheritancereasoning to the model of natural language generics provided directly in channeltheory by Cavedon and Glasbey (1994). Default inheritance links make typical-ity a primitive, thus are arguably an instance of the predicate operator generallyor usually as considered, for instance, by (Schubert & Pelletier, 1987); however,inheritance reasoning is more concerned with chaining generics together into argu-ments than with isolating when it is appropriate to have an inheritance link as theinterpretation of some sentence. Given the way the semantics of reason is mod-eled in channel theory here, this means that the semantics of the natural languagestatements themselves, as in Schubert and Pelletier's (1987) example Dogs areintelligent (p. 429) are not based on there being \`suciently many' realizations"that make it true, but on the existence of an information channel which enablesthe classication of some situation as if the statement were true.7 As Cavedon andGlasbey (1994) point out as an advantage of their model of generics, this meansthat channel theoretic approaches can thus provide a coherent interpretation ofsentences like John shoots burglars which would be true if John carried a gun andintended to make use of it without ever the occasion actually arising. It wouldbe enlightening to establish the exact relationship between their model of genericsand the semantics of inheritance logics provided here.7In fact, it would be quite interesting to explore at greater length relationship between thechannel theoretic approach and Schubert and Pelletier's (1987), since theirs does make criticaluse of distinguishing extensions of predicates from sets of objects whose evaluation with respectto predicates yields true. That is, they say that a kind is in the extension0 of some predicate i`suciently many' instances of the kind are in the extension of the predicate (where extension0is the concept they are trying to dene). Thus, there is a similar use of types at work, one whichadmits defeasibility.
Chapter 6Discussion
6.1 SummaryThis thesis has addressed the problem of default inheritance reasoning from threemain angles: proof theory, psychological plausibility, and semantics. ChaptersTwo and Four addressed mainly proof theoretic aspects, but included complexityanalysis and implementations of inheritance reasoners as well. Chapter Threeoered an evaluation of the plausibility of inheritance reasoning as a particularmodel of human reasoning with natural language generics. Chapter Five presenteda semantics for inheritance reasoning within a channel theoretic framework. Thetask of this short chapter is just to recapitulate and critique the main points of thethesis. The chapter also suggests some promising ways to develop this researchfurther.6.2 Contributions6.2.1 Proof Theory, etc.Chapter Two introduced the main concepts from path-based default inheritancereasoning that were important throughout the thesis. The main properties of in-terest are defeasibility (of course), transitive reasoning, negative reasoning, pathpreemption, redundancy, degrees of skepticism and chaining direction. The chap-ter also provides a summary of the three main attempts in the literature to provide180
Discussion 181a semantics to inheritance, all motivated from the direction of the framework usedfor the semantics (Veltman, 1994; Delgrande, 1990; Boutilier, 1989). The resultis that both Veltman (1994) and Delgrande (1990) provide a semantics to only asingle inheritance system each, and both are only approximate because neither pro-vides the proof theory for the corresponding inheritance system that does reach alland only the conclusions entailed in the semantics. Boutilier (1989) does provideboth semantics and the corresponding inheritance reasoner, but again, only for oneparticular system. To my knowledge, there has not been a general semantics inwhich the variations among inheritance can be identied. The main contributionof this chapter to the literature is a re-assessment of the complexity results whichhave shown downwards reasoning to be intractable (Selman & Levesque, 1989,1993). In fact, these results pertain only to a double chaining variety of inheri-tance, not to a single chaining variety of downwards reasoning symmetric to theupwards chaining of H90. Chapter Four provides formal denitions for path-basedinheritance reasoning including the axes of variation named above. Some addi-tional systems are also presented, corresponding to alternative conceptions of thesort of conclusions that are reasonable to draw (some based on the data obtainedin the experiments reported in Chapter Three), including the introduction of aversion of downwards reasoning that is symmetric to H90's upwards chaining inputative path construction. To my knowledge, apart from previous collaborativework involving the author, this is the rst time that the proof theoretic possibilitiesoutlined by Touretzky et al. (1987) have been formally dened within the sameframework, admitting more exact comparison among them. Only initial steps inthe direction of actually making comparisons were taken, for instance, consideringthe relative number of paths preempted by the various systems. An advantage ofpresenting the reasoners within a uniform style of denition, in addition to makingit easier to locate the parameters that can be tweaked to yield dierent reasoners,is that it lends itself easily to actually implementing those systems in a similarlyparameterized fashion. Prolog implementations are presented and described inthis chapter. Using Prolog as the implementation language has the advantage ofmaking verication easier due to the close correspondence between the text of thecode and the text of the denition (subject to considerations like subgoal ordering,etc.).
Discussion 1826.2.2 Psychological PlausibilityChapter Three presents some informal experiments designed to test whether a de-feasible interpretation of implication provides a better t than classical logic doeswith human application of modus tollens. It has been seen that classical logic haslittle predictive power of people's response to those logic problems. If classicallogic is a good theory of reasoning competence, then people diverge considerablyin their performance. If classical logic oers a good theory of truth relations butis not applicable as a theory of rational competence, then other logics which pro-vide a closer match to peformance should be considered. This thesis adopts thelatter perspective, and Chapter Three proceeds to investigate specic features ofinheritance reasoning as an alternative competence model and the degree to whichpeople satisfy them. A wide range of subjects (some obtained using Internet access,a new and powerful mode of access to the general population (Laurent & Vogel,1994)) were each presented forty problems comprised of inheritance graphs, eitherin graphic notation or just as the equivalent set of sentences. The defaults wereexpressed about abstract categories to prevent uncontrollable interaction of worldknowledge. Mainly the results here are negative for the specic proof theoreticfeatures considered elsewhere in the thesis. However, the prediction that peoplewould make judgements that suggested they sanctioned conclusions correspond-ing to paths through a network (transitivity) was upheld. Preemption by a singlelink (not by paths) was also a rather good predictor, considering just the sub-jects that did not rate the relevant problems ambiguous. In fact, the majority ofsubjects rated complex problems indeterminate; for problems that might have dis-criminated, for instance, whether restricted or full skepticism is more appropriate,people overwhelmingly classied them as indeterminate. Additionally, it seemedthat path counting, a weighing of the raw number of arguments for or against aconclusion, actually supplied a better predictor of subject responses than mostextant proof theories. This is important, because it is direct evidence against theidea of identifying links as redundant based on topological conguration: if a `re-dundant' link contributes to an argument that sways the path count and, hence,the decision, then it cannot be semantically redundant.An interesting negative result is the suggestion that people reason with neg-ative defaults in a way wholly unpredicted by the literature, admitting denite





Figure 6.1: A  != B  ! Csibility creates a dierent situation from the crisp set-theoretic one. In any case,if people responded to concrete categories the way they did to abstract ones, theywould be inclined to infer from just the information in (6.1) that penguins typicallydo not have wings. Thus, the sense is that negativity propagates down a path. Itis not clear whether multiple negatives intensify or cancel each other. Note thatone implication of accommodating in the proof theory nonnal negative links in apath is that negative cycles (Gener & Verma, 1989) become problematic again. Itis interesting to consider the conduit metaphor for channels which interpret pathsin the semantics: there is a natural metaphor for negative links being the last linkin a path (negative information blocking the pipe) as well as for intensication(the negative features accumulating in the pipe), but less so for double-negative
Discussion 184cancellation.1 Of course, more work is required to ascertain whether that neg-ative typicality might really be the denial of a positive one. However, subjectswere provided with an option that did deny the positive assertion. Note that ifother information besides what is represented in (6.1) is known, then there is anadditional link which should have been represented in the network|presumablyone which asserts that penguins typically have wings. Thus, any example like(6.1), which is designed to show that chaining past negative links is a bad idea,actually works as such an example on the basis of a positive link that the readerknows should rightfully be present. On the other hand, the complementary set ofexamples are those in which it works out just ne to reach the negative conclusionas in (6.2).cat  != flier  ! winged(6.2)While this point was not made in the chapter itself, it is illustrative of the waythat the large body of data amassed in these experiments can be used to informinheritance proof theory, based on what people nd reasonable to conclude.6.2.3 SemanticsThe fth chapter of this thesis introduces the channel-theoretic wherewithal laterused to supply a semantics for a family of inheritance reasoners, a subset of thosedescribed in Chapter Two and Four. Channel theory is a new mathematical frame-work originating with work in situation theory (Barwise, 1989; Seligman, 1990;Barwise, 1991, 1993; Barwise & Seligman, 1994), as a way of expressing naturalregularities. Regularities are modeled with real objects, channels, that connect sit-uations about which information ows. The framework presented in Chapter Fivedevelops a version of the theory presented by Barwise (1991). A brief example inthat chapter shows how channels can be used as a start for a theory of nonclassicalfeature structures. The model developed within this channel theoretic frameworktakes advantage of the fact that generics and defaults are kinds of regularity anduses channels as a semantic object with which to model inheritance. Atomic chan-nels are distinguished from composite channels, and inheritance graphs are given1Of course, one should always be cautious about taking speculative metaphors as fact, but itis an interesting observation nonetheless.
Discussion 185atomic channel theoretic interpretations. Dierent inheritance reasoners licensedierent paths, and correspondingly dierent restrictions on the composition ofchannels yield semantics for those reasoners. A path is supported by a reasonerjust when there is a channel corresponding to that path in the model when closedunder the appropriate composition operator. Chapter Five presents a semanticsfor H90, an upwards chaining, o-path preempting, restricted skeptical reasoner.It also shows the forms of composition required to obtain the sort of downwardschaining introduced in Chapter Four, as well as on-path preemption, full skepti-cism, and alternative conceptions of `redundant' links. To my knowledge this is therst parameterized semantics for a family of inheritance reasoners. Dimopoulos(1992) has also considered the semantics of more than individual systems, but stip-ulated that `process models' underlie each without specifying what those processmodels are. I argue that channels provide exactly the right level of descriptionin order to specify a semantics for inheritance that makes the correspondencesbetween proof theory and semantics explicit.6.3 Further WorkIn all three categories where this thesis has made positive contributions to theliterature, there is scope for further development.6.3.1 Proof Theory, etc.Having spelled out a parameterized denition for one family of inheritance rea-soners, it would be extremely useful to broaden the coverage and to add greaterdepth of analysis. Chapter Four demonstrated how reasoners could be related toeach other in terms of properties like `tendency to indeterminacy' which Chap-ter Three revealed to be a feature of human reasoning with defaults. There arealmost certainly a great many other interesting properties to consider in this fash-ion, by identifying the minimal dierences that achieve mutation of one reasonerinto another. Possibly, more important properties are to be discovered, such as adeeper insight into the complexity issues and exactly what proof theoretic featurestake a reasoner from one complexity class into another. While Touretzky et al.(1987) have outlined a space of variations, and this thesis has expanded on that
Discussion 186and within a formal setting, it has not taken full advantage of the formalizationin relating the systems to each other. That is for future work, and this thesis hasset the foundations for it.6.3.2 Psychological PlausibilityA criticism that can be leveled against the investigation of the psychological plausi-bility of inheritance reasoning are about the actual administration of experiments.Internet experimentation did supply wide access to subjects, but coordinating ma-terials attuned to the technical requirements of networked subjects (for instance,whether or not graphics could be printed or viewed or only text les) and timingconstraints made it dicult to obtain a proper balance of subjects in each condi-tion. However, this just entailed employing a statistical test which is insensitive tothose imbalances under certain other conditions. Log linear analysis provided thatexibility, and tests of degree of association oered back-up checks on potentiallyspurious signicance. Moreover, as pointed out in the introductory chapter tothis thesis, there has not before Elio and Pelletier (1993) and Hewson and Vogel(1994) been an investigation of the psychological plausibility of inheritance rea-soning, so any advances in this area are a contribution to the literature. ChapterThree, unfortunately, did not oer room to analyze the mass of data accumu-lated in the experiments to the fullest degree that is possible. Cluster analysiswould unearth interesting information about styles of reasoning and consistencyof individual members within a partition. Any number of other investigations ofproblems in the data set could also be conducted as a preliminary step to morerened experiments. It did turn out that forty questions was excessively demand-ing of subjects' energy, especially without remuneration. Future work in this areashould use more constrained experimental instruments. However, an advantageof having used the extensive questionnaire and large sample sizes initially is thatthere is now a substantial body of data that can be explored to the greatest extentpossible to extract information about other proof theoretic issues that are repre-sented in the problem set. It is clear even from the example given in x6.2.2 thatthere is much to be gained by using empirical results to inform the proof theoryof inheritance.It is also clear that a great deal more research in this area is required to clarify
Discussion 187some of the results. Now that a methodology exists based on comparing responsesto minimal pairs of sets of defaults about abstract categories, this can be appliedfurther using questionnaires designed to test specic issues more fully. For in-stance, the eect of path length was investigated only up to three links|eventhough longer paths were represented in the problem set, they were complicatedfor other reasons and could not reliably inform comment on path length. Anotherissue, which has been addressed in a subsequent research proposal based on thismaterial, is the conjecture that the overwhelming tendency towards indetermi-nacy is a function of the task design. Recall that subjects were presented withsets of defaults and then asked to state about two of the classes (always the ex-treme endpoints X and Y in the graphic translation), whether, X are typicallyY , typically not Y , both typically Y and typically not Y , neither typically Ynor typically not Y or whether they didn't know. For analysis purposes the lastcategory was excluded and the two categories before that were grouped togetheras the general category `indeterminate'. In particular, there were no consequencesof having made a decision in a particular way, thus no pragmatic need to ratecomplex graphs as anything other than indeterminate. It would be quite useful insubsequent research to design a follow-on task so as to encourage more determinateanswers. A follow-on task which infuses the original task with goal-directednessmay reach dierent results, less indeterminacy. It would also be useful to explorenegativity (as described earlier) and indeterminacy in greater detail to ascertainwhether people really do entertain directly conicting defaults and the extent towhich negative classications are mistaken for denials of positive classications.In fact, having acknowledged that the inheritance literature could benet fromgiving greater attention to the way people actually reason with generics and de-faults, it becomes obvious that there is quite a lot more to be investigated thancan be enumerated in this nal chapter. Chapter Three of this thesis, followingon from the work of Hewson and Vogel (1994), has presented one methodologyfor exploring these issues (using abstract categories, pairwise comparisons of re-sponses, etc.), that complements the methodology proposed by Elio and Pelletier(1993) (who use real-world problems, focus on the prediction that one exception toa default is irrelevant to the applicability of the default to a distinct object, etc.).Subsequent research in this area will benet from having contrasting methods to
Discussion 188work with.6.3.3 SemanticsThe semantics for inheritance reasoning provided in Chapter Five needs to berelated in detail to other semantic approaches. To an extent, this is the task ofchannel theory since as a mathematical framework it is in part responsible forindicating its equivalences with other frameworks. But largely such equivalencesare apparent through specic tasks, like the one at hand in providing a semantics toa family of inheritance reasoners. The diculty in establishing equivalences followsfrom there being no other framework applied to the same task. While, for instance,possible worlds and minimal models have been used to give semantics to specicinheritance reasoners, the choice of inheritance reasoner was somewhat arbitraryand followed essentially from the decisions made in the modeling framework, andthey have not been extended to give semantics to other inheritance reasoners. Itremains possible that establishing an equivalence with respect to the inheritancereasoners that those systems give semantics to would, through the generality ofthe channel theoretic approach, suggest how to modularize those approaches aswell. Thus, there is real value in constructing a detailed comparison betweenthe modeling frameworks as applied to the task of giving a semantics to defaultinheritance reasoning.Further, as with the proof theoretic and empirical investigations reported inthis chapter, there is room to utilize the same framework to broaden the class ofinheritance reasoners under consideration. Moreover, given the work of Cavedon(1995), there is an additional foothold (beyond the one through Delgrande's (1988,1990) conditional logic and its application as a semantics for inheritance) on estab-lishing connections between channel theoretic models and conditional logics, andthence to other formal systems that model defaults. It would be a rather illuminat-ing exercise to tie the present work on giving a semantics to inheritance reasoning,since inheritance does oer a naive natural language semantics for generics, withwork that gives natural language generics semantics directly within channel the-ory (Cavedon & Glasbey, 1994) and with the literature on the natural languagesemantics of generics. This oers the promise of a coherent and complete pictureof the role of generics and reasoning and seems within reasonable reach.
Discussion 1896.4 Final RemarksThis thesis has been a tripartite investigation of path-based default inheritancereasoning. Clearly there is more to inheritance than just those systems consideredhere, but the systems chosen were not arbitrary. They are those which have beenproposed within the literature, related reasoners, and reasoners suggested by theway people respond to sets of abstract defaults. Moreover, their proof theory hasbeen interrelated through a parameterized set of denitions (implementations forsome of them supplied) as well as with a semantics that provides models for thefamily. The thesis urges strongly that further energy be devoted to empirical studyof the way people reason with generics with an eye towards developing inheritanceproof theory accordingly. This seems a much more sound methodology than relyingsolely on logicians' introspections about what is reasonable to conclude underparticular interpretations of an inheritance network. For example, a recurrenttheme in the thesis is that the status of `redundant' links should not be takenfor granted. It is a matter for speculation how the fruits of such research wouldreintegrate into the applications of inheritance reasoning and default reasoningin general that were outlined in the introductory chapter, but certainly it cannothurt existing practical applications if the result includes more ecient reasoningstrategies, and it can only benet theoretical applications that invoke inheritanceif a `more correct' or `best-t' system is identied.
Appendix APrecis of Veltman's \Defaults inUpdate Semantics"
A.1 IntroductionThis appendix provides a technical summary of Veltman's work in dynamic seman-tics (Klein et al., 1990; Veltman, 1994), which aims to provide a formal frameworkin which to understand the semantics of defaults and natural language generics.Veltman (1994) develops a complex system in an incremental fashion startingfrom a framework similar to that reported by Klein et al. (1990) for an analysisof defaults in terms of their dynamic eect as sequences of sentences applied toinformation states. This is a quite general framework in which updates, tests,and revisions (`downdates') can ultimately be accommodated, although the initialwork in this thread of dynamic semantics has postponed consideration of revisions.The gist of the approach is to model states by sets of atomic sentences, startingwith the powerset of possible sentences, and eliminating those subsets that areinconsistent with input sentences as processing moves along.A.2 Basic DenitionsDenition 69 Let W be the universe, the powerset of a set of atomic sentences.An expectation pattern on W is a preordering  of W :  is reexive and transitive.hw; vi 2   w  v. 190
Precis of Veltman's \Defaults in Update Semantics" 191Essentially, an expectation pattern does the work for Veltman that preferredmodels do for Boutilier or that the accessibility relation among worlds does forDelgrande. However, Veltman's is a more nely grained system in that the patterncan change from state to state, and within a state there can be a multiplicity ofexpectation patterns (because  is a function that assigns patterns to subsets ofsentences and not a single pattern to all subsets) so that dierent expectations canbe brought to bear depending on the subset of information under consideration.Denition 70 Let  be a pattern on W ; w is a normal world in  i w 2 W and w  v for every v 2 W ; n is the set of all normal worlds in   is coherent i n 6= .Denition 71 Let  be a pattern on W and s  W . w is optimal in h; si i w 2 s and there is no v 2 s such that v  w. mh;si is the set of all optimal worlds in h; si.Denition 72 Let  and 0 be patterns on W , and e  W .1. 0 is a renement of  i 0  ;2.   e =f hv; wi 2 j if w 2 e, then v 2 eg;   e is the renement of  with theproposition e.Given that the renement operator has such an important role in updatinginformation states, it is useful to illustrate its function with an example. Considerthe following atomic sentences: a; b; c.W = f; fag; fbg; fcg; fa; bg; fb; cg; fa; cg; fa; b; cgg(A.1)Enumerate the elements of W using the position in the ordering as a name foreach of the worlds; w0 = , w1 = fag and so on. Let  be a pattern on W , thereexive and transitive closure of the following relation:f hw0; w1i, hw0; w2i, hw0; w3i, hw1; w4i, hw1; w6i, hw2; w4i, hw2; w5i, hw3; w6i, hw3; w5i, hw4; w7i,hw6; w7i, hw5; w7i g,depicted graphically in Figure A.1. Also let e = fw2; w4; w7g and e0 = fw2; w6; w7g.
























Figure A.3: Another Renement on 
Precis of Veltman's \Defaults in Update Semantics" 193 Let  be a frame on W and d; e  W . The proposition e is a default in d id \ e 6=  and d  e = d.In the above example (Figures A.1, A.2 and A.3), clearly, neither e nor e0 is adefault in .Denition 74Given a frame  on W ,  is coherent i for every nonempty d  W , nd 6= .With these preliminary denitions in place it is possible to formalize the ideaof an information state.Denition 75 Let W be a model of the unverse, the powerset of the set of atomicsentences.1.  is an information state i  = h; si, and one of the following conditions isfullled:(a)  is a coherent frame on W , and s is a nonempty subset of W .(b)  is the frame h;i, where d = fhw;wijw 2 dg for all d  W .2.  = h; si is at least as strong as  = h0; s0i i s  s0 and d  0d0 for everyd  W .3. >, the minimal state, is the state given by h;W i, where d = d d for everyd  W .?, the absurd state, is the state h;i.Although Veltman (1994) does not dene the concept of a coherent informationstate, it seems that his intention is as follows:Denition 76  = h; si is a coherent information state i  is an informationstate where  is a coherent frame on W , and s is a nonempty subset of W .Veltman (1994, p. 34) denes:Denition 77 Let e1; : : : ; en be defaults in d1; : : : ; dn. A world w complies withfe1; : : : ; eng i w 2 ei for every i such that w 2 di(1  i  n).
Precis of Veltman's \Defaults in Update Semantics" 194Denition 78 Let  = h; si be a coherent information state and assume thate1; : : : ; en are defaults in d1; : : : ; dn, respectively.The set of defaults fe1; : : : ; eng applies within s i there is no d  s such thatnd  [1i<n(di  ei).Instead of saying `the set fe1; : : : ; eng applies within s', we often say `e1; : : : ; enjointly apply within s.'Veltman relates denitions 77 and 78 by giving a reformulated version of thedenition of the notion of a set of defaults applying within an information statein terms of a world's complying with each default. Here I make the relationshipis more explicit by detailing in Proposition 14.Proposition 14 Let  = h; si be a coherent information state. The set of de-faults fe1; : : : ; eng applies within s i for every d  s there is some w 2 nd suchthat w complies with fe1; : : : ; eng.Proof: Let  = h; si be a coherent information state.( Suppose that for every d; s  d there is some w in nd such thatw complies with fe1; : : : ; eng.Then, for every d; s  d there exists a w 2 nd such that 8i; w 2di ^w 2 ei. ) nd contains elements that render it not a subset of[1i<n(di  ei).) Suppose that the set of defaults fe1; : : : ; eng applies within s.Then there does not exist a d at least as large as s such thatnd  [1i<n(di  ei). So, 8d; s  d; 9w0 2 nd such that w0 62[1i<n(di  ei), which means that w0 2 di ^ w0 2 ei. 2This just means that a default in the domain d applies within its subdomains only when it applies in all the intermediate subdomains between s and d.Denition 79 Let  = h; si be a coherent information state and assume thate1; : : : ; en are defaults in d1; : : : ; dn.
Precis of Veltman's \Defaults in Update Semantics" 1951. Then fe1; : : : ; eng is a maximal applicable set in  i e1; : : : ; en jointly applywithin s, and for every en+1 and dn+1 such that en+1 is a default in dn+1, ande1; : : : ; en,en+1 jointly apply within s it holds that en+1 = ei, and dn+1 = di forsome i  n.2. A world w is optimal in  i w 2 s and w complies with a maximal applicableset of defaults. The set of optimal worlds is denoted by m.The whole point of all this is to give the machinery that species how tomove from one state to another on the basis of information obtained through theinterpretation of sentences that either oer additional facts, default rules, or testsof plausible conclusions. One more set of denitions (p. 32) is useful to facilitatethe discussion of the actual interpretation of sentences.Denition 80 Let W be as before.1.  is an information state i  = h; si, and one of the following conditions isfullled:(a)  is a coherent frame on W , and s is a nonempty subset of W .(b)  is the frame h;i, where d = fhw;wijw 2 dg for all d  W .2.  = h; si is at least as strong as  = h0; s0i i s  s0 and d  0d0 for everyd  W .3. >, the minimal state, is the state given by h;W i, where d = d d for everyd  W .?, the absurd state, is the state h;i.Since updates change the information in states, a sequence of sentences appliedin successive order to the minimal information state will yield states containingdistinct domains and sets of expectation patterns on them.A.3 Interpreting DefaultsThe machinery described in the preceding section gets put to use during the in-terpretation of sentences like normally  and presumably  in addition to basicpropositional sentences such as .
Precis of Veltman's \Defaults in Update Semantics" 196Denition 81 Let A be a set consisting of nitely many atomic sentences. As-sociate a language with A, LA0 that has A as its nonlogical vocabulary and for itslogical vocabulary the following (classical) operators: :;_;^ (as well as parenthe-ses).Let LA contain LA0 , along with the additional binary operator ; and unaryoperator presumably.A formula  is a sentence of LA i there are sentences  and  of LA0 suchthat  =  , or  =  ; , or  = presumably  .Asserted defaults are thus expressed using the binary connective: if  thennormally  is translated as  ; . Contingent propositions (normally ) areexpressed as  _ : ; . The sentence  ;  means that the proposition is a default in the domain of worlds picked out by  . Propositions from LA0 areinterpreted as follows:Denition 82 Let  = h; si be an information state. For every sentence  inLA0 , [] is determined as follows: if s \ [[]] =  then [] = ?, otherwise, [] = h; s \ [[]]i.The machinery introduced in the preceding section for rening expectationpatterns is invoked in this context to identify the right domains.Denition 83 Let  = h; si be an information state. [ ;  ] is determinedas follows: [;  ] = ? if [[]] \ [[ ]] =  or [[]][[ ]] is an incoherent frame. Otherwise, [;  ] = h[[]][[ ]]; siThese denitions detail the updates. Basic propositions rene the set of worldsconsistent with the known description, without changing the expectation patternsinside the frame. Defaults rene the expectation patterns without rening the setof worlds. The nonupdating test associated with a proposition like presumably  is specied in Denition 84 at the outset.Denition 84 Let  = h; si be a coherent information state [presumably  ] isdetermined as follows:
Precis of Veltman's \Defaults in Update Semantics" 197 If m \[[ ]] = m, then [presumably  ] = . Otherwise, [presumably  ] = ?.Default conclusions are tests in update semantics; while in other systems oneconcludes  by default, in update semantics one accepts the sentence presumably. This is the highest level denition that says when you can conclude presumably|if the most normal worlds with respect to the information state  are exactlythe worlds that contain  (where worlds are modeled as sets of sentences), thenthe sentence presumably  is true, and otherwise it is absurd. This is a dynamicalnotion of `truth' at work since the denition actually states that if the antecedentcondition holds then [ presumably ] = , which means that presumably  is asentence that performs a test on an information state such that if it's success-ful, you know that the information state supports the sentence, and otherwise itdoesn't.The signicance of this fact is important to emphasize: it means that defaultconclusions are dierent in kind from the default rules that license them.1 Simplefacts and default rules, when added to information states rene those states, butin update semantics, the default conclusion is a test of what is reasonable toconclude on the basis of an information state. It is not something that renesthe information state. This is quite dierent from the main body of literature ininheritance reasoning in which a great deal of the complications that are emergerelate to the implications of determining the closure of an inheritance networkby including in it some of the implicit links. This is, in fact, the problem ofstability. Update semantics takes a rather pragmatic approach to the problemsince the most obvious solution is indeed to dierentiate that which you concludeby default because you know the default and that which you conclude by chainingdefaults.
1Also, note that a default here isn't a default rule a ; b; rather, a default is a contingentproposition.
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